Mt Cabot (39) – ChildFund Australia’s Teams in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam

August, 2018

During my years with ChildFund Australia, I was privileged to work with great people in six countries.  In an earlier article, I wrote about the terrific Sydney-based International Program Team: Caroline, Jackie, John, Mai, Manasi, Maria, Ouen, Sanwar, Sarah, Richard, Terina … This time, I want to thank the teams in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam that did such great work to help children and their families overcome poverty.

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I’ve been writing a series of blog posts about climbing each of the 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall.  And, each time, I’ve also been reflecting a bit on the journey since I joined Peace Corps, 34 years ago: on development, social justice, conflict, experiences along the way, etc.

Last time I described how we built collective action for child rights into our program approach, beginning with an exciting pilot project in Cambodia.  It was our way of building a rights-based approach into our development work, and I think there were many valuable lessons we learned through that project.

Earlier, I described ChildFund’s Sydney-based International Program Team.  Now, in this blog article, I want to introduce our teams in Southeast Asia and the Pacific: the people I had the pleasure of working with, overseas, during those years in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam.  Great people, doing great work…

But first…

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In the previous article in this series, I described climbing Mt Waumbek on 28 August.  My plan was to get to the top of Mt Waumbek, stay the night at Moose Brook Campground, and attempt to climb Mt Cabot the next day.  These are the two northern-most 4000-footers in New Hampshire, the farthest away from Durham, where we live, so it made sense to climb them both in one two-day trip.

I climbed Mt Cabot (4170ft, 1271m) on 29 August, 2017.  Cabot’s a much longer hike than Waumbek, especially given that (instead of going up-and-back) I hiked a loop up Bunnell Notch Trail, across Kilkenny Ridge Trail (including a visit to “The Horn” at lunchtime), and finally down Unknown Pond Trail.

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I Had Climbed Mt Waumbek The Day Before

 

Unusually, this day was characterized by a certain level of worry and anxiety: the trail-head is at the Berlin Fish Hatchery, which closes its gates at 4pm.  So, as I arrived at “The Horn” for lunch, at around 12:15pm, I began to worried about reaching my car in time!  Would I be able to reach the top of Mt Cabot and get back?

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I had camped at Moose Brook Campground the night before, so was able to get going pretty early, arriving at the York Pond trail-head at 8:41am.

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There were two cars at the trail-head as I arrived, so (once again) it looked like I would have a quiet hike!  After a lengthy stretch walking through hip-high shrubs and ferns, I emerged into typical White-Mountains low forest, along the side of a stream:

 

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I reached Kilkenny Ridge Trail at just after 10am, an hour and a quarter after starting.

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Along this section of Kilkenny Ridge Trail I encountered two hikers, both coming the other way.  They were doing the “Coos Trail,” which I had never heard of; we had a short chat about the 48 4000-footers (they had done them all, and we exchanged thoughts about Owl’s Head and the looooong Lincoln Woods Trail.)

At around 11am I reached Cabot Cabin, which is NOT at the top of Mt Cabot:

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There’s a small cairn just beyond Cabot Cabin, with views towards the north:

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Readers may have noticed that I don’t mention much wildlife when I describe these climbs.  That’s because there just isn’t much, or perhaps the animals that are in the area have learned to avoid humans.  But I did see a beautiful bird, probably a grouse of some kind, just after Cabot Cabin:

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The walk along Kilkenny Ridge Trail to the top of Mt Cabot is very pleasant – no real views, but a fine ridge walk.  I got to the top of Cabot at about 11:20am – number 39!:

 

 

 

From the top of Mt Cabot I dropped down towards “The Bulge,” continuing along Kilkenny Ridge Trail:

 

 

Between “The Bulge” and the spur trail up to “The Horn,” I began to be concerned about the time.  The trail-head, where I had parked, was inside the Berlin Fish Hatchery, which is closed (and the road gated, with the exit blocked) at 4pm.  It was nearly noon, and even though I hadn’t begun the hike until just before 9am, when I consulted the map I realized that I wasn’t yet halfway done!

But I was determined to walk up the spur to “The Horn,” as the view from there was supposed to be excellent.  I arrived at the junction with the path up to “The Horn” just at noon:

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As promised, the views from the top were great, though the clouds that were building took off a bit of the luster:

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I had a quick lunch there at The Horn, and decided to walk as quickly as possible to Unknown Pond: I figured that, if I arrived there before 1:15pm, all would be well and it would be easy to reach my car in good time.  If I got to Unknown Pond much later than 1:30pm, it might be close!  And even though I had my tent (down in my car), and would be fine, I didn’t want to spend the night at the trail-head, partly because there was no cellphone reception there and I thought Jean might be worried if she didn’t hear from me!

So I walked very quickly from “The Horn” to Unknown Pond, reaching there at 1:14pm,  just before the self-imposed deadline I had set!  The walk was pleasant, but I moved so fast that I didn’t see much of it!

Unknown Pond is quite pretty, with a campsite nearby – perhaps worth a visit sometime when the sun is out!

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Here I reached the junction with Unknown Pond Trail, which I would follow 3.3 miles down to the trail-head at York Pond Road, where I had left the car:

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Much of the rest of the day would be spent walking down alongside the stream that flows out of Unknown Pond, hiking at full velocity – I really didn’t want to be stuck behind the Hatchery gate!

 

There were many small meadows along the stream, with nice wildflowers, and as I dropped down in elevation, there were even some indications of the coming autumn:

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Autumn Is Coming!

 

So I flew down Unknown Pond Trail, not knowing when I would arrive at the trail-head; not sure if I’d make it or not because I couldn’t tell where I was!

I need not have worried, because I arrived at my car at 2:40pm – over an hour to spare!

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Mt Cabot, at least when hiked in a loop as I did, is a pleasant and long ascent, not challenging but a long day.  I had climbed number 39 of the 4000-footers – 9 to go!

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ChildFund Australia is part of a global group called, collectively, the ChildFund Alliance.  It’s a fairly loose grouping, in which each Member operates quite autonomously, and the few common policies that did exist across the ChildFund Alliance were not strictly enforced.  I will write more about some of the unusual behaviors of INGO groupings such as the ChildFund Alliance and Plan International in an upcoming article in this series.

For now, I just need to mention that, in the ChildFund Alliance, some Members both raise funds in their home markets and implement programs in developing countries, while others essentially only raise funds, supporting the work of other, more operational Members.  ChildFund Australia is in the former category – raising funds in Australia and also operating programs as “Lead Member” in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam, with other ChildFund Alliance members supporting our work financially.

During my six years with ChildFund Australia, I worked directly with those five Country Office teams, and in this article I want to introduce those teams.

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ChildFund Australia’s first operational Country Office was established in 1985, in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.  Working in PNG is very challenging; it’s a context of great poverty, incredible cultural and ecological diversity, huge inequality, astonishingly high costs, and shocking levels of violence.  My admiration goes to the three ChildFund Country Directors that I worked with in PNG, and their staff, that did such great work in the most challenging environment I ever worked in: I can compare it only to working in Tuluá, Colombia in terms of complexity and challenge.  And PNG is more complex and challenging.

Warwick “Smokey” Dawson had been CD in PNG for a few years when I arrived.  A lanky, phlegmatic Australian with lots of experience in PNG, Smokey and his wife Jeannie had established a high degree of discipline for local staff, and were doing some good work.

Here Smokey is to my left, with Terina Stibbard (our Sydney-based International Program Coordinator, who worked with PNG) on the far right, rear:

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Photo Taken At A ChildFund PNG Staff Retreat, 2010

 

But when I arrived in Sydney in 2009, our program operations in PNG were at a fairly small scale, and were in fact drifting slowly downward.  We were underspending our budget, and seemed to struggle meeting the basic requirements of our fundraising (mostly sponsorship).   Operational costs were very high.  As a result, our program ratios (a proxy for efficiency) were too low, and there were some strong and persistent opinions in Sydney that we should close our work there.  But, at the same time, PNG was a place with extreme child poverty, so I definitely wanted to try to address whatever was holding us back before giving up.

But certainly I was in no position to make changes myself, both because it wasn’t my role to directly manage things overseas, and also because at that point I was mostly learning about the (major!) challenges of working in the Pacific.  It’s a very complex and challenging environment, and I was on a very steep learning curve!  So hats off to Smokey and the team.

But we were very lucky to have Terina Stibbard as International Program Coordinator for PNG, based in Sydney – her passion and drive would be invaluable in turning around our operations in Port Moresby.

So when Smokey Dawson left, returning to Australia, I thought that a good next step might be to hire a PNG national as Country Director.  Given the complexities of working in such a unique culture, surely somebody from PNG would be better able to navigate this world, this parallel universe?  And, given her long experience overseas, I thought that Terina would be the perfect “critical friend” for a Papuan Country Director…

So Terina and I interviewed a range of candidates, both expatriates and PNG nationals.  In the end, we were lucky to find Andrew Ikupu, a PNG national with a PhD from Adelaide.  We felt that Andrew would be able to manage across the wide differences between these two cultures – PNG and Australia.

Here are a couple of images of Andrew:

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I liked Andrew a lot – he was very charismatic and smart.  Andrew was deeply immersed in his culture, and his long experience in Australia meant that he was also well able to bridge to other points of view.  He knew his country very well, and brought a unique combination of competencies to the role.  I learned a lot from him during the years we worked together.

On the other hand, I think that it was very challenging for Andrew to serve as our Country Director.  Firstly, having a decent salary and steady income in such a desperately-poor, and deeply-tribal place meant that, as a PNG national, Andrew faced constant pressure to help people in his home area (his “Wantoks” as they are called in PNG).  This pressure was financial (if a “Wantok” needed financial support, Andrew came under pressure to help), and also logistical (for example, if somebody in his home area was sick and needed to be evacuated, there were no formal alternatives; the only recourse people felt they had was to ask him to send a ChildFund vehicle, which he couldn’t do.)  I think he resisted these pressures, at least mostly, but I also think it was a big challenge.  I’m not sure I did Andrew a favor by hiring him…

At the same time, Andrew was in poor health, having developed diabetes just before joining ChildFund.  This illness is endemic in the Pacific, as a result (I think) of the encounter between a group of people living very traditional lives, with very traditional diets, abruptly transitioning to unhealthy Western food.  People there experienced a dramatic dietary shift to eating processed products, sugar, alcohol, etc., which seemed to have a big, negative impact on people in PNG and the Pacific, and certainly on Andrew.  The long-term consequences for people of the Pacific are likely to be quite negative.

So I think we made a good choice, but at the same time serving as ChildFund’s CD in PNG was very stressful for Andrew Ikupu.  We were very lucky that, just as Smokey was leaving, we also recruited another gifted senior manager: Manish Joshi joined as Program Manager for PNG.  Andrew and Manish worked together for some time and, when Andrew stepped down*, Manish was appointed Country Director.

Here are Manish and Andrew during the time that they worked together:

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Manish came to ChildFund from India, having recently worked in PNG as a United Nations Volunteer, in Madang with local government, so he was quite familiar with the country and the culture.  Manish did (and, as I write this article, still does) a truly outstanding job as Country Director, managing to address operational issues with a steady hand, and dramatically expanding the scale and scope of our program.

Early in Manish’s tenure, we made a very significant decision: we would stop raising funds through child sponsorship in PNG.  The associated costs of running sponsorship systems were way too high, and the complex and detailed nature of managing those systems in the chaotic context of PNG was too big a challenge for our (and any) team.  The whole system never seemed to work there.  But the flip side of this decision was that we would have to fund our programs exclusively through grants, which have their own serious complexities.  A very major challenge.

Manish and his team, with Terina’s support, succeeded brilliantly in this transition, exceeding all expectations.  One asset we would gain was the hiring of a very strong Program Manager (Aydel Salvadora) to replace Manish as he moved into the Country Director role.  Aydel served as a very competent “pair of hands,” enabling Manish to worry about the rest of our operation.

Amazingly, program activities increased steadily, despite having closed child sponsorship, and operations in general became more stable and functional. Our program ratio improved rapidly, and the operation moved quickly towards being financially sustainable.  Even more importantly, I think we were making increasing impact on child poverty.

Few INGOs can claim as much success in this challenging environment.  Of course our local staff deserves much credit, and Terina Stibbard played a fundamental role across the tenures of Smokey, Andrew, and Manish, keeping our support from Sydney at very high levels, and investing her heart and soul into the challenge.

But the most important factor in our success was the appointment of Manish Joshi as Country Director.  During the years that we worked together, I spoke with Manish most weeks by Skype, and almost every week there would be a situation or two – inside ChildFund or (most of the time) outside in the PNG environment – that was somehow catastrophic in a way that made Manish shake his head and worry.  We would talk about whatever it was, work through what we could do to minimize the impact on our world, Manish would chuckle about what an amazing place PNG was to work in, and then he’d get onto the issue in a relaxed but determined way.

Soon the voices in Sydney that had been insistently calling for the closing of our program in PNG became quiet.  Which made me feel very proud of our teams.

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This photo was taken during my final visit to the Port Moresby Country Office, in late 2015.  Manish Joshi is fourth from the left, and Joe Pasen (our Development Effectiveness Manager) is to my left.  Other key staff in this photo include Aydel Salvadora (who followed Manish into the Program Manager role), and program leaders Olive Oa, and Sharon Pondros:

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Nigel Spence, our CEO, is also in there (sixth from the right, in the back.)

And here is a photo from an early visit to PNG, with me on the left and Joe Pasen in the foreground:

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I’ve written about the villager Hillary, and shared a “Case Study” about his garden project, in an earlier blog article in this series.  Here Manish and I are visiting Hillary’s garden, with a ChildFund PNG staff member:

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With Manish Joshi

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Paul Brown (CEO Of ChildFund NZ), Manish Joshi, and Nigel Spence (CEO of ChildFund Australia)

 

Apologies to other staff members who I haven’t named – huge thanks to all of you!

It was a great pleasure working with Manish, who built ChildFund PNG into an important, high-performing organization in one of the world’s most challenging places.  Thank you Manish!  And warm appreciation goes to Terina Stibbard, who brought her formidable passion and energy to building ChildFund PNG.

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ChildFund Australia’s second Country Office was established in 1997, in Viet Nam.   By coincidence, I became Plan’s Country Director in Hanoi at about the same time, and I can remember meeting ChildFund’s second and third Country Directors there.

Later I would work with the first ChildFund Viet Nam CD, however, during my time consulting with CCF – by that time Daniel Wordsworth had moved to become Program Development Director in Richmond, Virginia, working with my old colleague Michelle Poulton.  I’m still not sure why I never met Daniel when we were both in Hanoi; perhaps it was Daniel’s predilection for nocturnal working hours…

I’ve written more about Daniel in several earlier articles in this series…

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By the time I joined ChildFund Australia, Peter Walton was finishing seven years as Country Director in Viet Nam.  He had done a great job there, and was ready to move on.

Here are three images of Peter (and others) from my first visit to ChildFund Viet Nam:

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Nigel Spence Is On The Far Left; Peter Walton And I Are In The Back

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Peter Walton (Back Left), Nigel Spence (Third From Left), Nguyen Ba Lieu (Third From Right)

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Peter Walton (Left), Nguyen Ba Lieu (Second From Right), Me (Right)

 

Peter’s departure was a challenge, partly because it came very soon after I joined ChildFund (I certainly didn’t want him to leave, at least not so soon after I arrived!)

But, in a sense it was good timing.  At the time, the Viet Nam operation was viewed by staff in Sydney as the model that our offices in PNG and Cambodia should emulate.  And it was also viewed by staff in Viet Nam as the model!  So the establishment of a program team in Sydney, with a mandate to lead program thinking, would be tricky for our team in Hanoi to handle…

Peter’s transition, although the timing was bad, was an opportunity to assert the proper role of the Sydney International Program Team and International Program Director.

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Hiring Peter’s successor was my first major overseas recruitment in my role at ChildFund.  So I was very lucky to have already met Deborah Leaver in Sydney.

At that time, Deb was Program Manager at ActionAid Australia, one of the few other INGOs based in Sydney.  (Most are based in Melbourne or Canberra.)  When I was reaching out to meet colleagues in my early months, Deb was one of the most welcoming, inviting me to visit her office near Sydney University and spending over an hour with me.  I was impressed, during that visit, with Deb’s obvious drive, energy, experience and intelligence.  So I was very happy when, a few weeks later, she asked if she could put her name forward for the Viet Nam Country Director position.

My response was: “of course!”

Here are two photos from our first visit to Hanoi, where we traveled together so I could  introduce her as our new Country Director:

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Deb Leaver, In The Center

 

Here is the Country Management Team in place when Deb arrived in Hanoi:

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Deb Leaver And The ChildFund Viet Nam Management Team

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Another Image Of The Viet Nam Country Management Team, Plus Me

 

ChildFund Viet Nam expanded on several important dimensions during Deb’s tenure.  We grew into a new province, Cao Bang, on the northern border with China.  And our local website and communications work really moved forward.  Our visibility in the development community was greatly enhanced, in a very good way; we became one of the “go-to” agencies.

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Several images of Nguyen Ba Lieu are included in the photos that I’ve shared, above.  He is on the far left in the image just above here.  Lieu was our Program Manager in Hanoi, and was one of our very first employees back in 1999 or so.  In fact, I can remember meeting Lieu when I was with Plan, ten years before I joined ChildFund!

Lieu was a vital part of our team in Viet Nam**, with a strong gift for working with local government partners (a complicated, and essential, aspect of working there.)  And he had a very agile and active mind, regularly creating interesting frameworks and concepts that were meant to guide our thinking and our work – not only for ChildFund Viet Nam.  I think that this meant that perhaps he had to adjust the most when I arrived on the scene and the International Program Team came into being, with our mandate for leading program thinking; but he handled the change with his innate grace and humility.

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Deb Leaver thrived in the CD role, and ended up staying for seven years before moving to Laos with another organization.  During that time she continued to build our program and enhanced the stature of ChildFund in the Vietnam development community.  And she started a family there in Hanoi.

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With Deb Leaver

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As I’ve hinted already in this article, one challenge Deb faced was that her arrival coincided with the establishment of the Sydney International Team, and my own new position as International Program Director.  During Peter Walton’s time, as I mentioned, ChildFund Viet Nam was seen as the leading Country Office, in effect leading program thinking for the overall agency.  My arrival meant that things would change – the Viet Nam team would now contribute to program thinking, of course, but would no longer act autonomously, no longer lead things.  And now there would be more space for other Country Offices, in PNG and Cambodia (and, later, in Laos and Myanmar) to contribute.

This was a tricky transition, and Deb worked hard to integrate ChildFund Viet Nam into the program-development efforts of the wider organization, under my leadership, while also maintaining the sense of agency and pride that had been built up during earlier years when the Viet Nam office essentially served as the program-development entity for ChildFund Australia.

I enjoyed working with the ChildFund Viet Nam team a great deal.  And it was great working with Deb: she was hard working, very smart, with a very wicked sense of humor.  It is a testament to her work with her senior management that her successor came from inside ChildFund Viet Nam: Nguyen Bich Lien, who had overseen administrative aspects of our operation, became our Country Director when Deb moved to Laos after seven years in Hanoi.

Huge thanks to the whole ChildFund Viet Nam team, and to Deb Leaver.  It was great working with all of you!

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ChildFund Australia’s third Country Office was in Cambodia, under the leadership of Carol Mortenson.  In 2009, the office was about a year old, our newest program, working in Svay Rieng province, in the far east of the country on the border with Viet Nam.

As I mentioned last time, given the nature of Cambodian governance, Carol made the astute decision early in her tenure to, essentially, work through local government to implement projects.  As a result, ChildFund faced relatively few difficulties operating on Cambodia.  Other agencies, whose mandates were more explicitly focused on human rights advocacy or democratization, faced a much different, much more challenging operating environment.

 

One key hire that Carol made early on was to recruit the gifted and talented, inspirational Sophiep Chat as her Program Manager.  Sophiep brought a unique set of skills to his role, and was of great help also to our wider program-development efforts beyond Cambodia.  I always enjoyed working with Sophiep, one of the most gifted NGO leaders I’ve worked with, and I learned a great deal from him – his contribution to our work in Cambodia, and to wider program development for the wider organization, was fundamental.

Later, two other gifted Cambodians joined Carol’s team:

  • Solin Chan became ChildFund Cambodia’s Development Effectiveness and Learning Manager, playing a key role in creating and implementing the overall ChildFund Australia Development Effectiveness Framework (DEF).  As with Sophiep, I learned a huge amount from Solin, who moved to work with UNICEF late in my time with ChildFund.  Solin was a very smart, and funny, professional who worked closely with Richard Geeves in moving the DEF forward;
  • Oum Vongarnith, our Finance and Administration Manager, was another key member of our team.  Hardworking and determined, we relied on Oum to make sure that operations were efficient and effective, and he never let us down.  I greatly enjoyed his sense of humor, and his dedication to our work was unrivaled.
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Solin, Carol, and Oum

 

During my time at ChildFund Australia, the Cambodia team grew into a second province (Kratie, north of Phnom Penh, on the Mekong) and slowly began to diversify our operational partnerships beyond local government.

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Carol Mortenson left ChildFund Cambodia after a productive seven years, the same length of time that Peter Walton had been with ChildFund in Viet Nam.  I thought that this was a good, long period of time, and reasonable to consider leadership changes.

After an extensive recruitment, we were lucky to bring Prashant Verma into ChildFund as Country Director.

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With Prashant Verma

 

Prashant came from Plan International in Cambodia, and brought with him probably the highest energy of any Country Director I’ve worked with.  His drive and commitment to our work was amazing to see, and upon assuming his position he immediately began to discern areas where we could advance the effectiveness of our work.  We were fortunate to bring Prashant on board, and although I only worked with him for a short time, I learned a lot from him.  Prashant is one of the most innovative Country Directors I ever worked with, and was a perfect successor to Carol.

My deep thanks to both Carol and Prashant!

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The fourth of our Country Offices to open was in Laos.  In Peter Walton’s last few months with ChildFund, he supervised initial research into our possible expansion into Laos, having hired a team of two consultants to carry out the work.  The outstanding work of those consultants, Chris Mastaglio and Keo Souvannaphoum, positioned us astutely to obtain a license to operate in the country.  Then they were selected as (respectively) Country Director and Program Manager.

We were very lucky to bring Chris and Keo onboard as our first staff in Laos.  They knew the country and its development context very well: Chris had been working in Laos with other INGOs for some time, and Keo was a Lao citizen with an advance degree from Duke University.

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With Chris Mastaglio

Personally, I found working with Chris and Keo to be a constant source of inspiration.  At first, Laos is a seemingly relaxed and uncomplicated place to work; but once we got going, the real situation revealed itself to be far more complex and challenging than initially perceived.  Chris and Keo knew this from the beginning, and positioned ChildFund in a very interesting space where we could make a lot of positive difference in the lives of children in Nonghet District while also subtly encouraging change in the deeper causes of poverty in the country.  This balancing act was very difficult and, in fact, most INGOs that tried to work in both areas were not successful.  It is a real testimony to Chris’s and Keo’s hard work and keen insights that we were able to stay engaged, successfully and sustainably (though not without some very nerve-wracking moments) in both domains.

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Vientiane Staff In 2011

As a result, ChildFund became a leader in the INGO community, and our work in Nonghet flourished, making a big difference in the lives of some people who were facing great poverty.

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Our first working area was in Nonghet District of Xieng Khouang Province, in the Northeast of the country, right on the border with Viet Nam.  A very good choice, because it was quite remote and the population was mainly from the Hmong ethnic group, somewhat excluded from Laos’s development process.

These images were taken in January of 2011; it was very cold in the winter!

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Staff Dinner

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Chris is a veteran rugby player, from Newcastle, and before joining ChildFund he had been coaching the Lao Women’s rugby team alongside his INGO work.  After a few years with ChildFund, Chris came up with a very innovative and fascinating project, supporting the development of female youth through rugby.  As this sport was new to Laos, it wasn’t “gendered,” so could be used as a tool to develop leadership skills, conflict management, teamwork, psycho-social development, etc.

The project, later called “Pass It Back,” was very successful and later expanded into other countries in Asia.  Today Chris directs the Pass It Back program, which is now a partnership with World Rugby, Asia Rugby Federation, and Women Win.  When Chris moved over to concentrate (more than) full-time on Pass It Back, we recruited his successor, and I was delighted that Keo was the successful candidate!  So Keo became our second Country Director for Laos.

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With Keo

 

It was a huge pleasure and honor working with these two gifted professionals and their teams in Vientiane and Nonghet.  My hats off to both Chris and Keo, and their teams, truly.

*

The final Country Office to be established in my tenure with ChildFund was in Myanmar, initially headed up by the very gifted and smart Burmese Country Manager Win May Htway, and then by her successor Nini Htwe.  (After I left ChildFund, and Nini departed, Win May returned as Country Director.)

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With Win May

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ChildFund Myanmar Team In April 2013 (Maria Attard On The Left)

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Win May Inspecting Our First Country Office

 

This is an image of Win May (on the right) with Oum Vongnarith, our Finance Manager in ChildFund Cambodia.  Oum provided outstanding support to the Myanmar operation from Phnom Penh, with frequent visits to Yangon and Mandalay:

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Our Myanmar Team in January, 2015

 

 

 

 

 

 

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With Nini

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From the start, we hoped to work in a different way in Myanmar: Papua New Guinea is sui generis.  In Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam, the nature of the national political reality meant that we worked mostly, or exclusively, with and through local and regional governments.  This worked, but had obvious drawbacks.

But, ideally, organizations like ChildFund Australia work with and through local civil society – in principle this is more efficient, builds the capability of local society over the long-term, and is embedded within the actual reality of the country.  But working with local organizations requires a very different skill set than we in ChildFund had developed in our other Country Offices.  So we would have to learn by doing, and much would depend on our own local leadership – first and foremost, our Country Director.

So we were lucky to have recruited such experienced and dedicated local Burmese Country Directors.

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Our Staff And Partners, Plus Maria Attard (Front Row), and Nigel Spence and Me (Back Row)

 

 

We approached this carefully, researching the development context in Myanmar and then preparing a proposed approach.  We prepared a document summarizing how we hoped to work in Myanmar and, since it implied such a large change in our model, once Nigel Spence was in agreement, we took it to our board of directors for discussion and approval.

When we had refined our proposed approach, and had approval from our board, we got going.  Maria Attard was the International Program Coordinator for Myanmar (and Viet Nam), and she managed the process of selecting our initial staff and first partners.  This went well: Win May was amongst our first employees, a brilliant choice of a courageous and passionate leader.  Our first partner organizations were selected, knowing full-well that things would likely go very well with some, and not so well with others.

Based around the capital, Yangon, Mandalay, and Shwebo, north of Mandalay, our first partners included organizations focused on street children, early-childhood development, primary education, youth, etc.

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Early Childhood Development Project

*

We saw this initial period of work in Myanmar as “Phase 1” of a possible shift to working through local civil society instead of implementing ourselves.  We weren’t thinking that ChildFund Australia would make that shift everywhere, but that it would be an important tool in our repertoire.

Many INGOs had already made this shift, years before, so in a sense it was overdue for us.  On the other hand, most the other major INGOs in Myanmar had begun to work in the country after Cyclone Nargis and, since the nature of the Myanmar government at that point was so oppressive, they had been forced to work directly, implementing projects with their own staff.  Even the INGOs that trumpeted their commitment to working in “partnership” with local civil society were not doing so, at least in Myanmar.  Because, in the interim, governance had changed (and improved) dramatically there, our relatively-late arrival gave us the opportunity to try to work in the right way.

“Phase 1” was meant to be a learning period, in which we worked with a larger number of partners, across a wider range of sectors and geographies, enabling us to learn and refine our approach and, in “Phase 2,” focus our programs more tightly on a narrower set of sectors and fewer partners.

This worked well – we had successes and setbacks.  One partner went a bit crazy and stopped cooperating.  Some project work wasn’t consistent with what ChildFund sought to achieve.  Most partners and projects went well.

But probably our biggest challenge was that our organizational systems and procedures were designed for direct implementation of projects.  At a deeper level, our culture and mental models were all consistent with operations being through our own staff.  Organizational ego is a problem in our development sector in general, but gets in the way even more significantly when working through partners.  And when our Myanmar staff began to interact with their peers in other ChildFund Australia countries, some sharing of experience actually ended up being quite unhelpful, because even in the same organization the operating models weren’t at all comparable.  These clashes of systems and assumptions caused on-going irritants and glitches, which is normal as this kind of fundamental shift progresses.

Many thanks to Win May and Nini and their teams in Myanmar, and to Maria Attard, for their hard work and courage in moving forward with such a different model.  It was very hard work, and they blazed a trail for ChildFund Australia.  Thank you!

*

Myanmar was changing very quickly during the years that I was traveling there with ChildFund Australia.  The last military government seemed to be trying to reform, at least in some areas, and you could feel things loosening up.  Then free elections were held and the National League for Democracy came into power.  Optimism was in the air.  (Sadly, the giddy optimism of these early days seems now to be very tempered by ethnic conflict and a range of other setbacks…)

It was an interesting and positive time for the country, and visiting was fascinating.  One other reason that I enjoyed visiting Myanmar was that my own meditation practice is Burmese in origin, so I was able to connect with that part of the country’s tradition several times a year.

Here are a few images of the country taken during my visits:

 

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Shwedagon At Night

 

 

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Shwedagon

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Shwedagon

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Shwedagon

 

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Shwedagon

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One Of My Favorite Places To Eat In Myanmar: “Feel” Restaurant

Spices

*

I would get together with our Country Directors, face-to-face, at least once each year.  Here is an image from an early get-togethers, with (from the left) Carol, Andrew, Chris, Deb, and me:

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And here is an image of the ChildFund Australia Country Directors in place as I departed, in 2015: from the left, Keo (Laos), Nini (Myanmar), Manish (PNG), Deb (Viet Nam), Prashant (Cambodia), Chris (Laos, then Pass It Back), and me:

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Keo, Nini, Manish, Deb, Prashant, Chris, Me

*

My heartfelt appreciation goes to our teams in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam.  It was an honor and privilege working with all of you.  Thanks for your incredible hard work and commitment!

*

Here are links to earlier blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration;
  33. Mt Moriah (33) – Putting It All Together (Part 1): the ChildFund Australia International Program Team;
  34. Owls’ Head (34) – Putting It All Together (Part 2): ChildFund Australia’s Theory of Change;
  35. Bondcliff (35) – ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness System;
  36. West Bond (36) – “Case Studies” in ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness System;
  37. Mt Bond (37) – Impact Assessement in ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness System;
  38. Mt Waumbek (38) – “Building the Power of Poor People and Poor Children…”

 

*- Sadly, Andrew Ikupu died a few years after I left Australia.

**- Also very sadly, Lieu died a year or so before I left Australia.

 

West Bond (37) – Impact Assessment in ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness Framework

June, 2018

International NGOs do their best to demonstrate the impact of their work, to be accountable, to learn and improve.  But it’s very challenging and complicated to measure change in social-justice work, and even harder to prove attribution.  At least, to do these things in affordable and participatory ways…

Two times in Plan International, earlier in my career, I had worked to develop and implement systems that would demonstrate impact – and both times, we had failed.

In this article I want to describe how, in ChildFund Australia, we succeeded, and were able to build and implement a robust and participatory system for measuring and attributing impact in our work.

Call it the Holy Grail!

*

I’ve been writing a series of blog posts about climbing each of the 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall.  And, each time, I’ve also been reflecting a bit on the journey since I joined Peace Corps, 33 years ago: on development, social justice, conflict, experiences along the way, etc.

So far, I’ve described climbing 36 of the 48 peaks, and covered my journey from Peace Corps in Ecuador (1984-86) through to my arrival in Sydney in 2009, where I joined ChildFund Australia as the first “International Program Director.”  This is my 37th post in the series.

In recent posts in this series I’ve been describing aspects of the ChildFund Australia “Development Effectiveness Framework” (“DEF”) the system that would help us make sure we were doing what we said we were going to do and, crucially, verify that we were making a difference in the lives of children and young people living in poverty.  So we could learn and improve our work…

There are three particular components of the overall DEF that I am detailing in more depth, because I think they were especially interesting and innovative.  In my previous blog I described how we used Case Studies to complement the more quantitative aspects of the system.  These Case Studies were qualitative narratives of the lived experience of people experiencing change related to ChildFund’s work, which we used to gain human insights, and to reconnect ourselves to the passions that brought us to the social-justice sector in the first place.

This time, I want to go into more depth on two final, interrelated components of the ChildFund Australia DEF: Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact.  Together, these two components of the DEF enabled us to understand the impact that ChildFund Australia was making, consistent with our Theory of Change and organizational vision and mission.  Important stuff!

But first…

*

Last time I described climbing to the top of Mt Bond on 10 August 2017, after having gotten to the top of Bondcliff.  After Mt Bond, I continued on to West Bond (4540ft, 1384m), the last of three 4000-footers I would scale that day.  (But, since this was an up-and-back trip, I would climb Mt Bond and Bondcliff twice!  It would be a very long day.)

As I described last time, I had arrived at the top of Bondcliff at about 10:30am, having left the trail-head at Lincoln Woods Visitor Center just after 6:30am.  This early start was enabled by staying the night before at Hancock Campsite on the Kancamagus road, just outside of Lincoln, New Hampshire.  Then I had reached the top of Bondcliff at 10:30am, and the summit of Mt Bond at about 11:30am.

Now I would continue to the top of West Bond, and then retrace my steps to Lincoln Woods:

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So, picking up the story from the top of Mt Bond, the Bondcliff Trail drops down fairly quickly, entering high-altitude forest, mostly pine and ferns.

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After 20 minutes I reached the junction with the spur trail that would take me to the top of West Bond.  I took a left turn here.  The spur trail continues through forest for some distance:

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I reached the top of West Bond at 12:30pm, and had lunch there.  The views here were remarkable; it was time for lunch, and I was fortunate to be by myself, so I took my time at the summit.

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Bondcliff From West Bond

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At The Summit Of West Bond.  Franconia Ridge And Mt Garfield In The Background.  A Bit Tired!

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Mt Bond, On The Left, And Bondcliff On The Right

 

Here are two spectacular videos from the top of West Bond.  The first simply shows Bondcliff, with the southern White Mountains in the background:

 

And this second video is more of a full panorama, looking across to Owl’s Head, Franconia Ridge, Garfield, the Twins, Zealand, and back:

 

Isn’t that spectacular?!

After eating lunch at the top of West Bond, I left at a bit before 1pm, and began to retrace my steps towards Lincoln Woods.  To get there, I had to re-climb Mt Bond and Bondcliff.

I reached the top of Mt Bond, for the second time, at 1:20pm.  The view down towards Bondcliff was great!:

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Bondcliff From The Top Of Mt Bond, Now Descending…

 

Here is a view from near the saddle between Mt Bond and Bondcliff, looking up at the latter:

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Looking Up At Bondcliff

 

As I passed over Bondcliff, at 2:15pm, I was slowing down, and my feet were starting to be quite sore.  I was beginning to dread the descent down Bondcliff, Wilderness, and Lincoln Woods Trails… it would be a long slog.

Here’s a view from there back up towards Mt Bond:

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A Glorious White Mountain Day – Mt Bond And West Bond, From Bondcliff

 

But there were still 8 or 9 miles to go!  And since I had declined the kind offer I had received to ferry my car up to Zealand trail-head, which would have saved me 3 miles, I had no other option but to walk back to Lincoln Woods.

It was nearly 5pm by the time I reached the junction with Twinway and the Lincoln Woods Trail.  By that time, I was truly exhausted, and my feet were in great pain, but (as I said) I had no option but to continue to the car: no tent or sleeping bag, no phone service here.

The Lincoln Woods Trail, as I’ve described in more detail elsewhere, is long and flat and wide, following the remnants of an old forest railway:

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Sleepers From The Old Forestry Railway

 

Scratches from walking poles?

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It was around 5:30 when I got to the intersection with Franconia Notch Trail, which is the path up Owl’s Head.

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It was a very long slog down Lincoln Woods Trail – put one foot in front of the other, and repeat!  And repeat and repeat and repeat and repeat …

Finally I reached the Lincoln Woods Visitor Center, where I had parked my car at 6:30am that morning, at 6:40pm, having climbed three 4000-footers, walked 22 miles, and injured my feet in just over 12 hours.

Looking back, I had accomplished a great deal, and the views from the top of three of New Hampshire’s highest and most-beautiful were amazing.  But, at the time, I had little feeling of accomplishment!

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Knackered!

 

*

Here is the diagram I’ve been using to describe the ChildFund Australia DEF:

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Figure 1: The ChildFund Australia Development Effectiveness Framework

 

In this article I want to describe two components of the DEF: #2, the Outcome Indicator Surveys; and #12, how we produced “Statements of Impact.”  Together, these two components enabled us to measure the impact of our work.

First, some terminology: as presented in an earlier blog article in this series, we had adopted fairly standard definitions of some related terms, consistent with the logical framework approach used in most mature INGOs:

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According to this way of defining things:

  • A Project is a set of Inputs (time, money, technology) producing a consistent set of Outputs (countable things delivered in a community);
  • A Program is a set of Projects producing a consistent set of Outcomes (measurable changes in human conditions related to the organization’s Theory of Change);
  • Impact is a set of Programs producing a consistent set of changes to Outcome Indicators as set forth in the organization’s Strategic Plan.

But that definition of “Impact,” though clear and correct, wasn’t nuanced enough for us to design a system to measure it.  More specifically, before figuring out how to measure “Impact,” we needed to grapple with two fundamental questions:

  • How “scientific” did we want to be in measuring impact?  In other words, were we going to build the infrastructure needed to run randomized control group trials, or would we simply measure change in our Outcome Indicators?  Or somewhere in between?;
  • How would we gather data about change in the communities where we worked?  A census, surveying everybody in a community, which would be relatively costly?  If not, what method for sampling would we use that would enable us to claim that our results were accurate (enough)?

*

The question “how ‘scientific’ did we want to be” when we assessed our impact was a fascinating one, getting right to the heart of the purpose of the DEF.  The “gold standard” at that time, in technical INGOs and academic institutions, was to devise “randomized control group” trials, in which you would: implement your intervention in some places, with some populations; identify ahead of time a comparable population that would serve as a “control group” where you would not implement that intervention; and then compare the two groups after the intervention had concluded.

For ChildFund Australia, we needed to decide if we would invest in the capability to run randomized control group trials.  It seemed complex and expensive but, on the other hand, it  would have the virtue of being at the forefront of the sector and, therefore, appealing to technical donors.

When we looked at other comparable INGOs, in Australia and beyond, there were a couple that had gone that direction.  When I spoke with my peers in some of those organizations, they were generally quite cautious about the randomized control trial (“RCT”) approach: though appealing in principle, in practice it was complex, requiring sophisticated technical staff to design and oversee the measurements, and to interpret results.  So RCTs were very expensive.  Because of the cost, people with practical experience in the matter recommended using RCTs, if at all, only for particular interventions that were either expensive or were of special interest for other reasons.

For ChildFund Australia, this didn’t seem suitable, mainly because we were designing a comprehensive system that we hoped would allow us to improve the effectiveness of our development practice, while also involving our local partners, authorities, and people in communities where we worked.  Incorporating RCTs into such a comprehensive system would be very expensive, and would not be suitable for local people in any meaningful way.

The other option we considered, and ultimately adopted, hinged upon an operational definition of “Impact.”  Building on the general definition shown above (“Impact is a set of Programs producing a consistent set of changes to Outcome Indicators as set forth in the organization’s Strategic Plan”), operationally we decided that:

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In other words, we felt that ChildFund could claim that we had made an significant impact in the lives of children in a particular area if, and only if:

  1. There had been a significant, measured, positive change in a ChildFund Australia Outcome Indicator; and
  2. Local people (community members, organizations, and government staff) determined in a rigorous manner that ChildFund had contributed to a significant degree to that positive change.

In other words:

  • If there was no positive change in a ChildFund Australia Outcome Indicator over three years (see below for a discussion of why we chose three years), we would not be able to claim impact;
  • If there was a positive change in a ChildFund Australia Outcome Indicator over three years, and local people determined that we had contributed to that positive change, we would be able to claim impact.

(Of course, sometimes there might be a negative change in a ChildFund Australia Outcome Indicator, which would have been worse if we hadn’t been working in the community.  We were able to handle that situation in practice, in community  workshops.)

I felt that, if we approached measuring impact in this way it would be “good enough” for us – perhaps not as academically robust as using RCT methods, but (if we did it right) certainly good enough for us to work with local people to make informed decisions, together, about improving the effectiveness of our work, and to make public claims of the impact of our work.

So that’s what we did!

*

As a reminder, soon after I had arrived in Sydney we had agreed a “Theory of Change” which enabled us to design a set of organization-wide Outcome Indicators.  These indicators, designed to measure the status of children related to our Theory of Change, were described in a previous article, and are listed here:

Screen Shot 2018-05-28 at 3.16.59 PMScreen Shot 2018-05-28 at 3.17.10 PM

 

These Outcome Indicators had been designed technically, and were therefore robust.  And they had been derived from the ChildFund Australia Vision, Mission, and Program Approach, so they measured changes that would be organically related to the claims we were making in the world.

So we needed to set up a system to measure these Outcome Indicators; this would become component #2 in the DEF (see Figure 1, above).  And we had to design a way for local partners, authorities, and (most importantly) people from the communities where we worked to assess changes to these Outcome Indicators and reach informed conclusions about who was responsible for causing the changes.

First, let me outline how we measured the ChildFund Australia Outcome Indicators.

*

Outcome Indicator Surveys (Component #2 in Figure 1, Above)

Because impact comes rather slowly, an initial, baseline survey was carried out in each location and then, three years later, another measurement was carried out.  A three-year gap was somewhat arbitrary: one year was too short, but five years seemed a bit long.  So we settled on three years!

Even though we had decided not to attempt to measure impact using complex randomized control trials, these survey exercises were still quite complicated, and we wanted the measurements to be reliable.  This was why we ended up hiring a “Development Effectiveness and Learning Manager” in each Country Office – to support the overall implementation of the DEF and, in particular, to manage the Outcome Indicator Surveys.  And these surveys were expensive and tricky to carry out, so we usually hired students from local universities to do the actual surveying.

Then we needed to decide what kind of survey to carry out.  Given the number of people in the communities where we worked, we quickly determined that a “census,” that is, interviewing everybody, was not feasible.

So I contacted a colleague at the US Member of the ChildFund Alliance, who was an expert in this kind of statistical methodology.  She strongly advised me to use the survey method that they (the US ChildFund) were using, called “Lot Quality Assurance Sampling.”  LQAS seemed to be less expensive than other survey methodologies, and it was highly recommended by our expert colleague.

(In many cases, during this period, we relied on technical recommendations from ChildFund US.  They were much bigger than the Australia Member, with excellent technical staff, so this seemed logical and smart .  But, as with Plan International during my time there, the US ChildFund Member had very high turnover, which led to many changes in approach.  This meant, in practice for us, although ChildFund Australia had adopted several of the Outcome Indicators that ChildFund US was using, in the interests of commonality, and – as I said – we had begun to use LQAS for the same reason, soon the US Member was changing their Indicators and abandoning the use of LQAS because new  staff felt it wasn’t the right approach.  This led to the US Member expressing some disagreement with how we, in Australia, were measuring Impact – even though we were following their – previous – recommendations!  Sigh.)

Our next step was to carry out baseline LQAS surveys in each field location.  It took time to accomplish this, as even the relatively-simple LQAS was a complex exercise than we were typically used to.  Surveys were supervised by the DEL Managers, carried out usually by students from local universities.  Finally, the DEL Managers prepared baseline reports summarizing the status of each of the ChildFund Australia Outcome Indicators.

Then we waited three years and repeated the same survey in each location.

(In an earlier article I described how Plan International, where I had worked for 15 years, had failed twice to implement a DEF-like system, at great expense.  One of the several mistakes that Plan had made was that they never held their system constant enough to be comparable over time.  In other words, in the intervening years after measuring a baseline, they tinkered with [“improved”] the system so much that the second measurement couldn’t be compared to the first one!  So it was all for naught, useless.  I was determined to avoid this mistake, so I was very reluctant to change our Outcome Indicators after they were set, in 2010; we did add a few Indicators as we deepened our understanding of our Theory of Change, but that didn’t get in the way of re-surveying the Indicators that we had started with, which didn’t change.)

Once the second LQAS survey was done, three years after the baseline, the DEL Manager would analyze differences and prepare a report, along with a translation of the report that could be shared with local communities, partners, and government staff.  The DEL Manager, at this point, did not attempt to attribute changes to any particular development actor (local government, other NGOs, the community themselves, ChildFund, etc.), but did share the results with the communities for validation.

Rather, the final DEF component I want to describe was used to determine impact.

*

Statements of Impact (Component #12 in Figure 1, Above)

The most exciting part of this process was how we used the changes measured over three years in the Outcome Indicators to assess Impact (defined, as described above, as change plus attribution.)

The heart of this process was a several-day-long workshop at which local people would review and discuss changes in the Outcome Indicators, and attribute the changes to different actors in the area.  In other words, if a particular indicator (say, the percentage of boys and girls between 12 and 16 years of age who had completed primary school) had changed significantly, people at the workshop would discuss why the change had occurred – had the local education department done something to cause the change?  Had ChildFund had an impact?  Other NGOs?  The local community members themselves?

Finally, people in the workshop would decide the level of ChildFund’s contribution to the change (“attribution”) on a five-point scale: none, little, some, a lot, completely.   This assessment, made by local people in an informed and considered way, would then serve as the basic content for a “Statement of Impact” that would be finalized by the DEL Manager together with his or her senior colleagues in-country, Sydney-based IPT staff and, finally, myself.

*

We carried out the very first of these “Impact” workshops in Svay Rieng, Cambodia, in February 2014.  Because this was the first of these important workshops, DEL Managers from Laos and Viet Nam attended, to learn, along with three of us from Sydney.

Here are some images of the ChildFund team as we gathered and prepared for the workshop in Svay Rieng:

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Here are images of the workshop.  First, I’m opening the session:

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Lots of group discussion:

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The DEL Manager in Cambodia, Chan Solin, prepared a summary booklet for each participant in the workshop.  These booklets were a challenge to prepare, because they would be used by local government, partners, and community members; but Solin did an outstanding job.  (He also prepared the overall workshop, with Richard Geeves, and managed proceedings very capably.)  The booklet presented the results of the re-survey of the Outcome Indicators as compared with the baseline:

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Here participants are discussing results, and attribution to different organizations that had worked in Svay Rieng District over the three years:

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Subgroups would then present their discussions and recommendations for attribution.  Note the headphones – since this was our first Impact Workshop, and ChildFund staff were attending from Laos, Viet Nam, and Australia in addition to Cambodia, we provided simultaneous translation:

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Here changes in several Outcome Indicators over the three years (in blue and red) can be seen.  The speaker is describing subgroup deliberations on attribution of impact to the plenary group:

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Finally, a vote was taken to agree the attribution of positive changes to Outcome Indicators.  Participants voted according to their sense of ChildFund’s contribution to the change: none, a little, some, a lot, or completely.  Here is a ballot and a tabulation sheet:

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Finally, here is an image of the participants in that first Statement of Impact Workshop: Local Community Members, Government Staff, ChildFund Staff (From The Local Area, Country Office, Sydney, and From Neighboring Viet Nam):

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*

Once the community workshops were finished, our local Senior Management would review the findings and propose adjustments to our work.  Then the DEL Managers would prepare a final report, which we described as “Statements of Impact.”

Generally speaking, these reports would include:

  • An introduction from the Country Director;
  • A description of the location where the Statement of Impact was produced, and a summary of work that ChildFund had done there;
  • An outline of how the report was produced, noting the three-year gap between baseline and repeat survey;
  • Findings agreed by the community regarding changes to each Outcome Indicator along with any attribution of positive change to ChildFund Australia;
  • Concluding comments and a plan of action for improvement, agreed by the local Country Office team and myself.

Examples of these reports are shared below.

*

This process took some time to get going, because of the three-year delay to allow for re-surveying, but once it commenced it was very exciting.  Seeing the “Statement of Impact” reports come through to Sydney, in draft, from different program countries, was incredible.  They showed, conclusively, that ChildFund was really making a difference in the lives of children, in ways that were consistent with our Theory of Change.

Importantly, they were credible, at least to me, because they showed some areas where we were not making a difference, either because we had chosen not to work in a particular domain (to focus on higher priorities) or because we needed to improve our work.

*

I’m able to share four ChildFund Australia Statements of Impact, downloaded recently from the organization’s website.  These were produced as described in this blog article:

*

Here are a few of the findings from that first “Statement of Impact” in Svay Chrum:

  • ChildFund made a major contribution to the increase in primary-school completion in the district:

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  • Although the understanding of diarrhea management had improved dramatically, it was concluded that ChildFund had not contributed to this, because we hadn’t implemented any related projects.  “Many development actors contributed to the change”:

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  • ChildFund had a major responsibility for the improvement in access to hygienic toilets in the district:

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  • ChildFund made a significant contribution to the increase in access to improved, affordable water in the district:

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  • ChildFund had made a major contribution to large increases in the percentage of children and youth who reported having opportunities to voice their opinions:

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  • Although the percentage of women of child-bearing age in the district who were knowledgeable regarding how to prevent infection with HIV, it was determined the ChildFund had made only a minor contribution to this improvement.  And recommendations were made by the group regarding youth knowledge, which had actually declined:

Screen Shot 2018-06-27 at 8.57.47 AM.png

 

To me, this is fantastic stuff, especially given that the results emerged from deep and informed consultations with the community, local partners, and local authorities.  Really, this was the Holy Grail – accountability, and lots of opportunity for learning.  The results were credible to me, because they seemed to reflect the reality of what ChildFund had worked on, and pointed out areas where we needed to improve; the report wasn’t all positive!

*

For me, the way that the Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact worked was a big step forward, and a major accomplishment.  ChildFund Australia now had a robust and participatory way of assessing impact so that we could take steps to confidently improve our work.  With these last two components of the DEF coming online, we had managed to put in place a comprehensive development-effectiveness system, the kind of system that we had not been able to implement in Plan.

As I shared the DEF – its design, the documents and reports it produced – with our teams, partners, Australian government, donors – I began to get lots of positive feedback.   At least for its time, in Australia, the ChildFund Australia DEF was the most comprehensive, robust, participatory, useful system put into place that anybody had ever seen.  Not the most scientific, perhaps, but something much better: usable, useful, and empowering.

*

My congratulations and thanks to the people who played central roles in creating, implementing, and supporting the DEF:

  • In Sydney: Richard Geeves and Rouena Getigan;
  • And the DEL Managers in our Country Offices: Chan Solin (Cambodia), Joe Pasen (PNG), Marieke Charlet (Laos), and Luu Ngoc Thuy and Bui Van Dung (Viet Nam).

*

Here are links to earlier blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration;
  33. Mt Moriah (33) – Putting It All Together (Part 1): the ChildFund Australia International Program Team;
  34. Owls’ Head (34) – Putting It All Together (Part 2): ChildFund Australia’s Theory of Change;
  35. Bondcliff (35) – ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness System;
  36. Mt Bond (36) – “Case Studies” in ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness System.

 

 

Mt Bond (36) – “Case Studies” In ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness Framework

June, 2018

I’ve been writing a series of blog posts about climbing each of the 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall.  And, each time, I’ve also been reflecting a bit on the journey since I joined Peace Corps, 33 years ago: on development, social justice, conflict, experiences along the way, etc.

So far, I’ve described climbing 35 of the 48 peaks, and covered my journey from Peace Corps in Ecuador (1984-86) through to my arrival in Sydney in 2009, where I joined ChildFund Australia as the first “International Program Director.”

Last time I described the ChildFund Australia “Development Effectiveness Framework,” the system that would help us make sure we were doing what we said we were going to do and, crucially, verifying that we were making a difference in the lives of children and young people living in poverty.  So we could learn and improve our work…

This time, I want to go into more depth on one component of the DEF, the “Case Studies” that described the lived experience of people that we worked with.  Next time, I’ll describe how we measured the impact of our work.

But first…

*

On 10 August, 2017, I climbed three 4000-footers in one very long day: Bondcliff (4265ft, 1300m), Mt Bond (4698ft, 1432m), and West Bond (4540ft, 1384m).  This was a tough day, covering 22 miles and climbing three very big mountains.  At the end of the hike, I felt like I was going to lose the toenails on both big toes (which, in fact, I did!) … it was a bit much!

Last time I wrote about climbing to the top of Bondcliff, the first summit of that day.  This time, I will describe the brief walk from there to the top of Mt Bond, the tallest of the three Bonds.  And next time I’ll finish describing that day, with the ascent of West Bond and the return to the trail-head at Lincoln Woods.

*

As I described last time, I arrived at the top of Bondcliff at about 10:30am, having left the trail-head at Lincoln Woods Visitor Center just after 6:30am.  I was able to get an early start because I had stayed the night before at Hancock Campsite on the Kancamagus road, just outside of Lincoln, New Hampshire.

It was a bright and mostly-sunny day, with just a few clouds and some haze.  The path between Bondcliff and Mt Bond is quite short – really just dropping down to a saddle, and then back up again, only 1.2 miles:

Bond Map - 6b

 

It took me about an hour to cover that distance and reach the top of Mt Bond from Bondcliff at 11:30am.  The path was rocky as it descended from Bondcliff, in the alpine zone, with many large boulders as I began to go back up towards Mt Bond – some scrambling required.

This photo was taken at the saddle between Bondcliff and Mt Bond: on the left is Bondcliff, on the right is West Bond, and in the middle, in the distance, is Franconia Ridge; Mt Bond is behind me.  A glorious view on an amazing day for climbing:

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From the Left: Bondcliff, Franconia Ridge, West Bond

 

It got even steeper climbing up from the saddle to the summit, passing through some small pine shrubs, until just before the top.

The views were spectacular at the summit of Mt Bond, despite the sky being slightly hazy – I could see the four 4000-footers of the Franconia Ridge to the west and Owl’s Head in the foreground, the Presidential Range to the east, and several other 4000-footers to the south and south-west:

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Looking To The West From The Summit Of Mt Bond

 

And I had a nice view back down the short path from the top of Bondcliff:

IMG_1943 (1)

 

There were a few people at the top, and I had a brief conversation with a couple that were walking from Zealand trailhead across the same three mountains I was climbing, and finishing at Lincoln Woods.  This one-way version of what I was doing in an up-and-back trip was possible because they had left a car at Lincoln Woods, driving to the Zealand trailhead in a second vehicle.  They would then ferry themselves back to Zealand from Lincoln Woods.

Kindly, they offered to pick up my car down at Lincoln Woods and drive it to Zealand, which would have saved me three miles.  I should have accepted, because finishing what became 22 miles, and three 4000-foot peaks, would end up hobbling me for a while, and causing two toenails to come off!  But I didn’t have a clear sense of how the day would go, so I declined their offer, with sincere thanks…

Getting to the top of Mt Bond was my 36th 4000-footer – just 12 more to go!

I didn’t stay too long at the top of Mt Bond on the way up, continuing towards West Bond… stay tuned for that next time!

*

Jean and I had moved to Sydney in July of 2009, where I would take up the newly-created position of International Program Director for ChildFund Australia.  It was an exciting opportunity for me to work in a part of the world I knew and loved (Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam) and in a challenging new country (Papua New Guinea).  It was a great chance to work with some really amazing people – in Sydney and in our Country Offices… to use what I had learned to help build and lead effective teams.  Living in Sydney would not be a hardship post, either!  Finally, it was a priceless chance for me to put together a program approach that incorporated everything I had learned to that point, over 25 years working in poverty reduction and social justice.

In the previous article in this series, I described how we developed a “Development Effectiveness System” (“DEF”) for ChildFund Australia, and I went through most of the components of the DEF in great detail.

My ambition for the DEF was to bring together our work into one comprehensive system – building on our Theory of Change and organizational Vision and Mission, creating a consistent set of tools and processes for program design and assessment, and making sure to close the loop with defined opportunities for learning, reflection, and improvement.

Here is the graphic that we used to describe the system:

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Figure 1: The ChildFund Australia Development Effectiveness Framework (2014)

 

As I said last time, I felt that three components of the DEF were particularly innovative, and worth exploring in more detail in separate blog articles:

  • I will describe components #2 (“Outcome Indicator Surveys) and #12 (Statement of Impact) in my next article.  Together, these components of the DEF were meant to enable us to measure the impact of our work in a robust, participatory way, so that we could learn and improve;
  • this time, I want to explore component #3 of the DEF: “Case Studies.”

*

It might seem strange to say it this way, but the “Case Studies” were probably my favorite of all the components of the DEF!  I loved them because they offered direct, personal accounts of the impact of projects and programs from children, youth, men and women from the communities in which ChildFund worked and the staff and officials of local agencies and government offices with whom ChildFund partnered.  We didn’t claim that the Case Studies were random or representative samples; rather, their value was simply as stories of human experience, offering insights would not have been readily gained from quantitative data.

Why was this important?  Why did it appeal to me so much?

*

Over my years working with international NGOs, I had become uneasy with the trend towards exclusive reliance on linear logic and quantitative measurement, in our international development sector.  This is perhaps a little bit ironic, since I had joined the NGO world having been educated as an engineer, schooled in the application of scientific logic and numerical analysis for practical applications in the world.

Linear logic is important, because it introduces rigor in our thinking, something that had been weak or lacking when I joined the sector in the mid-1980s.  And quantitative measurement, likewise, forced us to face evidence of what we had or had not achieved. So both of these trends were positive…

But I had come to appreciate that human development was far more complex than building a water system (for example), much more complicated than we could fully capture in linear models.  Yes, a logical, data-driven approach was helpful in many ways, perhaps nearly all of the time, but it didn’t seem to fit every situation in communities that I came to know in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  In fact, I began to see that an over-emphasis on linear approaches to human development was blinding us to ways that more qualitative, non-linear thinking could help; we seemed to be dismissing the qualitative, narrative insights that should also have been at the heart of our reflections.  No reason not to include both quantitative and qualitative measures.  But we weren’t.

My career in international development began at a time when the private-sector, business culture, started to influence our organizations in a big way: as a result of the Ethiopian famine of the mid-1980’s, INGOs were booming and, as a result, were professionalizing, introducing business practices.  All the big INGOs started to bring in people from the business world, helping “professionalize” our work.

I’ve written elsewhere about the positive and negative effects that business culture had on NGOs: on the positive side, we benefited from systems and approaches the improved the internal management of our agencies, such as clear delegations of authority, financial planning and audit, etc.  Overall, it was a very good, and very necessary evolution.

But there were some negatives.  In particular, the influx of private-sector culture into our organizations meant that:

  • We began increasingly to view the world as a linear, logical place;
  • We came to embrace the belief that bigger is always better;
  • “Accountability” to donors became so fundamental that sometimes it seemed to be our highest priority;
  • Our understanding of human nature, of human poverty, evolved towards the purely material, things that we could measure quantitatively.

I will attach a copy of the article I wrote on this topic here:  mcpeak-trojan-horse.

In effect, this cultural shift had the effect of emphasizing linear logic and quantitative measures to such a degree, with such force, that narrative, qualitative approaches were sidelined as, somehow, not business-like enough.

As I thought about the overall design of the DEF, I wanted to make 100% sure that we were able to measure the quantitative side of our work, the concrete outputs that we produced and the measurable impact that we achieved (more on that next time).  Because the great majority of our work was amenable to that form of measurement, and being accountable for delivering the outputs (projects, funding) that we had promised was hugely important.

But I was equally determined that we would include qualitative elements that would enable us to capture the lived experience of people who facing poverty.  In other words, because poverty is experienced holistically by people, including children, in ways that can be captured quantitatively and qualitatively, we needed to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative measurement approaches if we were to be truly effective.

The DEF “Case Studies” was one of the ways that we accomplished this goal.  It made me proud that we were successful in this regard.

*

There was another reason that I felt that the DEF Case Studies were so valuable, perhaps just as important as the way that they enabled us to measure poverty more holistically.  Observing our organizations, and seeing my own response to how we were evolving, I clearly saw that the influence of private-sector, business culture was having positive and negative effects.

One of the most negative impacts I saw was an increasing alienation of our people from the basic motivations that led them to join the NGO sector, a decline in the passion for social justice that had characterized us.  Not to exaggerate, but it seemed that we were perhaps losing our human connection with the hope and courage and justice that, when we were successful, we helped make for individual women and men, girls and boys.  The difference we were making in the lives of individual human beings was becoming obscured behind the statistics that we were using, behind the mechanical approaches we were taking to our work.

Therefore, I was determined to use the DEF Case Studies as tools for reconnecting us, ChildFund Australia staff and board, to the reason that we joined in the first place.  All of us.

*

So, what were the DEF Case Studies, and how were they produced and used?

In practice, Development Effectiveness and Learning Managers in ChildFund’s program countries worked with other program staff and partners to write up Case Studies that depicted the lived experience of people involved in activities supported by ChildFund.  The Case Studies were presented as narratives, with photos, which sought to capture the experiences, opinions and ideas of the people concerned, in their own words, without commentary.  They were not edited to fit a success-story format.  As time went by, our Country teams started to add a summary of their reflections to the Case Studies, describing their own responses to the stories told there.

Initially we found that field staff had a hard time grasping the idea, because they were so used to reporting their work in the dry, linear, quantitative ways that we had become used to.  Perhaps program staff felt that narrative reports were the territory of our Communications teams, meant for public-relations purposes, describing our successes in a way that could attract support for our work.  Nothing wrong with that, they seemed to feel, but not a program thing!

Staff seemed at a loss, unable to get going.  So we prepared a very structured template for the Case Studies, specifying length and tone and approach in detail.  This was a mistake, because we really wanted to encourage creativity while keeping the documents brief; emphasizing the “voice” of people in communities rather than our own views; covering failures as much as successes.  Use of a template tended to lead our program staff into a structured view of our work, so once we gained some experience with the idea, as staff became more comfortable with the idea and we began to use these Case Studies, we abandoned the rigid template and encouraged innovation.

*

So these Case Studies were a primary source of qualitative information on the successes and failures of ChildFund Australia’s work, offering insights from children, youth and adults from communities where we worked and the staff of local agencies and government offices with whom ChildFund Australia partnered.

In-country staff reviewed the Case Studies, accepting or contesting the opinions of informants about ChildFund Australia’s projects.  These debates often led to adjustments to existing projects but also triggered new thinking – at the project activity level but also at program level or even the overall program approach.

Case Studies were forwarded to Sydney, where they were reviewed by the DEF Manager; some were selected for a similar process of review by International Program staff, members of the Program Review Committee and, on occasion, by the ChildFund Australia Board.

The resulting documents were stored in a simple cloud-based archive, accessible by password to anyone within the organization.  Some Case Studies were also included on ChildFund Australia’s website; we encouraged staff from our Communications team in Sydney to review the Case Studies and, if suitable, to re-purpose them for public purposes.  Of course, we were careful to obtain informed consent from people included in the documents.

*

Through Case Studies, as noted above, local informants were able to pass critical judgement on the appropriateness of ChildFund’s strategies, how community members perceived our aims and purposes (not necessarily as we intended); and they could alert us to unexpected consequences (both positive and negative) of what we did.

For example, one of the first Case Studies written up in Papua New Guinea revealed that home garden vegetable cultivation not only resulted in increased family income for the villager concerned (and positive impact on children in terms of nutrition and education), it also enhanced his social standing through increasing his capacity to contribute to traditional cultural events.

Here are three images from that Case Study:

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And here is a copy of the Case Study itself:  PNG Case Study #1 Hillary Vegetable farming RG edit 260111.  Later I was able to visit Hillary at his farm!

Another Case Study came from the ChildFund Connect project, an exciting effort led by my former colleagues Raúl Caceres and Kelly Royds, who relocated from Sydney to Boston in 2016.  I climbed Mt Moriah with them in July, 2017, and also Mt Pierce and Mt Eisenhower in August of 2016.  ChildFund Connect was an innovative project that linked children across Laos, Viet Nam, Australia and Sri Lanka, providing a channel for them directly to build understanding of their differing realities.   This Case Study on their project came from Laos: LAO Case Study #3 Connect DRAFT 2012.

In a future article in this series, I plan on describing work we carried out building the power (collective action) of people living in poverty.  It can be a sensitive topic, particularly in areas of Southeast Asia without traditions of citizen engagement.  Here is a Case Study from Viet Nam describing how ChildFund helped local citizens connect productively with authorities to resolve issues related to access to potable water: VTM Case Study #21 Policy and exclusion (watsan)-FINAL.

*

Dozens of Case Studies were produced, illustrating a wide range of experiences with the development processes supported by ChildFund in all of the countries where we managed program implementation.  Reflections from many of these documents helped us improve our development practice, and at the same time helped us stay in touch with the deeper purpose of our having chosen to work to promote social justice, accompanying people living in poverty as they built better futures.

*

A few of the DEF Case Studies focused, to some extent, on ChildFund Australia itself.  For example, here is the story of three generations of Hmong women in Nonghet District in Xieng Khoung Province in Laos.  It describes how access to education has evolved across those generations:  LAO Case Study #5 Ethnic Girls DRAFT 2012.  It’s a powerful description of change and progress, notable also because one of the women featured in the Case Study was a ChildFund employee, along with her mother and daughter!

Two other influential Case Studies came from Cambodia, both of which touched on how ChildFund was attempting to manage our child-sponsorship mechanisms with our programmatic commitments.  I’ve written separately, some time ago, about the advantages of child sponsorship: when managed well (as we did in Plan and especially in ChildFund Australia), and these two Case Studies evocatively illustrated the challenge, and the ways that staff in Cambodia were making it all work well.

One Case Study describes some of the tensions implicit in the relationship between child sponsorship and programming, and the ways that we were making progress in reconciling these differing priorities: CAM Case Study 6 Sponsorship DRAFT 2012.  This Case Study was very influential, with our staff in Cambodia and beyond, with program staff in Sydney, and with our board.  It powerfully communicated a reality that our staff, and families in communities, were facing.

A second Case Study discussed how sponsorship and programs were successfully integrated in the field in Cambodia: CAM Case Study #10 Program-SR Integration Final.

*

As I mentioned last time, given the importance of the system, relying on our feeling that the DEF was a great success wasn’t good enough.  So we sought expert review, commissioning two independent, expert external reviews of the DEF.

The first review (attached here: External DEF Review – November 2012), which was concluded in November of 2012, took place before we had fully implemented the system.  In particular, since Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact (to be covered in my next blog article) were implemented only after three years (and every three years thereafter), we had not yet reached that stage.  But we certainly were quite advanced in the implementation of most of the DEF, so it was a good time to reflect on how it was going.

I included an overview of the conclusions reached by both reviewers last time.  Here I want to quote from the first evaluation, with particular reference to the DEF Case Studies:

One of the primary benefits of the DEF is that it equips ChildFund Australia with an increased quantity and quality of evidence-based information for communications with key stakeholders including the Board and a public audience. In particular, there is consolidated output data that can be easily accessed by the communications team; there is now a bank of high quality Case Studies that can be drawn on for communication and reflection; and there are now dedicated resources in-country who have been trained and are required to generate information that has potential for communications purposes. The increase in quantity and quality of information equips ChildFund Australia to communicate with a wide range of stakeholders.

One of the strengths of the DEF recognized by in-country staff particularly is that the DEF provides a basis for stakeholders to share their perspectives. Stakeholders are involved in identifying benefits and their perspectives are heard through Case Studies. This has already provided a rich source of information that has prompted reflection by in-country teams, the Sydney based programs team and the ChildFund Australia Board.

This focus on building tools, systems and the overall capacity of the organization places ChildFund Australia in a strong position to tackle a second phase of the DEF which looks at how the organization will use performance information for learning and development. It has already started on this journey, with various parts of the organization using Case Studies for reflection. ChildFund Australia has already undertaken an exercise of coding the bank of Case Studies to assist further analysis and learning. There is lots of scope for next steps with this bank of Case Studies, including thematic reflections. Again, the benefits of this aspect have not been realised yet as the first stages of the DEF roll-out have been focused on data collection and embedding the system in CF practices.

In most Country Offices, Case Studies have provided a new formal opportunity for country program staff to reflect on their work and this has been used as a really constructive process. The Laos Country Office is currently in the process of translating Case Studies so that they can be used to prompt discussion and learning at the country level. In PNG, the team is also interested in using the Case Studies as a communication tool with local communities to demonstrate some of the achievements of ChildFund Australia programs.

In some cases, program staff have found Case Studies confronting when they have highlighted program challenges or weaknesses. The culture of critical reflection may take time to embed in some country offices and may be facilitated by cross-country reflection opportunities. Currently, however, Country Office staff do not know how to access Case Studies from other country programs. ChildFund Australia is exploring how the ‘bank’ of DEF Case Studies would be most accessible and useful to country office personnel.

One of the uses of Case Studies has been as a prompt for discussion and reflection by the programs team in Sydney and by the Board. Case Studies have been seen as a really useful way to provide an insight into a program, practice and ChildFund Australia achievements.

At an organizational level, an indexing and cross-referencing system has been implemented which enables Case Studies to be searched by country and by theme. The system is yet to be introduced to MEL and Program users, but has potential to be a very useful bank of qualitative data for reflection and learning. It also provides a bank of data from which to undertake thematic reflections across and between countries. One idea for consideration is that ChildFund draw on groups of Case Studies to develop practice notes.

In general Case Studies are considered to be the most ‘successful’ part of the DEF by those involved in collecting information.

The second reviewer concentrated on other components, mainly aspects I will describe in more detail in my next article, not so much the Case Studies…

*

So the Case Studies were a very important element in the overall DEF.  I tried very hard to incorporate brief reflections on selected Case Studies at every formal meeting of the International Program Team, of ChildFund Australia’s Program Review Committee, and (less frequently) at meetings of our Board of Directors.  More often than not, time pressures on the agendas of these meetings led to us dropping the Case Studies from discussion, but often enough we did spend time (usually at the beginning of the meetings) reflecting on what we saw in them.

At the beginning, when we first began to use the Case Studies, our discussion tended to be mechanical: pointing out errors in the use of English, or questioning how valid the observations might be, challenging the statistical reliability of the conclusions.  But, over time, I noticed that our teams began to use the Case Studies as they were designed: to gain insight into the lived experience of particular human beings, and to reconnect with the realities of people’s struggle for better lives for themselves and their children.

This was a great success, and really worked as I had hoped.  The Case Studies complemented the more rigorous, quantitative components of the DEF, helping the system be holistic, enabling us to see more deeply into the effect that our work was having while also enhancing our accountability.

*

Next time, I will describe getting to the top of West Bond, and all the way down the 11 miles from there to the Lincoln Woods parking lot, where I staggered back to my car with such damage to my feet that I soon would lose toenails on both my big toes!  And I will share details of the final two components of the DEF that I want to highlight: the Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact were probably the culmination of the whole system.

So, stay tuned!

*

Here are links to earlier blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration;
  33. Mt Moriah (33) – Putting It All Together (Part 1): the ChildFund Australia International Program Team;
  34. Owls’ Head (34) – Putting It All Together (Part 2): ChildFund Australia’s Theory of Change;
  35. Bondcliff (35) – ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness System.

 

 

Mt Moriah (33) – Putting It All Together (Part 1): the ChildFund Australia International Program Team

May, 2018

I began a new journey two years ago (May, 2016), tracing two long arcs in my life:

  • Climbing all 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall (1219m), what is called “peak-bagging” by local climbers.  I’m describing, in words and images, the ascent of each of these peaks – mostly done solo, but sometimes with a friend or two;
  • Working in international development during the MDG era: what was it like in the sector as it boomed, and evolved, from the response to the Ethiopian crisis in the mid-1980’s through to the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

*

Picking up the story in July of 2009, I flew to Sydney for what would become 6 great years as ChildFund Australia’s first International Program Director; Jean would join me there in a few weeks.  In two previous blog entries of this series, I described how I was thinking about programming, and about putting together a strong set of teams in Sydney and overseas, as I approached this exciting new challenge.

In many ways, as I headed towards Sydney, I was hoping to put it all together: 25 years in international development and social justice, designing and implementing programs and partnerships, building cohesive and high-performing teams – this was my chance to start afresh with all of the lessons learned over those decades.  To really get it right.

In this article, I want to introduce the program team at ChildFund’s head office in Sydney – the “International Program Team” – share a bit about the great people I worked with, along with a description of how the team’s staffing and structure evolved.  I would approach this task very mindful of what I had learned in Plan International, especially how we refocused and restructured the agency; and keeping the lessons about building strong teams in complex situations, that I had learned at UUSC in my mind also.

But first: I climbed Mt Moriah (4049ft, 1234m) on July 22, 2017, with Kelly Royds and Raúl Caceres, friends from Australia who, coincidentally, had worked at ChildFund (but not on the IPT.)  We had hiked up Mt Pierce and Mt Eisenhower a year earlier, in August of 2016…

*

Raúl and Kelly came up from Cambridge the day before, and we left Durham at about 7:45am, and stopped for sandwiches and coffee in Ossipee on the way north.  Traffic was heavy on this summer weekend, so it wasn’t until 10:45am that we reached the trailhead in Gorham, in the northern reaches of the White Mountains.

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Raúl and Kelly at the Beginning of the Climb

 

Mt Moriah is the northern-most of the six 4000-foot peaks in the Wildcat-Carter range.  I had climbed Wildcat “D” and Wildcat Mountain (on one day), and Middle and South Carter (on the next day), in September of 2016, solo; and I had summited Carter Dome on 9 July, 2017, with our friend Draco.  So Moriah was the last of these six that I would climb.

Moriah is an “easy to moderate” hike, and we had a nice day for the climb: not too hot, partly cloudy and a bit misty.   It’s 4.5 miles up, and we retraced our steps from the top.

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The trail climbs moderately from the trailhead just outside of Gorham, reaching a ledge outlook at Mt Surprise.  There, views opened to the west towards the Presidential range:

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This ledge area seemed unusual to me – not so high in altitude, but quite alpine in nature: low pines and large areas of lichens, as if we were at a much greater elevation:

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I guess the conditions here were affected by a combination of elevation and latitude: since we were at the northern end of the White Mountains, perhaps the winter weather would be a bit more severe?

It was a bit misty, with views that were not quite as dramatic as last time I was up on this range, but still very impressive.  There is a short boggy area near the top.

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Nearing the Top – Raúl, With Kelly in the Background

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We reached the spur path to the summit of Mt Moriah at 2pm.  From here it wasn’t too far to the top.

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The summit itself is a small, rocky clearing, and on this day it was quite crowded, so we ate a late lunch at an outlook a short distance from the top, with great views to the north:

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The (Crowded) Summit Of Mt Moriah

 

An outcropping was visible to the south, without anybody on it.  It looked like there would be great views from there so, after lunch I thought that I would go ahead to try to get to it.  Maybe the view there would be worth the walk.  When we reached the intersection with the Kenduskeag Trail, Kelly and Raúl decided to wait for me there; I kept going, hoping to reach that outcropping.

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Taking first the right-hand turn (along the Carter-Moriah Trail, coincident with the Appalachian Trail here) and then doubling back to explore briefly along the Kenduskeag Trail, I just couldn’t find that outcrop.  After poking around a bit, I headed back to where I had last seen Raúl and Kelly, but they had gone.  So I began the descent back to the trailhead.

Soon I passed a couple who were climbing up, and I asked them if they had seen my friends.  No!  Whoops!  Clearly we had gotten separated at the top, so I asked the couple to tell Raúl and Kelly that I had begun the descent.  A few minutes later I was able to get reception on my cellphone, and rang Raúl: sure enough, they were waiting for me back at the summit!  In retrospect, I should have thought of that – of course they would want to wait where there was a view! – but I had been too tired to climb back up there, and assumed that they were feeling similarly.

From their perspective, as I was descending, Raúl and Kelly became worried that I was lost and perhaps injured.  Finally they decided that it would be best to walk to the trailhead, and then I called Raúl and we realized what had happened.

I descended as we had ascended, a beautiful day for a hike in the White Mountains:

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Presidential Range, Now Backlit In The Afternoon

 

Nearing the trailhead, I came across part of an old car that I hadn’t seen on the way up:

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I arrived back at the trailhead at 5pm, and Kelly and Raúl finished at about 6:30pm.  Despite our inadvertent (and temporary!) separation, all turned out OK and it was a pleasant and enjoyable day.  Mt Moriah, peak number 33, was climbed – 15 more to go!

*

When I arrived in Sydney, one of my first tasks was to finalize the structure of the new International Program Team (“IPT”), and complete its staffing.  Having spent lots of time and energy worrying about structure in previous roles (particularly at the International Headquarters of Plan International – see this blog), I was thinking about this in two ways:

  1. Because structure has a strong influence on behavior, I wanted to keep the IPT’s structure lean, flat and close to the field, and efficient, cost-wise;
  2. Because with the right people, structure wasn’t the most important thing, I wanted to not worry about it too much: just get the right people, make as good a structural decision as I could, and then get on with the work and let things evolve through intentional, restorative, reflective learning.

It turns out that these two aims are fairly consistent.  Yes, structure does have a strong influence on behavior, so it’s important not to get it wrong.  And, within reason, flatter structures are better: fewer levels of bureaucracy between field and senior management keeps things a bit more grounded in the reality of our NGO work.  Flatter structures help keep head-office costs down, also.  But I had also learned an important lesson along the way: hire great people, make roles very clear and connected to the organization’s mission and people’s passions, and then let things evolve, reflecting and learning-by-doing.  Don’t obsess too much about structure.

So that’s what I did.

*

When I arrived in Sydney, the IPT was in flux.  Even though ChildFund Australia had been working in Papua New Guinea for fifteen years, and in Viet Nam for a decade, the main role of Sydney-based program staff at that point was to oversee projects funded through the Australia-NGO Cooperation Program (“ANCP”) of AusAID (the Australian Government’s overseas aid agency), implemented by the US member of the ChildFund Alliance, confusingly-named ChildFund International.  This meant that the IPT had little role with regards to ChildFund Australia’s own programming…

In 2009, ChildFund Australia was preparing for growth: our private income was growing strongly, and because the new Labor government was promising to strongly-increase overseas development assistance in line with international commitments, and we had just become top-tier ANCP “Partners” with AusAID, it looked like that income stream was also going to grow quite rapidly.  Part of that preparation for growth resulted in the creation of my new role as International Program Director, which would assume the management of ChildFund Australia’s three (becoming five) Country Directors.

ChildFund Australia’s organizational structure as I arrived in Sydney looked something like this:

IPD Structure - 1.002

 

  • Five Department Directors worked with Nigel: Bandula Gonsalkorale (Finance and IT); Jan Jackson (HR); Lynne Joseph (Sponsor Relations); Di Mason (Fundraising and Marketing); and me;
  • Initially we had three Country Directors, handling program implementation and reporting to me: Carol Mortenson (Cambodia); Smokey Dawson (PNG); and Peter Walton (Viet Nam).  Peter also handled regional responsibilities for the Mekong, supervising ChildFund’s research into setting up operations in Laos.  I will share more about these Country Directors, and their successors and teams, in upcoming articles in this series…

And in the Sydney Program Department, five positions were in the FY2010 budget (in addition to my own):

  • Veronica Bell had just left ChildFund, taking up a position at the Human Rights Council for New South Wales.  So her International Program Manager position was vacant;
  • Richard Geeves had just joined, only a few days before my arrival, as International Program Coordinator for the Mekong programs (Cambodia and Viet Nam).  Richard had long experience in the education sector in Australia (including in indigenous areas), and was recently returned to Australia after many years working from Cambodia;
  • Rouena (“Ouen”) Getigan had joined ChildFund several years earlier, and therefore was our repository of wisdom and knowledge; the rest of us were new, but Ouen knew how things worked!  She handled relations with our ChildFund partners in Africa and Asia that were funded through the ANCP program, and did an outstanding job of building and maintaining these partnerships.  In addition, to support a large regional HIV and AIDS project in Africa, Ouen supervised a very capable Kampala-based project coordinator, Evas Atwine;
  • Terina Stibbard, like Richard, had just joined ChildFund, only a few days before my arrival, as International Program Coordinator for Papua New Guinea.  Overflowing with passion for the work, and with a tireless commitment, Terina took on what was perhaps our biggest challenge: building a strong program in PNG.  I will write much more about PNG in a future blog post in this series.  Also, among other things, Terina introduced us to the concept of “critical friend,” which perfectly captured the IPC role with our Country Offices: without direct authority, but able to advise and speak truth directly without harming relationships;
  • And Nigel had left one position undefined, for me to consider.

Interviews for the Mekong and PNG roles had begun before I was hired, but before finalizing things with Richard and Terina, Nigel and Jan had consulted me, asking if I wanted them to wait until I got to Sydney before finalizing these hires.  But Richard and Terina looked great to me, on paper, and I saw no reason to delay.

In terms of the program-team’s structure, I didn’t see any reason, at this point, for the extra structural level implied by the “International Program Manager” role.  Over time, I saw things might evolve in three general domains:

IPD Structure - 1.001

 

In the Program Support domain, one group of staff in Sydney would accompany Country Directors and, most directly, the Program Managers in our program countries, helping develop projects and programs with the greatest impact on the causes of child poverty in each location.  In the Program Development area, Sydney staff would provide technical and systems support, establishing standards and helping measure results.  Finally, of course, we had a general function of Program Implementation – our Country Directors.

As we will see, in fact, the IPT structure did in fact evolve in this way.

*

So here is the first iteration of the IPT structure, put in place soon after my arrival:

IPD Structure - 1.003

 

Richard, Ouen, and Terina focused mainly on “Program Support” duties, working directly with our Program Managers in Cambodia, PNG, and Viet Nam, and with ChildFund partner offices in Asia and Africa to help them develop and implement, and learn from, increasingly sophisticated programming.  Two new hires, Jackie Robertson and Cory Steinhauer, joined ChildFund to support program development: Jackie was focused on developing the policies and standards that would govern our work; and Cory would focus on building a development-effectiveness framework through which we would design our programs and measure our results.

Here are some images of that first IP team:

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Terina, Richard, Cory, Jackie, Me and Ouen

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Richard, Terina, Me

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Ouen

*

This structure worked very well.  In terms of how I managed the team, from the beginning I tried to put in place a range of “restorative” practices, aimed at keeping the team together, keeping us grounded and motivated:

  • Every Monday morning at 10am, we had a team checkin.  I had learned how to do this from Atema Eclai at UUSC, though I had to adapt it quite a bit: Australians weren’t enthusiastic about the “touchy-feely” aspects of checkins like Atema’s.  So we limited things to a brief general chat followed by a discussion of priorities for the week.  This seemed to work very well, settling us into the week smoothly, and was replicated by the team even when I was away;
  • Every month or two, we had a formal IPT Meeting.  These events had agendas, minutes, pending-action-items lists, etc.  They were business meetings, which I would chair, meant to be efficient fora for decision-making and accountability.  They worked very well.  For example, I had learned how to use “pending-action-items” lists from Max van der Schalk while working at Plan’s international headquarters, and the introduction of this tool was very important at ChildFund: decisions that required action went onto the list, organized in order by date, and stayed on the list until they were completed or the IPT agreed to remove them.  This provided a strong element of accountability and was a helpful irritant that kept us from neglecting decisions and becoming less accountable.  Once the ChildFund Australia “Development Effectiveness Framework” (“DEF”) was completed, we introduced a short reflection from a field case study at the beginning of each IPT Meeting, to help ground us in the reality of our work; much more detail about the DEF will come in a future blog in this series;
  • My intention was to complement the formal IPT meetings with periodic reflection meetings about a topic related to our work.  These sessions wouldn’t have agendas or minutes, much less structured and more relaxed than the IPT Meetings, and would be chaired by different members of the IPT who had expressed an interest in a particular topic – micro-finance, human rights, direct giving, etc.  These sessions were always interesting and useful, and energizing, so I regret not organizing more of them.  Somehow they seemed to drop off the agenda with the fast pace of work, over time, and I don’t think that I fully realized the potential of this concept;
  • I tried to have an open door policy, available for IPT members at any time.  I made sure to close my door only when necessary, and to invite any team member to come in and sit down whenever they dropped by.  I think this was helpful in creating and sustaining a culture of caring and support, clearly communicating to everybody that helping the team was my main job.  Of course, there were times when my office door needed to be closed – for the discussion of sensitive matters, particularly on the phone with our Country Directors – but I had learned at UUSC to be quite mindful of asking permission to close my door, to enhance transparency and make sure people were comfortable.  As with the team checkins, it seemed that our mostly-Australian staff viewed this habit of mine – asking permission to close my door – as a bit silly.  But I think it was helpful;
  • Of course, I carried out an annual performance review of each member of the team, and spent lots of time preparing these documents.  I tried to be balanced, but to always include areas for improvement – loyal readers of this blog will remember my experience with Pham Thu Ba, back in Plan Viet Nam: when I finished her first performance review, which was stellar, she told me I wasn’t doing my job if I couldn’t help her improve!  This made a big impression on me, and even though western culture these days seems to only value praise, I wanted to honor Thu Ba’s example in my work in Australia.  This worked well, most of the time!;
  • In addition to the yearly performance review process, I tried to have some less-formal, one-on-one time with each IPT member every year.  I’d invite them for coffee or lunch, and have an open, unstructured chat about how things were going. I wasn’t able to make this happen as often as I wanted, but it was a very useful mechanism, helping surface concerns and opportunities that I might not have appreciated otherwise;
  • Finally, also dating from my time in Viet Nam, I adapted and used a “Team Effectiveness Assessment” for use with the IPT, and was able to use this tool to formally assess how we were progressing.   The framework I used came from a great workbook that I had discovered at Asia Books in the Bangkok Airport, back when I worked in Hanoi in the late 1990’s: “The Team-Building Workshop,” by Vivette Payne.  The approach included in the book outlined eight elements of team effectiveness, and a survey was included that could be used to measure the status of a particular team.  Starting with how I had used the survey in Hanoi, I now adapted the survey and used it four times with the IPT, tracking results and identifying areas that we could focus on to improve (in yellow):

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You can see that our overall score, a measure of team effectiveness, improved from 197.1 in March, 2011 to 230.6 in December of 2011, and then moved back down to 204.1 in January of 2014.  I think that the decrease in score reflects the arrival of several new IPT members, and the corresponding need to settle the team down into new roles and relationships.

Each time we used this tool, we identified areas for focus, which are initiated in yellow: for example, in October of 2012 we looked to focus on “Roles” and “Team Relationships” and “Skills & Learning.”  I found the tool to be practical and very useful, though not to be taken too literally; discussion of results and team reflection on next steps was more important than the numerical scoring… and the fact that I was using this tool periodically gave the team a message that I was taking our effectiveness seriously, and investing my time, and all of our time, on improving the team environment.

*

In one of my blogs about UUSC, I described how I had created the “UUSC Handbook,” to enhance clarity of how things would be done in that agency.  From my perspective, as Executive Director there, the UUSC Handbook was a big success, notwithstanding its large size.  Given the tensions that existed in that agency, having an agreed, approved set of standards and procedures was helpful, and since it mainly simply codified and clarified existing practices, it didn’t create too much bureaucracy.

I replicated this approach at ChildFund Australia, creating the ChildFund “Program Handbook.”  Like its UUSC predecessor, the Program Handbook was quite complex and bulky to produce and update, which happened periodically … they were both meant to be living documents.   And it contained much content that was already existing, just needing to be codified.

But, unlike the UUSC Handbook, ChildFund’s document contained much that was new: our Theory of Change and our Development Effectiveness Framework, and a range of program policies – these were new, developed by the new IPT, and represented the ongoing maturing of ChildFund’s programming.

A copy of a version of the ChildFund Australia Program Handbook is here (Program Handbook – 3.3 DRAFT ); even though this is marked as “Draft,” I think it was the final update that we issued before I left Sydney in 2015.

*

Two years later, in 2011, ChildFund Australia was growing strongly, and we had commenced operations in Laos.  The IPT structure in Sydney evolved consistently with this growth:

IPD Structure - 1.004

 

Carol Mortensen continued as CD in Cambodia, but changes had been made in PNG and Viet Nam, and we had started operations in Lao PDR:

  • Andrew Ikupu, a very-experienced Papua New Guinean, had replaced Smokey Dawson as CD in PNG.  Andrew had long experience working in development in his country, and had a PhD from the University of South Australia in Adelaide;
  • Deb Leaver had taken over from Peter Walton in Viet Nam.  I had first met Deb in late 2009, when I visited ActionAid Australia, where Deb was Program Director, and she had been probably the most welcoming of my peers in Sydney.  We were lucky to hire Deb to follow Peter;
  • Chris Mastaglio, with his able colleague Keoamphone Souvannaphoum, had helped ChildFund with the initial research into why, how, and where we should work in Laos.  Once we made the decision to start working there, we were fortunate that both Chris and Keo were available to join ChildFund: Chris as CD, and Keo as Program Manager (and, later, as CD when Chris transitioned to head up a regional sport-for-development program).

We were very lucky to have Andrew, Chris, Deb and Keo join ChildFund Australia.

In Sydney, things had also evolved.  Cory Steinhauer had departed, and Richard Geeves had moved over from Program Support (where he had served as IPC for the Mekong) to work on Development Effectiveness.  He was quite good at this role: while I was the primary architect of ChildFund’s Development Effectiveness Framework, which I will describe in detail in a future blog post in this series, Richard was an able foil, working to keep things simple and practical, and he had a good touch with the field, keeping the implementation of what was a new, challenging system on track, with good humor.

John Fenech joined the Program Development team, helping our Country Offices prepare grant proposals.  Relative to our size, ChildFund Australia had a lower proportion of income from technical grants (bilateral, multi-lateral, foundation) than our peer organizations, and John’s role was to build our portfolio.  Although John was one of the younger members of the IPT, he brought a vivid countercultural sense, sometimes seeming to date more from the 1970’s than from the 2010’s.  In a good way…

Terina remained engaged with PNG, and she was doing a fantastic job working with Andrew Ikupu and his Program Manager Manish Joshi (later becoming CD there).  As a result, our programs in PNG were really taking off – growing in size, impact, and sophistication, and diversifying in income source.  And Ouen continued to work with our ChildFund International partners across Africa and Asia as they implemented an increasing number of ANCP-funded projects.

As our programs were expanding, two new IPCs had joined, working with our programs in the Mekong: Caroline Pinney took over support from Cambodia and Laos, and Maria Attard worked with our team in Viet Nam, while also coordinating research and initial engagement in Myanmar.  Caroline brought long experience in Asia, with AVI (the Australian volunteer-sending agency), and a very strong level of dedication and passion for our work.  Maria’s work had been in Cambodia (working with women and children that had suffered from domestic violence) and the Pacific (in the disability sector), before returning to Australia (continuing in the disability sector).  Maria brought a welcome sense of activism to the team, building on her advocacy work in the disability sector.  Both Caroline and Maria showed remarkable dedication to the heavy workload and complicated realities of the programs that they supported.

Finally, in this second iteration of the IPT structure, we decided that the scale of operations was large enough to merit a program officer to provide a range of support services to the team.  Initially we wanted to hire an indigenous Australian, accessing subsidy programs offered by the government.  This was Terina’s idea, and was a very good one, but we were never able to make it work due to complicated and dysfunctional bureaucracy on the government side.

So we shifted concepts, and decided instead to look towards recent graduates in international development.  Given how many people were finishing degrees in the field, and how few jobs there were, we thought it would be good to make the position time-limited – giving new graduates some real work experience, and some income, while taking some administrative load off of the rest of the IPT.  And then booting them out into the real world.

We recruited externally, and were able to hire a very smart, extremely hard-working new graduate, Mai Nguyen.  From then on, Mai handled a range of administrative and program-support duties with great efficiency and good humor.

Here are images of that iteration of the IPT:

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IPT in February, 2012.  From Left To Right: John Fenech, Ouen Getigan, Me, Maria Attard, Terina Stibbard, Mai Nguyen, Caroline Pinney, and Richard Geeves.  Missing: Jackie Robertson

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IPT in March, 2012.  From Left To Right: Ouen Getigan, Maria Attard, Terina Stibbard (seated), Caroline Pinney, Jackie Robertson, Me (seated), John Fenech, Mai Nguyen, and Richard Geeves

 

*

In 2014 we introduced IPT’s third structural evolution, the last version of my time as International Program Director.  At this point, our scale had grown further, with the addition of Myanmar and, with 11 direct reports, I was having trouble providing proper individual attention to everybody.  So we introduced a new level, partly to break my “span of control”: so Ouen and Richard became “Managers”:

 

IPD Structure - 1.001

 

Ouen would be handling Program Development and the support of our Development Effectiveness Framework, and Richard moved to manage Program Support while also serving as IPC for PNG (after Terina Stibbard departed.)  This allowed me to give priority attention to the five Country Directors now reporting to me, and to Ouen and Richard.

Here is an image of that final iteration of the Sydney-based team:

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IPT in November, 2014: John Fenech, Sanwar Ali, Caroline Pinney, Richard Geeves, Maria Attard, Me, Manasi Kogekar, Mai Nguyen, Sarah Hunt, and Ouen Getigan.  Missing: Jackie Robertson.

 

We had upped our technical support capacity, by recruiting Sanwar Ali from Oxfam Australia; he would head support for our increasing Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Response efforts.  John Fenech had moved to serve as IPC for Cambodia, allowing Caroline Pinney to focus on Cambodia, and Mai Nguyen had moved to serve as IPC for Myanmar, allowing Maria Attard to focus on Viet Nam.  To replace John in the grant-development role, we (re)hired Sarah Hunt, who was quickly very successful in bringing in additional resources to the program; Sarah had served on the IPT before my arrival, and we were lucky to bring her back, thanks to Ouen’s strong recommendation.  Sarah made grant development look easy, which it certainly isn’t!

This team worked very well, and seemed harmonious and effective.  Ouen and Richard were good, supportive managers of their teams, and I was able to spend much more time with our Country Directors.

*

In my last article in this series, I shared a framework that I developed over time, for thinking about effective teams in NGO settings:

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In that article, I said that “… our INGO teams will perform strongly if:

  • their task is clear, accountability is clear, what we are supposed to do, and why, is clear, and if how to carry out our tasks is clear;
  • we operate in a context of high trust;
  • the inspiration that we bring to our work is refreshed periodically.  And:
  • the normal wear-and-tear on our human relationships, the harm done over time, is restored intentionally.”

How did we do in ChildFund Australia’s IPT?

  • Clarity: We did fairly well here.  I was careful to engage with the IPT to make sure that their roles and jobs were clear, and the work we did to develop a programmatic Theory of Change and Development Effectiveness Framework also greatly enhanced clarity.  The preparation and frequent updating of the Program Handbook also provided clarity, though perhaps was viewed as a bit bureaucratic by some.  But, overall, I’d say things were clear;
  • Trust: this is a bit harder to judge, for me, because it was my job to create and maintain an environment of trust.  Trust comes from a combination of competence and honesty, and I feel that IPT members viewed me as quite competent and honest.  For example, I decided to share minutes of all Senior Management Team meetings with IPT members at our IPT Meetings – orally, in summary, and omitting any confidential content.  I think that sharing this information helped reinforce a sense of transparency.  But of course many factors were beyond my control, and I was imperfect in my communications skills;
  • Inspiration: I think we did fairly well here, I tried to bring a sense of the realities in the field into all our meetings, and into board and Senior-Management meetings, using (for example) case studies from our Development Effectiveness Framework to reconnect us with the deeper motivations that brought us into the NGO sector.  Again, I was imperfect in this, but I think we did pretty well;
  • Restorative Practices: earlier in this article I described my efforts to build restorative practices into the ongoing context of the IPT, and I think these worked very well.

Overall, perhaps a solid B+.

*

That’s some of the story of ChildFund Australia’s International Program Team, from 2009 through 2015.  ChildFund’s work expanded enormously during that time, and the IPT  managed to support that expansion smoothly, with increasing attention to the quality and sophistication of our programming.

It did come at a financial cost: program support increased from around 4% of funds remitted to international programming in 2010, to 6.7% in 2015.  My sense is that the gains in effectiveness and impact were well worth this investment – I will explore this in more depth in an upcoming post in this series.

I enjoyed working with the IPT, and learned a lot from them.  Morale was good, consistently, and though I can’t take sole credit for that success, I think that the approach we took helped.

With gratitude and warm appreciation to:

  • Sanwar Ali
  • Maria Attard
  • John Fenech
  • Richard Geeves
  • Rouena Getigan
  • Sarah Hunt
  • Manasi Kogekar
  • Mai Nguyen
  • Caroline Pinney
  • Jackie Robertson
  • Cory Steinhauer
  • Terina Stibbard

*

Stay tuned for more blog posts about ChildFund Australia: our Theory of Change and Development Effectiveness Framework, our work and great teams in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam, and much  more…

*

Here are links to blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration.