Mt Bond (36) – “Case Studies” In ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness Framework

June, 2018

I’ve been writing a series of blog posts about climbing each of the 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall.  And, each time, I’ve also been reflecting a bit on the journey since I joined Peace Corps, 33 years ago: on development, social justice, conflict, experiences along the way, etc.

So far, I’ve described climbing 35 of the 48 peaks, and covered my journey from Peace Corps in Ecuador (1984-86) through to my arrival in Sydney in 2009, where I joined ChildFund Australia as the first “International Program Director.”

Last time I described the ChildFund Australia “Development Effectiveness Framework,” the system that would help us make sure we were doing what we said we were going to do and, crucially, verifying that we were making a difference in the lives of children and young people living in poverty.  So we could learn and improve our work…

This time, I want to go into more depth on one component of the DEF, the “Case Studies” that described the lived experience of people that we worked with.  Next time, I’ll describe how we measured the impact of our work.

But first…

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On 10 August, 2017, I climbed three 4000-footers in one very long day: Bondcliff (4265ft, 1300m), Mt Bond (4698ft, 1432m), and West Bond (4540ft, 1384m).  This was a tough day, covering 22 miles and climbing three very big mountains.  At the end of the hike, I felt like I was going to lose the toenails on both big toes (which, in fact, I did!) … it was a bit much!

Last time I wrote about climbing to the top of Bondcliff, the first summit of that day.  This time, I will describe the brief walk from there to the top of Mt Bond, the tallest of the three Bonds.  And next time I’ll finish describing that day, with the ascent of West Bond and the return to the trail-head at Lincoln Woods.

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As I described last time, I arrived at the top of Bondcliff at about 10:30am, having left the trail-head at Lincoln Woods Visitor Center just after 6:30am.  I was able to get an early start because I had stayed the night before at Hancock Campsite on the Kancamagus road, just outside of Lincoln, New Hampshire.

It was a bright and mostly-sunny day, with just a few clouds and some haze.  The path between Bondcliff and Mt Bond is quite short – really just dropping down to a saddle, and then back up again, only 1.2 miles:

Bond Map - 6b

 

It took me about an hour to cover that distance and reach the top of Mt Bond from Bondcliff at 11:30am.  The path was rocky as it descended from Bondcliff, in the alpine zone, with many large boulders as I began to go back up towards Mt Bond – some scrambling required.

This photo was taken at the saddle between Bondcliff and Mt Bond: on the left is Bondcliff, on the right is West Bond, and in the middle, in the distance, is Franconia Ridge; Mt Bond is behind me.  A glorious view on an amazing day for climbing:

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From the Left: Bondcliff, Franconia Ridge, West Bond

 

It got even steeper climbing up from the saddle to the summit, passing through some small pine shrubs, until just before the top.

The views were spectacular at the summit of Mt Bond, despite the sky being slightly hazy – I could see the four 4000-footers of the Franconia Ridge to the west and Owl’s Head in the foreground, the Presidential Range to the east, and several other 4000-footers to the south and south-west:

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Looking To The West From The Summit Of Mt Bond

 

And I had a nice view back down the short path from the top of Bondcliff:

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There were a few people at the top, and I had a brief conversation with a couple that were walking from Zealand trailhead across the same three mountains I was climbing, and finishing at Lincoln Woods.  This one-way version of what I was doing in an up-and-back trip was possible because they had left a car at Lincoln Woods, driving to the Zealand trailhead in a second vehicle.  They would then ferry themselves back to Zealand from Lincoln Woods.

Kindly, they offered to pick up my car down at Lincoln Woods and drive it to Zealand, which would have saved me three miles.  I should have accepted, because finishing what became 22 miles, and three 4000-foot peaks, would end up hobbling me for a while, and causing two toenails to come off!  But I didn’t have a clear sense of how the day would go, so I declined their offer, with sincere thanks…

Getting to the top of Mt Bond was my 36th 4000-footer – just 12 more to go!

I didn’t stay too long at the top of Mt Bond on the way up, continuing towards West Bond… stay tuned for that next time!

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Jean and I had moved to Sydney in July of 2009, where I would take up the newly-created position of International Program Director for ChildFund Australia.  It was an exciting opportunity for me to work in a part of the world I knew and loved (Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam) and in a challenging new country (Papua New Guinea).  It was a great chance to work with some really amazing people – in Sydney and in our Country Offices… to use what I had learned to help build and lead effective teams.  Living in Sydney would not be a hardship post, either!  Finally, it was a priceless chance for me to put together a program approach that incorporated everything I had learned to that point, over 25 years working in poverty reduction and social justice.

In the previous article in this series, I described how we developed a “Development Effectiveness System” (“DEF”) for ChildFund Australia, and I went through most of the components of the DEF in great detail.

My ambition for the DEF was to bring together our work into one comprehensive system – building on our Theory of Change and organizational Vision and Mission, creating a consistent set of tools and processes for program design and assessment, and making sure to close the loop with defined opportunities for learning, reflection, and improvement.

Here is the graphic that we used to describe the system:

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Figure 1: The ChildFund Australia Development Effectiveness Framework (2014)

 

As I said last time, I felt that three components of the DEF were particularly innovative, and worth exploring in more detail in separate blog articles:

  • I will describe components #2 (“Outcome Indicator Surveys) and #12 (Statement of Impact) in my next article.  Together, these components of the DEF were meant to enable us to measure the impact of our work in a robust, participatory way, so that we could learn and improve;
  • this time, I want to explore component #3 of the DEF: “Case Studies.”

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It might seem strange to say it this way, but the “Case Studies” were probably my favorite of all the components of the DEF!  I loved them because they offered direct, personal accounts of the impact of projects and programs from children, youth, men and women from the communities in which ChildFund worked and the staff and officials of local agencies and government offices with whom ChildFund partnered.  We didn’t claim that the Case Studies were random or representative samples; rather, their value was simply as stories of human experience, offering insights would not have been readily gained from quantitative data.

Why was this important?  Why did it appeal to me so much?

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Over my years working with international NGOs, I had become uneasy with the trend towards exclusive reliance on linear logic and quantitative measurement, in our international development sector.  This is perhaps a little bit ironic, since I had joined the NGO world having been educated as an engineer, schooled in the application of scientific logic and numerical analysis for practical applications in the world.

Linear logic is important, because it introduces rigor in our thinking, something that had been weak or lacking when I joined the sector in the mid-1980s.  And quantitative measurement, likewise, forced us to face evidence of what we had or had not achieved. So both of these trends were positive…

But I had come to appreciate that human development was far more complex than building a water system (for example), much more complicated than we could fully capture in linear models.  Yes, a logical, data-driven approach was helpful in many ways, perhaps nearly all of the time, but it didn’t seem to fit every situation in communities that I came to know in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  In fact, I began to see that an over-emphasis on linear approaches to human development was blinding us to ways that more qualitative, non-linear thinking could help; we seemed to be dismissing the qualitative, narrative insights that should also have been at the heart of our reflections.  No reason not to include both quantitative and qualitative measures.  But we weren’t.

My career in international development began at a time when the private-sector, business culture, started to influence our organizations in a big way: as a result of the Ethiopian famine of the mid-1980’s, INGOs were booming and, as a result, were professionalizing, introducing business practices.  All the big INGOs started to bring in people from the business world, helping “professionalize” our work.

I’ve written elsewhere about the positive and negative effects that business culture had on NGOs: on the positive side, we benefited from systems and approaches the improved the internal management of our agencies, such as clear delegations of authority, financial planning and audit, etc.  Overall, it was a very good, and very necessary evolution.

But there were some negatives.  In particular, the influx of private-sector culture into our organizations meant that:

  • We began increasingly to view the world as a linear, logical place;
  • We came to embrace the belief that bigger is always better;
  • “Accountability” to donors became so fundamental that sometimes it seemed to be our highest priority;
  • Our understanding of human nature, of human poverty, evolved towards the purely material, things that we could measure quantitatively.

I will attach a copy of the article I wrote on this topic here:  mcpeak-trojan-horse.

In effect, this cultural shift had the effect of emphasizing linear logic and quantitative measures to such a degree, with such force, that narrative, qualitative approaches were sidelined as, somehow, not business-like enough.

As I thought about the overall design of the DEF, I wanted to make 100% sure that we were able to measure the quantitative side of our work, the concrete outputs that we produced and the measurable impact that we achieved (more on that next time).  Because the great majority of our work was amenable to that form of measurement, and being accountable for delivering the outputs (projects, funding) that we had promised was hugely important.

But I was equally determined that we would include qualitative elements that would enable us to capture the lived experience of people who facing poverty.  In other words, because poverty is experienced holistically by people, including children, in ways that can be captured quantitatively and qualitatively, we needed to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative measurement approaches if we were to be truly effective.

The DEF “Case Studies” was one of the ways that we accomplished this goal.  It made me proud that we were successful in this regard.

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There was another reason that I felt that the DEF Case Studies were so valuable, perhaps just as important as the way that they enabled us to measure poverty more holistically.  Observing our organizations, and seeing my own response to how we were evolving, I clearly saw that the influence of private-sector, business culture was having positive and negative effects.

One of the most negative impacts I saw was an increasing alienation of our people from the basic motivations that led them to join the NGO sector, a decline in the passion for social justice that had characterized us.  Not to exaggerate, but it seemed that we were perhaps losing our human connection with the hope and courage and justice that, when we were successful, we helped make for individual women and men, girls and boys.  The difference we were making in the lives of individual human beings was becoming obscured behind the statistics that we were using, behind the mechanical approaches we were taking to our work.

Therefore, I was determined to use the DEF Case Studies as tools for reconnecting us, ChildFund Australia staff and board, to the reason that we joined in the first place.  All of us.

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So, what were the DEF Case Studies, and how were they produced and used?

In practice, Development Effectiveness and Learning Managers in ChildFund’s program countries worked with other program staff and partners to write up Case Studies that depicted the lived experience of people involved in activities supported by ChildFund.  The Case Studies were presented as narratives, with photos, which sought to capture the experiences, opinions and ideas of the people concerned, in their own words, without commentary.  They were not edited to fit a success-story format.  As time went by, our Country teams started to add a summary of their reflections to the Case Studies, describing their own responses to the stories told there.

Initially we found that field staff had a hard time grasping the idea, because they were so used to reporting their work in the dry, linear, quantitative ways that we had become used to.  Perhaps program staff felt that narrative reports were the territory of our Communications teams, meant for public-relations purposes, describing our successes in a way that could attract support for our work.  Nothing wrong with that, they seemed to feel, but not a program thing!

Staff seemed at a loss, unable to get going.  So we prepared a very structured template for the Case Studies, specifying length and tone and approach in detail.  This was a mistake, because we really wanted to encourage creativity while keeping the documents brief; emphasizing the “voice” of people in communities rather than our own views; covering failures as much as successes.  Use of a template tended to lead our program staff into a structured view of our work, so once we gained some experience with the idea, as staff became more comfortable with the idea and we began to use these Case Studies, we abandoned the rigid template and encouraged innovation.

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So these Case Studies were a primary source of qualitative information on the successes and failures of ChildFund Australia’s work, offering insights from children, youth and adults from communities where we worked and the staff of local agencies and government offices with whom ChildFund Australia partnered.

In-country staff reviewed the Case Studies, accepting or contesting the opinions of informants about ChildFund Australia’s projects.  These debates often led to adjustments to existing projects but also triggered new thinking – at the project activity level but also at program level or even the overall program approach.

Case Studies were forwarded to Sydney, where they were reviewed by the DEF Manager; some were selected for a similar process of review by International Program staff, members of the Program Review Committee and, on occasion, by the ChildFund Australia Board.

The resulting documents were stored in a simple cloud-based archive, accessible by password to anyone within the organization.  Some Case Studies were also included on ChildFund Australia’s website; we encouraged staff from our Communications team in Sydney to review the Case Studies and, if suitable, to re-purpose them for public purposes.  Of course, we were careful to obtain informed consent from people included in the documents.

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Through Case Studies, as noted above, local informants were able to pass critical judgement on the appropriateness of ChildFund’s strategies, how community members perceived our aims and purposes (not necessarily as we intended); and they could alert us to unexpected consequences (both positive and negative) of what we did.

For example, one of the first Case Studies written up in Papua New Guinea revealed that home garden vegetable cultivation not only resulted in increased family income for the villager concerned (and positive impact on children in terms of nutrition and education), it also enhanced his social standing through increasing his capacity to contribute to traditional cultural events.

Here are three images from that Case Study:

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And here is a copy of the Case Study itself:  PNG Case Study #1 Hillary Vegetable farming RG edit 260111.  Later I was able to visit Hillary at his farm!

Another Case Study came from the ChildFund Connect project, an exciting effort led by my former colleagues Raúl Caceres and Kelly Royds, who relocated from Sydney to Boston in 2016.  I climbed Mt Moriah with them in July, 2017, and also Mt Pierce and Mt Eisenhower in August of 2016.  ChildFund Connect was an innovative project that linked children across Laos, Viet Nam, Australia and Sri Lanka, providing a channel for them directly to build understanding of their differing realities.   This Case Study on their project came from Laos: LAO Case Study #3 Connect DRAFT 2012.

In a future article in this series, I plan on describing work we carried out building the power (collective action) of people living in poverty.  It can be a sensitive topic, particularly in areas of Southeast Asia without traditions of citizen engagement.  Here is a Case Study from Viet Nam describing how ChildFund helped local citizens connect productively with authorities to resolve issues related to access to potable water: VTM Case Study #21 Policy and exclusion (watsan)-FINAL.

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Dozens of Case Studies were produced, illustrating a wide range of experiences with the development processes supported by ChildFund in all of the countries where we managed program implementation.  Reflections from many of these documents helped us improve our development practice, and at the same time helped us stay in touch with the deeper purpose of our having chosen to work to promote social justice, accompanying people living in poverty as they built better futures.

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A few of the DEF Case Studies focused, to some extent, on ChildFund Australia itself.  For example, here is the story of three generations of Hmong women in Nonghet District in Xieng Khoung Province in Laos.  It describes how access to education has evolved across those generations:  LAO Case Study #5 Ethnic Girls DRAFT 2012.  It’s a powerful description of change and progress, notable also because one of the women featured in the Case Study was a ChildFund employee, along with her mother and daughter!

Two other influential Case Studies came from Cambodia, both of which touched on how ChildFund was attempting to manage our child-sponsorship mechanisms with our programmatic commitments.  I’ve written separately, some time ago, about the advantages of child sponsorship: when managed well (as we did in Plan and especially in ChildFund Australia), and these two Case Studies evocatively illustrated the challenge, and the ways that staff in Cambodia were making it all work well.

One Case Study describes some of the tensions implicit in the relationship between child sponsorship and programming, and the ways that we were making progress in reconciling these differing priorities: CAM Case Study 6 Sponsorship DRAFT 2012.  This Case Study was very influential, with our staff in Cambodia and beyond, with program staff in Sydney, and with our board.  It powerfully communicated a reality that our staff, and families in communities, were facing.

A second Case Study discussed how sponsorship and programs were successfully integrated in the field in Cambodia: CAM Case Study #10 Program-SR Integration Final.

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As I mentioned last time, given the importance of the system, relying on our feeling that the DEF was a great success wasn’t good enough.  So we sought expert review, commissioning two independent, expert external reviews of the DEF.

The first review (attached here: External DEF Review – November 2012), which was concluded in November of 2012, took place before we had fully implemented the system.  In particular, since Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact (to be covered in my next blog article) were implemented only after three years (and every three years thereafter), we had not yet reached that stage.  But we certainly were quite advanced in the implementation of most of the DEF, so it was a good time to reflect on how it was going.

I included an overview of the conclusions reached by both reviewers last time.  Here I want to quote from the first evaluation, with particular reference to the DEF Case Studies:

One of the primary benefits of the DEF is that it equips ChildFund Australia with an increased quantity and quality of evidence-based information for communications with key stakeholders including the Board and a public audience. In particular, there is consolidated output data that can be easily accessed by the communications team; there is now a bank of high quality Case Studies that can be drawn on for communication and reflection; and there are now dedicated resources in-country who have been trained and are required to generate information that has potential for communications purposes. The increase in quantity and quality of information equips ChildFund Australia to communicate with a wide range of stakeholders.

One of the strengths of the DEF recognized by in-country staff particularly is that the DEF provides a basis for stakeholders to share their perspectives. Stakeholders are involved in identifying benefits and their perspectives are heard through Case Studies. This has already provided a rich source of information that has prompted reflection by in-country teams, the Sydney based programs team and the ChildFund Australia Board.

This focus on building tools, systems and the overall capacity of the organization places ChildFund Australia in a strong position to tackle a second phase of the DEF which looks at how the organization will use performance information for learning and development. It has already started on this journey, with various parts of the organization using Case Studies for reflection. ChildFund Australia has already undertaken an exercise of coding the bank of Case Studies to assist further analysis and learning. There is lots of scope for next steps with this bank of Case Studies, including thematic reflections. Again, the benefits of this aspect have not been realised yet as the first stages of the DEF roll-out have been focused on data collection and embedding the system in CF practices.

In most Country Offices, Case Studies have provided a new formal opportunity for country program staff to reflect on their work and this has been used as a really constructive process. The Laos Country Office is currently in the process of translating Case Studies so that they can be used to prompt discussion and learning at the country level. In PNG, the team is also interested in using the Case Studies as a communication tool with local communities to demonstrate some of the achievements of ChildFund Australia programs.

In some cases, program staff have found Case Studies confronting when they have highlighted program challenges or weaknesses. The culture of critical reflection may take time to embed in some country offices and may be facilitated by cross-country reflection opportunities. Currently, however, Country Office staff do not know how to access Case Studies from other country programs. ChildFund Australia is exploring how the ‘bank’ of DEF Case Studies would be most accessible and useful to country office personnel.

One of the uses of Case Studies has been as a prompt for discussion and reflection by the programs team in Sydney and by the Board. Case Studies have been seen as a really useful way to provide an insight into a program, practice and ChildFund Australia achievements.

At an organizational level, an indexing and cross-referencing system has been implemented which enables Case Studies to be searched by country and by theme. The system is yet to be introduced to MEL and Program users, but has potential to be a very useful bank of qualitative data for reflection and learning. It also provides a bank of data from which to undertake thematic reflections across and between countries. One idea for consideration is that ChildFund draw on groups of Case Studies to develop practice notes.

In general Case Studies are considered to be the most ‘successful’ part of the DEF by those involved in collecting information.

The second reviewer concentrated on other components, mainly aspects I will describe in more detail in my next article, not so much the Case Studies…

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So the Case Studies were a very important element in the overall DEF.  I tried very hard to incorporate brief reflections on selected Case Studies at every formal meeting of the International Program Team, of ChildFund Australia’s Program Review Committee, and (less frequently) at meetings of our Board of Directors.  More often than not, time pressures on the agendas of these meetings led to us dropping the Case Studies from discussion, but often enough we did spend time (usually at the beginning of the meetings) reflecting on what we saw in them.

At the beginning, when we first began to use the Case Studies, our discussion tended to be mechanical: pointing out errors in the use of English, or questioning how valid the observations might be, challenging the statistical reliability of the conclusions.  But, over time, I noticed that our teams began to use the Case Studies as they were designed: to gain insight into the lived experience of particular human beings, and to reconnect with the realities of people’s struggle for better lives for themselves and their children.

This was a great success, and really worked as I had hoped.  The Case Studies complemented the more rigorous, quantitative components of the DEF, helping the system be holistic, enabling us to see more deeply into the effect that our work was having while also enhancing our accountability.

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Next time, I will describe getting to the top of West Bond, and all the way down the 11 miles from there to the Lincoln Woods parking lot, where I staggered back to my car with such damage to my feet that I soon would lose toenails on both my big toes!  And I will share details of the final two components of the DEF that I want to highlight: the Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact were probably the culmination of the whole system.

So, stay tuned!

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Here are links to earlier blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration;
  33. Mt Moriah (33) – Putting It All Together (Part 1): the ChildFund Australia International Program Team;
  34. Owls’ Head (34) – Putting It All Together (Part 2): ChildFund Australia’s Theory of Change;
  35. Bondcliff (35) – ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness System.

 

 

Bondcliff (35) – ChildFund Australia’s Development Effectiveness Framework

June, 2018

I began a new journey just over two years ago, in May, 2016, tracing two long arcs in my life:

  • During those two years, I’ve been climbing all 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall (1219m), what is called “peak-bagging” by local climbers. I’m describing, in words and images, the ascent of each of these peaks – mostly done solo, but sometimes with a friend or two;
  • Alongside descriptions of those climbs, I’ve been sharing what it was like working in international development during the MDG era: as it boomed, and evolved, from the response to the Ethiopian crisis in the mid-1980’s through to the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

In each article, I am writing about climbing each of those mountains and, each time, I reflect a bit on the journey since I began to work in social justice, nearly 34 years ago: on development, human rights, conflict, experiences along the way, etc.

So, when I wrap things up in this series, there should be 48 articles…

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In 2009 Jean and I moved to Sydney, where I took up a new role as International Program Director for ChildFund Australia, a newly-created position.  On my way towards Sydney, I was thinking a lot about how to build a great program, and how I would approach building a strong team – my intention was to lead and manage with clarity, trust, and inspiration.  A few weeks ago, I wrote describing the role and staffing and structural iterations of ChildFund’s International Program Team and, last time, I outlined the foundational program approach we put in place – a Theory of Change and Outcome and Output Indicators.

Once the program approach was in place, as a strong foundation, we moved forward to build a structured approach to development effectiveness.  I am very proud of what we achieved: the resulting ChildFund Australia “Development Effectiveness Framework” (“DEF”) was, I think, state-of-the-art for international NGOs at the time.  Certainly few (if any) other INGOs in Australia had such a comprehensive, practical, useful system for ensuring the accountability and improvement of their work.

Since the DEF was so significant, I’m going to write three articles about it:

  1. In this article I will describe the DEF – its components, some examples of products generated by the DEF, and how each part of the system worked with the other parts.  I will also share results of external evaluations that we commissioned on the DEF itself;
  2. Next time, I will highlight one particular component of the DEF, the qualitative “Case Studies” of the lived experience of human change.  I was especially excited to see these Case Studies when they started arriving in Sydney from the field, so I want to take a deep dive into what these important documents looked like, and how we attempted to use them;
  3. Finally, I will the last two DEF components that came online (Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact), the culmination of the system, where we assessed the impact of our work.

So there will be, in total, three articles focused on the DEF.  This is fitting, because I climbed three mountains on one day in August of 2017…

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On 10 August, 2017, I climbed three 4000-footers in one day: Bondcliff (4265ft, 1300m), Mt Bond (4698ft, 1432m), and West Bond (4540ft, 1384m).  This was a very long, very tough day, covering 22 miles and climbing three mountains in one go.  At the end of the hike, I felt like I was going to lose the toenails on both big toes… and, in fact, that’s what happened.  As a result, for the rest of the season I would be unable to hike in boots and had to use hiking shoes instead!

Knowing that the day would be challenging, I drove up from Durham the afternoon before and camped, so I could get the earliest start possible the next morning.  I got a spot at Hancock Campground, right near the trailhead where I would start the climb:

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The East Branch of the Pemigewassit River runs alongside this campground, and I spent a pleasant late afternoon reading a book by Jean Paul Lederach there, and when it was dark I crawled into my sleeping bag and got a good night’s sleep.

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Here is a map of the long ascent that awaited me the next morning, getting to the top of Bondcliff:

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After Bondcliff, the plan was that I would continue on to climb Mt Bond and West Bond, and to then return to Lincoln Woods… more on that in the next two articles in this series.  In this one I will describe climbing the first 4000-footer of that day, Bondcliff.

I got an early start on 10 August, packing up my tent-site and arriving at the trailhead at Lincoln Woods at about 6:30am:

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It was just two weeks earlier that I had parked here to climb Owl’s Head, which I had enjoyed a lot.  This time, I would begin the same way – walking up the old, abandoned forestry railway for about 2.6 miles on Lincoln Woods Trail, to where I had turned left up the Franconia Brook Trail towards Owl’s Head.  I arrived at that junction at about 7:30am:

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This time I would continue straight at that intersection, continuing onto the Wilderness Trail, which winds through forest for a short distance, before opening out again along another old logging railway, complete with abandoned hardware along the way, discarded over 130 years ago:

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At the former (and now abandoned) Camp 16 (around 4.4 miles from the parking lot at Lincoln Woods), I took a sharp left and joined a more normal trail – no more old railway.  I began to ascend moderately, going up alongside Black Brook: now I was on the Bondcliff Trail.

 

I crossed Black Brook twice on the way up after leaving the Wilderness Trail, and then crossed two dry beds of rock, which were either rock slides or upper reaches of Black Brook that were dry that day.

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It’s a long climb up Black Brook; after the second dry crossing, Bondcliff Trail takes a sharp left turn and continues ascending steadily.  Just before reaching the alpine area, and the summit of Bondcliff, there is a short steep section, where I had to scramble up some bigger boulders.  Slow going…

But then came the reward: spectacular views to the west, across Owl’s Head to Franconia Ridge, up to Mt Garfield, and over to West Bond and Mt Bond.  Here Mt Lincoln and Mt Lafayette are on the left, above Owl’s Head, with Mt Garfield to the right:

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Lincoln and Lafayette In The Distance On The Left, Mt Garfield In The Distance On The Right

 

Here is a view looking to the southwest from the top of Bondcliff:

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From The Summit Of Bondcliff

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From The Summit Of Bondcliff

 

And this is the view towards Mt Bond, looking up from the top of Bondcliff:

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West Bond Is On The Left, And Mt Bond On The Right

 

I got to the top of Bondcliff at about 10:30am, just about four hours from the start of the hike.  Feeling good … at this point!  Here is a spectacular view back down towards Bondcliff, taken later in the day, from the top of West Bond:

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I would soon continue the climb, with a short hop from Bondcliff up to the top of Mt Bond.  Stay tuned!

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Last time I wrote about how we built the foundations for ChildFund Australia’s new program approach: a comprehensive and robust “Theory of Change” that described what we were going to accomplish at a high level, and why; a small number of reliable, measurable, and meaningful “Outcome Indicators” that would enable us to demonstrate the impact of our work as related explicitly to our Outcome Indicators; and a set of “Output Indicators” that would allow us to track our activities in a consistent and comparable manner, across our work across all our programs: in Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam.  (Myanmar was a slightly different story, as I will explain later…)

Next, on that foundation, we needed a way of thinking holistically about the effectiveness of our development work: a framework for planning our work in each location, each year; for tracking whether we were doing what we had planned; for understanding how well we were performing; and improving the quality and impact of our work.  And doing all this in partnership with local communities, organizations, and governments.

This meant being able to answer five basic questions:

  1. In light of our organizational Theory of Change, what are we going to do in each location, each year?
  2. how will we know that we are doing what we planned to do?
  3. how will we know that our work makes a difference and gets results consistent with our Theory of Change?;
  4. how will we learn from our experience, to improve the way we work?;
  5. how can community members and local partners directly participate in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the development projects that ChildFund Australia supports?

Looking back, I feel that what we built and implemented to answer those questions – the ChildFund Australia “Development Effectiveness Framework” (“DEF”) – was our agency’s most important system.  Because what could be more important than the answers to those five questions?

*

I mentioned last time that twice, during my career with Plan International, we had tried to produce such a system, and failed (at great expense).  We had fallen into several traps that I was determined to avoid repeating this time, in ChildFund Australia, as we developed and implemented the DEF:

  • We would build a system that could be used by our teams with the informed participation of local partners and staff, practically – that was “good enough” for its purpose, instead of a system that had to be managed by experts, as we had done in Plan;
  • We would include both quantitative and qualitative information, serving the needs of head and heart, instead of building a wholly-quantitative system for scientific or academic purposes, as we had done in Plan;
  • We would not let “the best be the enemy of the good,” and I would make sure that we moved to rapidly prototype, implement, and improve the system instead of tinkering endlessly, as we had done in Plan.

I go into more detail about the reasons for Plan’s lack of success in that earlier article.

*

Here is a graphic that Caroline Pinney helped me create, which I used very frequently to explain how the DEF was designed, functioned, and performed:

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Figure 1: The ChildFund Australia Development Effectiveness Framework (2014)

 

In this article, I will describe each component of the DEF, outlining how each relates to each other and to the five questions outlined above.

However, I’m going to reserve discussion of three of those components for my next two articles:

  • Next time, I will cover #3 in Figure 1, the “Case Studies” that we produced.  These documents helped us broaden our focus from the purely quantitative to include consideration of the lived experience of people touched by the programs supported by ChildFund Australia.  In the same way, the Case Studies served as valuable tools for our staff, management, and board to retain a human connection to the spirit that motivated us to dedicate our careers to social justice;
  • And, after that, I will devote an article to our “Outcome Indicator Surveys” (#2 in Figure 1, above) and Statements of Impact (#12 in Figure 1). The approach we took to demonstrating impact was innovative and very participatory, and successful.  So I want to go into a bit of depth describing the two DEF components involved.

Note: I prepared most of what follows.  But I have included and adapted some descriptive material produced by the two DEF Managers that worked in the International Program Team:  Richard Geeves and Rouena Getigan.  Many thanks to them!

*

Starting Points

The DEF was based on two fundamental statements of organizational identity.  As such, it was built to focus us on, and enable us to be accountable for, what we were telling the world we were:

  1. On the bottom left of the DEF schematic (Figure 1, above) we reference the basic documents describing ChildFund’s identity: our Vision, Mission, Strategic Plan, Program Approach, and Policies – all agreed and approved by our CEO (Nigel Spence) and Board of Directors.  The idea was that the logic underlying our approach to Development Effectiveness would therefore be grounded in our basic purpose as an organization, overall.  I was determined that the DEF would serve to bring us together around that purpose, because I had seen Plan tend to atomize, with each field location working towards rather different aims.  Sadly, Plan’s diversity seemed to be far greater than required if it were simply responding to the different conditions we worked in.  For example, two Field Offices within 20 km of each other in the same country might have very different programs.  This excessive diversity seemed to relate more to the personal preferences of Field Office leadership than to any difference in the conditions of child poverty or the local context.  The DEF would help ChildFund Australia cohere, because our starting point was our organizational identity;
  2. But each field location did need a degree flexibility to respond to their reality, within ChildFund’s global identity, so at the bottom of the diagram we placed the Country Strategy Paper (“CSP”), quite centrally.  This meant that, in addition to building on ChildFund Australia’s overall purpose and identity globally, we would also build our approach to Development Effectiveness on how we chose to advance that basic purpose in each particular country where we worked, with that country’s particular characteristics.

Country Strategy Paper

The purpose and outline of the CSP was included in the ChildFund Australia Program Handbook:

To clarify, define, communicate and share the role, purpose and structure of ChildFund in-country – our approach, operations and focus. The CSP aims to build a unity of purpose and contribute to the effectiveness of our organisation.

When we develop the CSP we are making choices, about how we will work and what we will focus on as an organisation. We will be accountable for the commitments we make in the CSP – to communities, partners, donors and to ourselves.

While each CSP will be different and reflect the work and priorities of the country program, each CSP will use the same format and will be consistent with ChildFund Australia’s recent program development work.

During the development of the CSP it is important that we reflect on the purpose of the document. It should be a useful and practical resource that can inform our development work. It should be equally relevant to both our internal and external stakeholders. The CSP should be clear, concise and accessible while maintaining a strategic perspective. It should reflect clear thinking and communicate our work and our mission. It should reflect the voice of children.  Our annual work plans and budgets will be drawn from the CSP and we will use it to reflect on and review our performance over the three year period.

Implementation of the DEF flowed from each country’s CSP.

More details are found in Chapter 5 of the Program Handbook, available here: Program Handbook – 3.3 DRAFT.  Two examples of actual ChildFund Australia Country  Strategy Papers from my time with the organization are attached here:

For me, these are clear, concise documents that demonstrate coherence with ChildFund’s overall purpose along with choices driven by the situation in each country.

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Beginning from the Country Strategy Paper, the DEF branches in two inter-related (in fact, nested) streams, covering programs (on the left side) and projects (on the right side).  Of course, projects form part of programs, consistent with our program framework:

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Figure 2: ChildFund Australia Program Framework

 

But it was difficult to depict this embedding on the two dimensions of a graphic!  So Figure 1 showed programs on one side and projects on the other.

Taking the “program” (left) side first:

Program Description

Moving onto the left side of Figure 1, derived from the Country Strategy Paper, and summarized in the CSP, each Country Office defined a handful (some countries had 3, others ended up with 5) “Program Descriptions” (noted as #1 in Figure 1), each one describing how particular sets of projects would create impact, together, as measured using ChildFund Australia’s Outcome Indicators – in other words, a “Theory of Change,” detailing how the projects included in the program linked together to create particular  positive change.

The purpose and outline of the Program Description was included in the ChildFund Australia Program Handbook:

ChildFund Australia programs are documented and approved through the use of “Program Descriptions”.  All Program Descriptions must be submitted by the Country Director for review and approval by the Sydney International Program Director, via the International Program Coordinator.

For ChildFund Australia: a “program” is an integrated set of projects that, together, have direct or indirect impact on one or more of our agreed organisational outcome indicators.   Programs normally span several geographical areas, but do not need to be implemented in all locations; this will depend on the geographical context.  Programs are integrated and holistic. They are designed to achieve outcomes related to ChildFund Australia’s mission, over longer periods, while projects are meant to produce outputs over shorter timeframes.

Program Descriptions were summarized in the CSP, contained a listing of the types of projects (#5 in Figure 1) that would be implemented, and were reviewed every 3 or 4 years (Program Review, #4 in Figure 1).

To write a Program Description, ChildFund staff (usually program managers in a particular Country Office) were expected to review our program implementation to-date, carry out extensive situational analyses of government policies, plans and activities in the sector and of communities’ needs in terms of assets, aspirations and ability to work productively with local government officials responsible for service provision. The results of ChildFund’s own Outcome Indicator surveys and community engagement events obviously provided very useful evidence in this regard.

Staff then proposed a general approach for responding to the situation and specific strategies which could be delivered through a set of projects.  They would also show that the approach and strategies proposed are consistent with evidence from good practice both globally and in-country, demonstrated that their choices were evidence-based.

Here are 2 examples of Program Descriptions:

Producing good, high-quality Program Descriptions was a surprising challenge for us, and I’m not sure we ever really got this component of the DEF right.  Probably the reason that we struggled was that these documents were rather abstract, and our staff weren’t used to operating at this level of abstraction.

Most of the initial draft Program Descriptions were quite superficial, and were approved only as place-holders.  Once we started to carry out “Program Reviews” (see below), however, where more rigor was meant to be injected into the documents, we struggled.  It was a positive, productive struggle, but a struggle nonetheless!

We persisted, however, because I strongly believed that our teams should be able to articulate why they were doing what they were doing, and the Program Descriptions were the basic tool for that exact explanation.  So we perservered, hoping that the effort would result in better programs, more sophisticated and holistic work, and more impact on children living in poverty.

*

 

 

Program Reviews

For the same reasons outlined above, in my discussion of the “Program Descriptions” component of the DEF, we also struggled with the “Program Review” (#4 in Figure 1, above).  In these workshops, our teams would consider an approved “Program Description” (#1 in Figure 1) every three or four years, subjecting the document to a formal process of peer review.

ChildFund staff from other countries visited the host country to participate in the review process and then wrote a report making recommendations for how the Program under review might be improved.  The host country accepted (or debated and adjusted) the  recommendations, acted on them and applied them to a revision of the Program Description: improving it, tightening up the logic, incorporating lessons learned from implementation, etc.

Program Reviews were therefore fundamentally about learning and improvement, so we made sure that, in addition to peers from other countries, the host Country Office invited in-country partners and relevant experts.  And International Program Coordinators from Sydney were asked to always attend Program Reviews in the countries that they were supporting, again for learning and improvement purposes.

The Program Reviews that I attended were useful and constructive, but I certainly sensed a degree of frustration.  In addition to struggling with the relatively-high levels of abstraction required, our teams were not used to having outsiders (even their peers other ChildFund offices) critique their efforts.  So, overall, this was a good and very-important component of the DEF, designed correctly, but it needed more time for our teams to learn how to manage this process and to be open to such a public process of review.

*

Projects and Quarterly Reports

As shown on the right hand side of Figure 1, ChildFund’s field staff and partners carried out routine monitoring of projects (#6 in the Figure) to ensure that they were on track, and on which they based their reporting on activities and outputs.  Project staff summarized their monitoring through formal Quarterly Reports (#7) on each project documenting progress against project plans, budgets, and targets to ensure projects are well managed.  These Quarterly Reports were reviewed in each Country Office and most were also forwarded to ChildFund’s head office in Sydney (and, often, donors) for review.

When I arrived, ChildFund Australia’s Quarterly reporting was well-developed and of high quality, so I didn’t need to focus on this aspect of our work.  We simply incorporated it into the more-comprehensive DEF.

*

Quarterly Output Tracking

As described last time, ChildFund developed and defined a set of Outputs which became standard across the organization in FY 2011-12.  Outputs in each project were coded and  tracked from Quarter to Quarter by project.  Some of the organizational outputs were specific to a sector such as education, health and water sanitation or a particular target group such as children, youth or adults.  Other Outputs were generic and might be found in any project, for example, training or awareness raising, materials production and consultation.

Organizational Outputs were summarized for all projects in each country each Quarter and country totals were aggregated in Sydney for submission to our Board of Directors (#8 in Figure 1, above).  In March 2014 there were a total of 47 organizational Outputs – they were listed in my last article in this series.

One purpose of this tracking was to enhance our accountability, so a summary was reviewed every Quarter in Sydney by the International Program Team and our Program Review Committee.

Here is an example of how we tracked outputs: this is a section of a Quarterly Report produced by the International Program Team for our Board and Program Review Committee: Output Report – Q4FY15.

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Project Evaluations

ChildFund also conducted reviews or evaluations of all projects (#9 in Figure 1, above) – in different ways.  External evaluators were employed under detailed terms of reference to evaluate multi-year projects with more substantial budgets or which were significant for learning or to a particular donor.  Smaller projects were generally evaluated internally.  All evaluators were expected to gather evidence of results against output targets and performance indicators written against objectives.

*

All development effectiveness systems have, at their heart, mechanisms for translating operational experiences into learning and program improvement.  In the representation of ChildFund’s DEF in Figure 1, this was represented by the central circle in the schematic which feeds back evidence from a variety of sources into our organizational and Country Strategy Papers, Program Descriptions and project planning and design.

Our program staff found that their most effective learning often occurred during routine monitoring through observation of project activities and conversations in communities with development partners.  Through thoughtful questioning and attentive listening, staff could make the immediate decisions and quick adjustments which kept project activities relevant and efficient.

Staff also had more formal opportunities to document and reflect on learning.  The tracking of outputs and aggregation each Quarter drew attention to progress and sometimes signaled the need to vary plans or redirect resources.

Project evaluations (#9 in Figure 1, above) provided major opportunities for learning, especially when external evaluators bring their different experiences to bear and offer fresh perspectives on a ChildFund project.

*

The reader can easily grasp that, for me, the DEF was a great success, a significant asset for ChildFund Australia that enabled us to be more accountable and effective.  Some more-technically-focused agencies were busy carrying out sophisticated impact evaluations, using control groups and so forth, but that kind of effort didn’t suit the vast majority of INGOs.  We could benefit from the learnings that came from those scientific evaluations, but we didn’t have the resources to introduce such methodologies ourselves.  And so, though not perfect, I am not aware of any comparable organization that succeeded as we did with our DEF.

While the system built on what I had learned over nearly 30 years, and even though I felt that it was designed comprehensively and working very well, that was merely my opinion!

Given the importance of the system, relying on my opinion (no matter how sound!) wasn’t good enough.  So we sought expert review, commissioning two independent, expert external reviews of the DEF.

*

The first review, which was concluded in November of 2012, took place before we had fully implemented the system.  In particular, since Outcome Indicator Surveys and Statements of Impact (to be covered in an upcoming blog article) were implemented only after three years (and every three years thereafter), we had not yet reached that stage.  But we certainly were quite advance in the implementation of most of the DEF, so it was a good time to reflect on how it was going.

In that light, this first external review of the DEF concluded the following:

The development of the DEF places ChildFund Australia in a sound position within the sector in the area of development effectiveness. The particular strength of ChildFund Australia’s framework is that it binds the whole organisation to a set of common indicators and outputs. This provides a basis for focussing the organisation’s efforts and ensuring that programming is strategically aligned to common objectives. The other particular strength that ChildFund Australia’s framework offers is that it provides a basis for aggregating its achievements across programs, thereby strengthening the organisation’s overall claims of effectiveness.

Within ChildFund Australia, there is strong support for the DEF and broad agreement among key DEF stakeholders and users that the DEF unites the agency on a performance agenda. This is in large part due to dedicated resources having been invested and the development of a data collection system has been integrated into the project management system (budgeting and planning, and reporting), thereby making DEF a living and breathing function throughout the organisation. Importantly, the definition of outcomes and outputs indicators provides clarity of expectations across ChildFund Australia.

One of the strengths of the DEF recognised by in-country staff particularly is that the DEF provides a basis for stakeholders to share their perspectives. Stakeholders are involved in identifying benefits and their perspectives are heard through case studies. This has already provided a rich source of information that has prompted reflection by in-country teams, the Sydney based programs team and the ChildFund Australia Board.

Significantly, the DEF signals a focus on effectiveness to donors and the sector. One of the benefits already felt by ChildFund Australia is that it is able to refer to its effectiveness framework in funding submissions and in communication with its major donors who have an increasing interest on performance information.

Overall, the review found that the pilot of the DEF has been implemented well, with lots of consultation and engagement with country offices, and lots of opportunity for refinement. Its features are strong, enabling ChildFund to both measure how much it is doing, and the changes that are experienced by communities over time. The first phase of the DEF has focused on integrating effectiveness measurement mechanisms within program management and broader work practices, while the second phase of the DEF will look at the analysis, reflection and learning aspects of effectiveness. This second phase is likely to assist various stakeholders involved in collecting effectiveness information better understand and appreciate the linkages between their work and broader organisational learning and development. This is an important second phase and will require ongoing investment to maximise the potential of the DEF. It place ChildFund Australia in a strong position within the Australian NGO sector to engage in the discourse around development effectiveness and demonstrate its achievements.

A full copy of this first review, removing only the name of the author, is attached here: External DEF Review – November 2012.

In early 2015 we carried out a second review.  This time, we had implemented the entire DEF, carrying out (for example) Statement of Impact workshops in several locations.  The whole system was now working.

At that point, we were very confident in the DEF – from our point of view, all components were working well, producing good and reliable information that was being used to improve our development work.  Our board, program-review committee, and donors were all enthusiastic.  More importantly, local staff and communities were positive.

The only major concern that remained related to the methodology we used in the Outcome Indicator Surveys.  I will examine this issue in more detail in an upcoming blog article in this series; but the reader will notice that this second formal, external evaluation focuses very much on the use of the LQAS methodology in gathering information for our Outcome Indicator workshops and Statements of Impact.

That’s why the external evaluator we engaged to carry out this second review was an expert in survey methodologies (in general) and in the LQAS (in particular.)

In that light, this second external review of the DEF concluded the following:

ChildFund Australia is to be commended for its commitment to implementing a comprehensive and rigorous monitoring and evaluation framework with learning at its centre to support and demonstrate development effectiveness. Over the past five years, DEL managers in Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam, with support and assistance from ChildFund Australia, country directors and program managers and staff, have worked hard to pilot, refine and embed the DEF in the broader country programs.  Implementing the DEF, in particular the Outcome Indicator Survey using LQAS, has presented several challenges.  With time, many of the early issues have been resolved, tools improved and guidelines developed.  Nevertheless, a few issues remain that must be addressed if the potential benefits are to be fully realised at the organisational, country and program levels.

Overall, the DEF is well suited for supporting long-term development activities in a defined geographic area.  The methodologies, scope and tools employed to facilitate Outcome Indicator Surveys and to conduct Community Engagement and Attribution of Impact processes are mostly fit for purpose, although there is considerable room for improvement.  Not all of the outcome indicators lend themselves to assessment via survey; those that are difficult to conceptualise and measure being most problematic. For some indicators in some places, a ceiling effect is apparent limiting their value for repeated assessment. While outcome indicators may be broadly similar across countries, both the indicators and the targets with which they are to be compared should be locally meaningful if the survey results are to be useful—and used—locally.

Used properly, LQAS is an effective and relatively inexpensive probability sampling method.  Areas for improvement in its application by ChildFund include definition of the lots, identification of the sampling frame, sample selection, data analysis and interpretation, and setting targets for repeated surveys.

Community Engagement and the Attribution of Impact processes have clearly engaged the community and local stakeholders.  Experience to date suggests that they can be streamlined to some extent, reducing the burden on staff as well as communities.  These events are an important opportunity to bring local stakeholders together to discuss local development needs and set future directions and priorities.  Their major weakness lies in the quality of the survey results that are presented for discussion, and their interpretation.  This, in turn, affects the value of the Statement of Impact and other documents that are produced.

The DEF participatory processes have undoubtedly contributed to the empowerment of community members involved. Reporting survey results in an appropriate format, together with other relevant data, in a range of inviting and succinct documents that will meet the needs of program staff and partners is likely to increase their influence.

A full copy of this second review, removing only the name of the author, is attached here: DEF Evaluation – April 2015.

*

Great credit is due to ChildFund staff that contributed to the conceptualization, development, and implementation of the DEF.  In particular, Richard Geeves and Rouena Getigan in the International Program Team in Sydney worked very hard to translate my sometimes overly-ambitious concepts into practical guidelines, and ably supported our Country Offices.

One of the keys to the success of the DEF was that we budgeted for dedicated in-country support, with each Country Office able to hire a DEL Manager (two in Viet Nam, given the scale of our program there.)

Many thanks to Solin in Cambodia, Marieke in Laos, Joe in Papua New Guinea, and Thuy and Dung in Viet Nam: they worked very hard to make the DEF function in their complex realities.  I admire how that made it work so well.

*

In this article, I’ve outlined how ChildFund Australia designed a comprehensive and very robust Development Effectiveness System.  Stay tuned next time, when I describe climbing Mt Bond, and then go into much more depth on one particular component (the Case Studies, #3 in Figure 1, above).

After that, in the following article, I plan to cover reaching the top of West Bond and descending back across Mt Bond and Bondcliff (and losing toenails on both big toes!) and go into some depth to describe how we carried out Outcome Indicator Surveys (#2 in Figure 1) and Statements of Impact (#12) – in many ways, the culmination of the DEF.

*

Here are links to earlier blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration;
  33. Mt Moriah (33) – Putting It All Together (Part 1): the ChildFund Australia International Program Team;
  34. Owls’ Head (34) – Putting It All Together (Part 2): ChildFund Australia’s Theory of Change.

 

 

Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program

March, 2018

I began a new journey nearly two years ago (May, 2016), tracing two long arcs in my life:

  • Climbing all 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall (1219m), what is called “peak-bagging” by local climbers.  I’m describing, in words and images, the ascent of each of these peaks – mostly done solo, but sometimes with a friend or two;
  • Working in international development during the MDG era: what was it like in the sector as it boomed, and evolved, from the response to the Ethiopian crisis in the mid-1980’s through to the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

So far, I’ve described climbing 30 of those 48 mountains in New Hampshire, and I’ve moved across time, from the beginning as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ecuador (1984), through to serving as Executive Director for UUSC Just Democracy (into mid-2009).

*

Last time I described a failed merger between three large international NGOs.  Across the MDG era there was a constant theme, in senior management strategy sessions and board rooms, of consolidation: surely, we thought, the sector would go through a period of mergers and acquisitions like what we were seeing in the for-profit world.  We imagined that, at the end of this process, that there would be many fewer, larger generalist INGOs, and a range of smaller, specialized agencies.  Seemed inevitable.

That consolidation hasn’t really happened, even now, but we had tried one: I had led the due diligence effort from Plan International’s perspective in mid-1997, helping formulate a strong case that Plan International, Plan USA, and Save the Children USA could achieve much more if they combined forces.  The process ended, as I described, because of glitches in the relationship between two CEOs and their boards.  And because, in one case, the agency’s board saw their own roles being diluted should the merger go forward.

A real pity, because the combination of these three agencies back in 1997 would have really created very strong programmatic and funding synergies.  And it would have jump-started a necessary and positive consolidation in our sector…

*

In this article, I want to reflect about how to build a great INGO program: to misquote Haruki Murakami: what we think about, when we think about a great program.

In early 2009, my work as Executive Director at UUSC Just Democracy was in transition, partly because of our success.  Our political work in New Hampshire had contributed (in a small way) to the success of several progressive candidates in the 2008 federal election, and our donors were starting to relax.  (Which is pretty sad because, as we all know now, the great results of 2008 would be rapid undermined by a virulent, anti-democratic, right-wing reaction from 2010 onwards.)

The consequence for UUSC Just Democracy was that I started to pick up some consulting work from my old life, in particular with old friends at ChildFund, organizing what became Bright Futures 101 in the Philippines, which I’ve blogged about earlier.

That consultancy led to a connection with ChildFund Australia, which was looking to put in place a new, international program department in Sydney.  At first it seemed like I might be able to help out on a consultancy basis, because they were having trouble finding the right International Program Director, a new position.  Maybe I could fill in for a while … so I had several Skype interviews with ChildFund’s CEO, Nigel Spence, which went well.  So well that it felt like maybe I should consider doing the job!

We agreed that after my assignment in the Philippines I would travel to Sydney for face-to-face discussions with Nigel and members of his board of directors.

As I prepared for that visit, I spent time thinking about how I would approach creating a new program approach, and a new team, for ChildFund, should I be lucky enough to be given the opportunity.

*

But first, back to the other arc of this journey: I climbed both Galehead Mountain and Mt Garfield, solo, on July 19, 2017.  Here is a view of both peaks, from an image I had taken from Mt Lafayette a couple of weeks before:

Screen Shot 2017-07-20 at 12.16.34 PM

 

North Twin and South Twin Mountains can be seen behind Galehead.  The idea was that Jean would drop me off, I would loop up over Galehead, across to Garfield, and then finish up a few miles from where I started.  If we planned things well, Jean would be waiting for me…

Jean and I drove up from Durham that morning, leaving home at about 7:15am.  We stopped for refreshments in Tilton, and then to buy me a sandwich (for the hike) in Lincoln.

We drove up through Franconia Notch, and then east on Rt 3.  Jean was going to drop me off at the start of the Gale River Trail, and then have a day with an old high-school friend in Littleton, and pick me up at the end of the Garfield Trail.  I planned to hike up Gale River Trail, then make my way up past Galehead Hut on Garfield Ridge Trail, to the top of Galehead Mountain.  Then I’d retrace my steps on Garfield Ridge Trail, to the top of Mt Garfield, and then drop down Garfield Trail.

First, the climb of Galehead Mountain:

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Jean left me at the Gale River trailhead at 9:45am:

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Looking Fresh – That Would Change!

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When I looked at the AMC White Mountain Guide, it seemed that the whole loop would take me over 9 hours, which seemed hard to believe.  I figured it would take me between 7 and 8 hours, so asked Jean to meet me between 5pm and 6pm.  In the meantime, she would visit with her friend from high school.

The walking was easy up the Gale River Trail, gently upward for several miles, mostly in the shade of a lovely clear blue sky.  The first couple of miles were a bit unusual, because I wasn’t “rock-hopping” here, it was mostly on roots, “root-hopping,” dodging mud.  But it was a gorgeous day:

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The trail is north-facing, so would be covered with snow and ice for many months in an average year.  Of course, I was walking in late July, so the path was clear, but evidence of crampon-walking was clear along the way:

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Evidence Of A Crampon

 

At around 11am, the trail became somewhat steeper, and rockier; by this point, I was completely drenched with sweat!:

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I reached the Garfield Ridge Trail (coincident with the Appalachian Trail here) at about 11:30am, and became very optimistic about how long the hike would take me.  I had read that this part of the hike would take 3 1/2 hours, so if I was already at the ridge, not even two hours after starting, this was going to be easy!?  Was I making much better time than I expected?

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Things definitely didn’t turn out that way!  To begin with, even though I had reached the Garfield Ridge Trail, I still had plenty of climbing to do before I even reached Galehead Hut.  As I looked ahead, the actual ridge seemed quite a bit higher than I was, and North Twin Mountain loomed over me to the east.

I took a left turn, and it took me 15 minutes to reach the actual ridge near Galehead Hut, the end of the Garfield Ridge Trail, the intersection with Frost Trail and the Twinway:

 

 

 

There were several Appalachian Trail through-hikers on the trail, mostly seeming to be heading south.  I took the Frost Trail, and arrived at Galehead Hut just before noon:

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From Galehead Hut, the Frost Trail continues a short distance to the summit of Galehead Mountain.  I dropped my pack at the Hut, and headed up.

There is a great outlook half-way up the mountain, where there are views back down to the Hut, to South Twin Mountain, and down along the Bond ridge:

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South Twin From The Frost Trail

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Galehead Hut, North Twin Upper Left

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From Left: North Twin, South Twin, Bond Ridge

 

I arrived at the forested summit of Galehead Mountain at 12:19pm.  Just a rock cairn surrounded by small pines, no view at all:

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Peak number 31, done and dusted!

I got back to Galehead Hut at just past 12:30pm, and had a quick lunch.  I started back on the Frost Trail to rejoin the Garfield Ridge Trail at just before 1pm, heading towards Mount Garfield!

*

So what does it take to build a great INGO program?  I was thinking a lot about this as I prepared for my interviews with ChildFund Australia, drawing from my career thus far.  In the rest of this blog, I want to outline the elements of my thinking.

If I was lucky enough to be able to create a new program structure in Australia, I kept coming back to experiences I’ve described earlier in this blog series.  They seemed to coalesce into five general themes:

  1. It felt important to emphasize the commitment to closeness with people living in poverty that I had learned from colleagues in Tuluá, Colombia, as they explored and adapted PRA methods in the late 1980’s.  As our sector had “professionalized” in the 1990’s, it really felt like we had gained a lot, but lost a lot, too.  (I would describe both sides of that coin in an article I would write in Australia, which I have already blogged about earlier.)  Later we would insist on incorporating this commitment into what became “Bright Futures”, in the early 2000’s;
  2. To make sure we got things right, I thought about lessons from the Total Quality Management framework that I developed when I was Regional Director for Plan International in South America in the early 1990’s.  Part of this would have to be a clear measurement system, so that we could learn and improve and be accountable;
  3. To measure it, we needed to have a clear understanding of poverty (in general), and child poverty (in particular).  I thought a lot about the framework that we had developed when I worked with CCF as a consultant in the early 2000’s, designing and testing what became “Bright Futures”;
  4. I had learned a lot about how human-rights and social-justice frameworks could help us address the deeper causes of poverty, because these concepts had underlaid UUSC’s work, and the understanding of power that drove our activist work, in the mid-2000’s.  To have real impact, these frameworks needed to be alive in our work;
  5. And, finally, it felt like I might have a priceless opportunity, setting up a new team in Sydney and, later, in Laos and Myanmar, to approach my leadership and management role using the restorative principles and NGO values I had learned along the way.  I wanted to focus my own contribution squarely on bringing out the best in our NGO people.

When I thought about putting all those pieces together, I began to get very excited at the prospect of joining ChildFund Australia, which I would do in July of 2009.  Before this journey arrives in Sydney, however, I want to reflect a bit more on the five areas outlined above…

*

As I thought about creating the new department in Sydney, being close to the people we were meant to serve – people living in poverty – seemed to be of fundamental importance.  How could we dream of helping improve their lives if we didn’t have a clear sense of their situations, at a human level?

Back in Tuluá, Colombia, in the late 1980’s, I had been fortunate to work with a group of great people who were way ahead of my own evolution in this sense:

They were a joyful group in Tuluá, and I learned a lot from them.  For example, I vividly recall our program head (Lucyla Posso) and several program staff working to carry out a PRA exercise – I had no idea what that was, but they were excited by this new methodology.  I was still caught up in my engineering approach – Gantt Charts, etc. – and didn’t pay enough attention to what Lucyla, Lijia, and Oscar Arley and others were doing.  Later I would catch on to the power of PRA methods!

Later, we would incorporate this fundamental commitment – accompaniment of people living in poverty – into what became Bright Futures.  In 2003 I summarized much of the research carried out as we designed Bright Futures in the Phase 1 Report (attached here: Phase 1 Report – Final):

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For now, I just want to highlight the fourth dot-point included in the Box: “to be appropriate and relevant, (good development practice) is based on an immersion in each local environment, and the active participation of the poor themselves.”  The use of PRA tools would be fundamental in enabling us to make this a reality, but as I thought about setting up a new department in Sydney I was determined to bring this into our work not only as a tool, but also as a key value.  Accompaniment of people living in poverty would enable us to design effective development programs and to understand their impact, and it would also help create and reinforce a culture of respect and humility.

*

From my time at Plan International’s South America Regional Office, and in particular as we developed a framework for Total Quality Management in Plan, I had learned that a great organization must be united around a clear purpose, drive the continuous improvement of everything it does, and it must have a healthy and accountable management culture.  Later I came to appreciated that this greatness can only be constructed on a strong platform of policies and procedures.  Otherwise, people would tend to spend too much time reinventing ways of carrying out mundane tasks; for some reason, we are drawn to spend time on these kinds of housekeeping issues instead of grappling with the challenges of our program work.  The graphic captures the overall idea:

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Building A Great International NGO

 

Of course, my role at ChildFund Australia, if I ended up joining, was not to run the overall organization – that was Nigel’s job.  But nevertheless the framework was in my mind as I thought about setting up a new department:

  • I would want to have our basic policies and procedures be crystal clear, mostly so that we wouldn’t have to think about them.  The idea of creating something like the “UUSC Handbook” I’ve described earlier was in my mind, somehow;
  • The management culture that we would co-create in our team would be as full of trust and empowerment, accountability, and fun, as possible.  I wanted to apply what I had learned from Atema Eclai at UUSC, what I would later learn to describe as “restorative principles,” in our teams;
  • We would establish a clear framework for assessing the effectiveness of our work, and we’d use that framework to improve our work on an agile basis.  What would become the ChildFund Australia “Development Effectiveness Framework” came from this;
  • And we would strive to be very clear about our purpose, and how our program work linked explicitly to that purpose.  Here I would end up building the first chapter of what became the ChildFund “Program Handbook” to include a theory of change and how we would measure its achievement.

I will share much more on all these topics in the near future!

*

As I’ve outlined in an earlier blog post in this series, one of the many exciting aspects of the work that Michelle Poulton and Daniel Wordsworth were doing in CCF in the early 2000’s was the study of child poverty.  CCF had commissioned staff from Queen Elizabeth House at Oxford University to survey the literature, listen to children and youth around the world, and then reflect back their findings.

I’ve explored those findings in some detail earlier in this series.  To summarize, we had formulated a clear framework that represented the lived experience of children who were living in poverty:

  • Part of their experience could be described as deprivation.  Just as with adults, children and their caregivers experienced poverty as a lack of health, education, income, etc.

But children’s actual lived experience of poverty couldn’t be described entirely in terms of what is traditionally understood as “deprivation.”  The CCF Poverty Study documented very clearly that:

  • in addition to deprivation, children experienced exclusion, even from the earliest ages;
  • And that children living in poverty felt a strong sense of vulnerability.

(The CCF Poverty Study was published in three volumes, all available for download through these links: CHILDRENANDPOVERTY3 – COPY; CHILDRENANDPOVERTY2 – COPY; CHILDRENANDPOVERTY1 – COPY.)

These two additional elements of child poverty, exclusion and vulnerability, represented areas that, generally speaking, we were not addressing in our programming.  I wanted to see how we could build them into our work at ChildFund Australia, if I ended up joining the organization!

*

Later I had been lucky to join UUSC, where I served as Executive Director.  One of the key elements of our work there had been the creation of the “UUSC Handbook”, which was my attempt to put in place the kind of clarity of policies and procedures mentioned above.

More importantly, UUSC was an organization focused on human rights, social justice, and activism.  Our organizational theory of change, described in an earlier blog post in this series, spoke to the linkages involved for us:

Human rights and social justice have never advanced without struggle. It is increasingly clear that sustained, positive change is built through the work of organized, transparent and democratic civic actors, who courageously and steadfastly challenge and confront oppression. 

As we explored the consequences of looking at our work at UUSC in this way, I began to deepen my own understanding of the importance of power, and collective action, in advancing human rights.  I would want to incorporate this understanding, somehow, into our work in ChildFund Australia.

*

Finally, to some extent I would be setting up a new team in Sydney, if I ended up going there.  I mentioned above that great international NGOs have a healthy and accountable management culture, so my intention was to build teams in Australia (and where we worked overseas, in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam) that were grounded in the values of our sector, clear about what we were doing and why, and driven to improve the impact of our work.

Just as important, I wanted to build teams that had high trust, listened well, were inspired, trusted each other, and were curious enough to discover the innovations that would help us break through.  I had learned how this can be achieved, and how it can be undermined, in the preceding 25 years, so I felt ready for the challenge.

*

My visit to Sydney for the interview would be successful, and I would return to New Hampshire in mid-2009 to pack up for the move, rent our house, and get our cat Lois ready for the trans-Pacific trip.

It felt like a priceless opportunity.  To help build a world-class program:

  • which was as close to people living in poverty as possible;
  • with clear policies and procedures, united around a clear purpose, driven to continuously improve what we did, and with a healthy and accountable management culture;
  • underpinned by an understanding that poverty was a shifting and dynamic mixture of deprivation, exclusion, and vulnerability;
  • informed by human-rights and social-justice frameworks, and by an understanding of power and collective action;
  • and, finally, that I would lead and manage in a way that brought out the best in our NGO people.

 

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May, 2009

 

A big challenge, that I would do my best to achieve, imperfectly, over the next six years.  Stay tuned for next time, when six years at ChildFund Australia begins!

*

Here are links to other blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration.

 

Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997)

February, 2018

I began a new journey in May of 2016, tracing two long arcs in my life:

  • Climbing all 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall (1219m), what is called “peak-bagging” by local climbers.  I’m describing, in words and images, the ascent of each of these peaks – mostly done solo, but sometimes with a friend or two;
  • Working in international development during the MDG era: what was it like in the sector as it boomed, and evolved, from the response to the Ethiopian crisis in the mid-1980’s through to the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

So far, I’ve described climbing 29 of those 48 mountains in New Hampshire, and I’ve moved across time, from the beginning as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ecuador (1984), through to serving as Executive Director for UUSC Just Democracy (into mid-2009).

*

In this blog post, I want to describe a short “project” that Max van der Schalk, then the CEO of Plan International, gave me as I was leaving Plan’s international headquarters for a year’s sabbatical.  We were looking at a big merger, and Max asked me to head up the merger team on Plan International’s side.

But first…

*

I climbed Carter Dome (4832ft, 1473m) on 9 July 2017, with Yingji Ma, a friend who is studying at UNH.  He goes by the name of “Draco” here.  Carter Dome is the eighth-highest of the 48 peaks

We left Durham at about 7:15am and drove up Rt 16 towards the White Mountains, stopping along the way for coffee and tea, and sandwiches to pack for lunch.  We arrived at the trailhead of the 19-Mile Brook Trail at about 9:30am:

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Draco, Peppy And Energetic – As We Departed!

 

Our plan was to hike up 19-Mile Brook Trail, and then bear left to take the Carter Dome Trail up to Carter-Moriah Trail, on the ridge.  Then we would turn south, taking the spur over to Mt Hight (4675ft, 1425m), and continue along Carter-Moriah to reach Carter Dome.  Rejoining 19-Mile Brook Trail at Carter Notch, we’d finish the day dropping down directly back to the parking area.

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(Note that Mt Hight does not qualify as an official “4000-footer.”  The AMC criteria for being included as an official “4000-footer” is that a mountain must (1) be at least 4000 feet high while also (2) rising at least 200 ft above the low point of its connecting ridge with a higher neighbor.  In this case, Mt Hight does not rise 200 feet above the ridge connecting it to Carter Dome, which is higher.)

I had climbed the southern and northern sections of this ridge over two very memorable  days in September, 2016 – climbing Wildcat D, Wildcat Mountains, and then Middle Carter and South Carter.  Once we finished the climb today, I would have only Mt Moriah left of the six 4000-footers on this long ridge that stretches along the east side of Mt Washington.

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We walked up the 19-Mile brook, gently upward for some time.  It was a very nice day, mostly sunny, perfect cool temperature.  Draco said he felt good and fresh!

 

At 10:41am, we reached the start of the Carter Dome Trail, where we went left onto a less-developed path:

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The trail then became steeper, and at 11:57am we reached the junction of Carter Dome Trail and Carter-Moriah Trail:

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Here we turned south towards Carter Dome, our objective for the day, joining the Appalachian Trail.  Soon we came to another junction where we had the option of going directly towards Carter Dome, or getting there via Mt Hight.  It was about noon, and we had time, so we decided to take the slightly-longer route, and go via Mt Hight:

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This was a good decision because, even though the ascent up to Mt Hight was very steep and rocky, the views from there were excellent.  As we would see, the summit of Carter Dome is forested, without any view at all!  We arrived at the summit of Mt Hight at 12:30pm, very windy, and a good time to have lunch.

There were really great views towards the east and the Presidential Range, and towards the west and the Atlantic Ocean:

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The Presidential Range Is Behind Me

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Mt Washington On The Left

 

After lunch at the cold and windy top of Mt Hight, we continued towards Carter Dome, at about 1pm.  We were now up at elevation, so the trail was up-and-down along the ridge:

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We arrived at the junction of the Black Angel Trail, and continued towards Carter Dome:

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We reached the summit of Carter Dome at about 1:30pm:

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The Summit of Carter Dome

 

It looks like there used to be a tower here at the summit, but we didn’t stay too long at Carter Dome, as there are no views.  So we continued along the Carter-Moriah Trail and, as we approached Carter Notch, the view down into the notch was impressive.  Here the Carter Notch Hut complex is visible below, and Wildcat Mountain rises above the Hut:

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Back in September of 2016, I had sat on Wildcat Mountain and had lunch looking north into the notch.  A guy with two new artificial knees had sat with me, and described his plan to do the “cycle” of the 48 4000-footers: every one of the 48 peaks, in each month of the year!  Too much for me…

Here is the mirror-image view, taken last year from that spot at the top of Wildcat Mountain at lunchtime: I’m looking back towards Carter Dome here, in September of 2016:

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Draco and I dropped down steeply toward the hut, hopping over and around typical White Mountains granite boulders, and arrived at the lake next to hut at 2:20pm:

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After resting for a few minutes (Draco said he was getting tired!), here at the junction of the 19-Mile Brook and Carter-Moriah trails, we took a right turn, and headed north.  It was about 2:30pm … the 19-Mile Brook Trail ascends briefly up to the Carter Notch saddle, and then drops steadily down to the trailhead.

Soon the trail rejoins the 19-Mile Brook, and we walked down alongside it, crossing occasionally:

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We had seen an inviting swimming hole on the way up, and talked about taking a quick dip when we came back through.  In the end, Draco took the chance and said it was “SUPER COLD”:

We arrived back at Rt 16 at about 4:20pm after a very nice day, beautiful views along the way, especially at Mt Hight.

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Arriving Back At The Car – Looking Slightly Less Energetic!

 

A glorious White-Mountains day, and peak number 30 had been climbed!

*

Loyal readers of this blog will recall that Jean and I had left the UK in May of 1997.  I had wrapped up four years at Plan’s International Headquarters (“IH”), and was looking forward to spending a year in Durham, New Hampshire, on a “sabbatical.”  This was a very generous policy that allowed Plan staff with tenure in the organization to take time to reflect, without pay but with a guarantee of a job at the end.

We flew from Heathrow airport to Boston that May, on the day that Tony Blair became Prime Minister, and then drove up to Durham, where Jean’s sister Joan had helped us rent a house outside of town.  The plan was to take a year and reflect about my time at IH, maybe climb a few of the White Mountains, take some courses at the University of New Hampshire (which is based in Durham)…

It was a great year.  The “reflection” part of that year led to two papers that were published in peer-reviewed journals, and which have informed several blog posts in this series:

Few operational staff in INGOs take the time to write for serious journals, so I was proud to have managed to publish these articles.

As for taking classes at UNH, that worked out well also.  I took a course in African History, Intro to Architecture (with Jean), and bicycle maintenance.  That winter, I spent a good amount of time learning to cross-country ski.  And I did two small pieces of work for Plan, researching the potential for the organization to begin work in two new countries: Madagascar and Eritrea.  This involved a few weeks of work, and a visit to each country.

During the year, I kept my eye on internal vacancies in Plan, thinking about reentry.  My ideal next job would be back in the field, starting up a new country for Plan, as Country Director.  The visit to Eritrea had been positive, and I had recommended that Plan consider establishing operations there.  After that decision had been made, I applied for the job and was appointed as Country Director.  The future looked bright for Eritrea, and for Jean and I there, but just as I was leaving the country from my research visit, tensions rose (again) with Ethiopia, which led to a long period of conflict.  Soon, what had looked to be a possible model for an open society in Africa descended into repression and dictatorship.  This included a rapid closing of space for civil society in the country, including for INGOs.  So Plan deferred the opening of a Country Office in Asmara…

In the end, as readers know, Jean and I ended up flying to Hanoi in July of 1998, where I had been appointed as Country Director.  This would be my favorite posting in Plan, which I’ve described extensively in earlier articles in this series: here and here and here and here.

*

But as left for that sabbatical year, in May of 1997, Max asked me to continue to look after a very important and rather sensitive project for a few more weeks, from New Hampshire.  Now, 20 years later, I feel that I can write about it: we were moving towards merging three organizations together: Plan International, Plan USA, and Save the Children USA.

Over the years, our sector always seems to be on the cusp of consolidation.  The logic is clear: many of our organizations do very similar work overseas, duplicating many functions.  And we compete for funds domestically.  So, at least in principle, mergers would seem to offer opportunities for massive cost savings.  To my knowledge, if we had succeeded in merging Plan, Plan USA and Save USA, it would have been one of the first mega-mergers in the sector.  The fact that the merger failed is, I think, a case study that illustrates why consolidation hasn’t really happened, despite the clear economic (and moral) case that can be made.  Instead, what we’ve seen, mostly, is consolidation between unequal parties (a larger INGO absorbing a smaller agency) rather than the kind of merger we were examining (between three large organizations.)

*

The day after Jean and I arrived in New Hampshire, still with major jet lag, I drove south to Rhode Island.  You may recall that Plan’s International Headquarters had been located in East Greenwich, Rhode Island, before we moved to the UK.  But the US fundraising office, “Plan USA,” was still there in Rhode Island, in separate premises not far from where IH had been.  It was a two hour drive for me: an hour to Boston, then another hour to Rhode Island.

The idea of merging Plan International, Plan USA, and Save USA had been on the table, quietly, for a few months.  I think that the idea emerged from what we had called “The Gang Of Four,” which was an initiative that Max van der Schalk had prompted over coffee with three other CEOS (Dean Hirsch of World Vision International, the head of Save USA, and Paul McCleary of CCF) one afternoon in Geneva at a UNICEF meeting.  Max thought that Plan, Save, World Vision, and CCF ought to be able to collaborate on something big, and the other three CEOs agreed.  Maybe as a way of building towards something even bigger.

We four program directors (the Save International program director had joined us) were asked to figure out something that made sense, and I proposed that we work together to figure out how we could do a better job with girl education, together.  My colleagues liked it, our CEOs embraced the idea, and off we went.  (It’s quite interesting that Plan is now becoming quite focused on girls, overall.  A good move into “exclusion” and away from “deprivation”, very appropriate for these times.  More on that later…)

From the “Gang of Four” initiative came, among other things, closer relations at the programmatic level, with me, Gary Shaye of Save US, Steve Commins of World Vision, and  Joy Carol of CCF getting to know each other.   It was great working with the three of them – I certainly learned a lot.  And, out of that very positive initiative came, I think, the idea of merging.

*

There were three CEOs directly involved in this possible merger: Max, of course, at Plan.  Then there was Sam Worthington, who was the CEO of Plan USA (now the CEO of the US peak body for INGOs, Interaction.)  And of course the CEO of Save USA.

The potential for efficiencies was really clear: Plan USA and Save USA competed for support in a very similar marketplace: individual donors, major donors, corporations, and the US government.  Even more interesting was that Plan USA raised most of its funding from private sources, and Save USA got the majority of its money from the US government; this meant that the potential for leveraging Plan’s private income to “match” a big increase in government grants, seemed very large if the two agencies were merged.  In fact, Save USA’s government funding was pretty much “matched out”:  they they didn’t have any more “private” income to match government funding, so they couldn’t grow.

And Save USA and Plan International both had operations in a number of countries, doing very similar work in the same places.  Duplication and inefficiencies across the three organizations seemed ripe for elimination.  All in all, there seemed to be big financial, programmatic, and moral reasons to at least consider consolidation.

But structural relations were complex: Plan USA was, in theory, mostly, a fundraising office for the Plan alliance, tightly bound to the wider group.  Plan International implemented programs for the whole Plan alliance.  Save USA was, similarly, a key member of the Save the Children Alliance, raising funds and running their own programs around the world, and also remitting funds to other Save members.  A merger would be very challenging.

But first we needed to figure out if the advantages we saw, in principle, really existed in fact.  And we needed to do this very quietly, because a merger of this kind, with Save USA leaving the Save the Children alliance, would be a bombshell!

(As an aside, as I was leaving IH for my sabbatical, I had a strange conversation with the chairman of Plan’s international board of directors, Fred McElman.  I thought he simply  wanted to thank me for having spent four years at IH, which he did, but then he went on to express his sorrow that things hadn’t worked out… but perhaps something would come from the merger.  Later I thought that he was assuming that I had been interested in the CEO job, Max’s job, and that perhaps something like it would emerge from the merger for me!  It was kind of him, but of course he was looking at things from a private-sector point of view: I was DELIGHTED to be leaving IH and, after the year on sabbatical, going back to the field.)

As I mentioned above, Max asked me to lead the due diligence from Plan International’s perspective.  Sam Worthington was, of course, based in Rhode Island, and Gary’s office was in Connecticut.  There was a fourth player involved in the process: Dave Matheson, a senior partner at the Boston Consulting Group, was on the board of Plan USA and Plan International and he offered to provide expert assistance, in the form of a very savvy BCG analyst, with experience in our sector.  I’ve forgotten this person’s name, sadly, but we all worked together very well in the process.  New Hampshire, Boston, Rhode Island, and Connecticut – we were all in the same general area, which boded well for being able to get through the due diligence.

*

Gary and I were asked to look at the value proposition for the merger from the programmatic and government-funding sides, with that excellent BCG analyst helping us.   We met a few times in Rhode Island and Boston, and worked out the details.

We saw how overhead costs could be lowered by eliminating duplication where both agencies had field operations in the same country.  And, most importantly, Plan’s private income could be used to “match” a big increase in government funding.  In both ways, the combined entities would be able to do more than the three separate organizations could do.  Perhaps a lot more.  From our perspective, as I recall, the business case for the merger was overwhelmingly strong and we realized that, if it went ahead, we would be in the vanguard of consolidation that so many had predicted for years.

The arguments for, and against, the merger were prepared and board meetings were scheduled to consider matters.

Sam Worthington had become seriously ill while visiting Plan’s work in Africa, and was still recovering during this time.  I vividly remember a lengthy meeting of Save USA’s board which Sam and I both attended, where he had to retire to an adjoining room where a cot had been set up so he could rest a few times during the meeting.  His courage, and commitment, were admirable.

*

Of course, the merger didn’t happen.  In fact, things fell apart rather quickly after Gary and I concluded our due diligence.

Why did it all fall apart?  From what I could observe, which admittedly was only part of the story, I think there were two main reasons that such an obvious good idea didn’t go forward.

First, in two of the three agencies the CEOs weren’t in strong positions.  Max van der Schalk was transitioning out of Plan, and would leave within a few months.  This kind of merger would need strong leadership from all sides, and while Max certainly was a strong leader, he was also leaving.  What was worse was that Max’s successor, John Greensmith, had been named but had no idea that this huge merger was a distinct possibility!

It’s hard for me to understand why Plan’s board hadn’t briefed John about the discussions, but it is easy to understand why he was very opposed to the idea once he found out: there would be nothing attractive about the idea for him, which might even threaten his (very new) job!  So while Max was on-board, and saw the compelling logic, John Greensmith was uninterested and skeptical.

The situation with Save USA was even stranger.  The board meeting that Sam and I attended was surreal, to say the least, and not because Sam was so sick: despite clear evidence why it made lots of sense, the idea of the merger was basically put aside without significant discussion.

What was going on?  Like Plan’s board, Save’s board was well aware of the discussions; and, in this case, their CEO was very involved and positive, and he wasn’t on the way out of his job.  So it wasn’t like the situation in Plan, where the board was involved but a new CEO was uninterested.

My sense, from attending that one board meeting, was that the Save CEO had lots of great initiatives bubbling along, he was very creative … and his board had learned that many of them wouldn’t come to fruition.  I got the feeling that the Save USA board tended to let a thousand flowers bloom, but when this one unexpectedly looked like it was turning into something serious they were very uninterested, to say the least.  And they quashed it without hesitation.

So the first reason why the merger didn’t go ahead was that two of the three CEOs didn’t, or weren’t able to, push things ahead with their boards.  The second reason is also related to the boards that were involved: ego.

The brief discussions at that Save USA board meeting were informative: they didn’t focus on the business case, but rather on their individual roles in a combined entity.  In other words, sure, it makes sense from the perspective of doing more for children living in poverty, but what role will I, a Save board member, have in this merged organization?   Since Save USA would be a large minority part of a a combined organization, the writing was on the wall.  So: no!

From my perspective, the merger failed for those two reasons: Plan’s new CEO hadn’t been briefed on a huge development that affected his job, and Save USA’s board thought that merging the  organizations would diminish their own roles in some way.

*

Once the merger failed, I focused on the things I had wanted to do in my sabbatical: skiing, studying, writing, hiking.  In later years, of course, some mergers would happen in our sector and many more acquisitions would take place.  But I still wonder about the  impact that our merger would had in the sector – it would have been a big deal, I think,  a very positive example of putting aside vested interests and ego in favor of the mission.

*

Stay tuned for the next blog in this series: before describing how Jean and I moved to Australia for six great years with ChildFund, I want to reflect a bit about how poverty, the sector, and my own thinking had changed since my time in the Peace Corps, 25 years before.

*

Here are links to other blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration.

Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy

February, 2018

I began a new journey in May of 2016, tracing two long arcs in my life:

  • Climbing all 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall (1219m), what is called “peak-bagging” by local climbers.  I’m describing, in words and images, the ascent of each of these peaks – mostly done solo, but sometimes with a friend or two;
  • Working in international development during the MDG era: what was it like in the sector as it boomed, and evolved, from the response to the Ethiopian crisis in the mid-1980’s through to the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

So far, I’ve described climbing 28 of those 48 mountains in New Hampshire, and I’ve moved across time, from the beginning as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ecuador (1984), through to serving as Executive Director for UUSC (through 2008).

*

Last time I described one aspect of my work as Executive Director at the UU Service Committee (UUSC) in Cambridge, Massachusetts: managing relations with the staff union.  In that post, I described how I tackled that particular part of my role, navigating between principle and pragmatism.

As I said there, my biggest lesson learned from those years of working with the UUSC Bargaining Unit was that there is no inherent, inevitable contradiction between (on the one hand) being clear and firm about roles, being fair but strict about adherence to procedures and performance, and (on the other hand) living up to the ideals of a nonprofit organization dedicated to social justice – viewing things through the prism of right relationships.  And, for me, I discovered that the way to successfully navigate the terrain between principle and pragmatism is to learn how to manage conflict while developing a deep sense of humility and self-awareness, mindfulness and equanimity, and engaged non-attachment.

*

One of our major priorities at UUSC was to build engaged activism focused on critical issues of human rights and social justice.  In fact, making this happen was probably our most central focus, given our theory of change:

  • It is possible to build a better world, a world that is free from oppression and injustice, where all can realize their full human rights.  This vision can be achieved only through the work of organized, transparent, and democratic civic actors who challenge and confront oppression.1

For me, the second sentence in that statement encapsulates UUSC’s “theory of change.”  I still like it very much.

Much of this task would be carried out through our partners around the world, as we accompanied their work on economic and environmental justice, on civil liberties, and in crises.  But another major part of our work building civic activism was spelled out in another section of our Strategic Plan:

UUSC builds a more engaged and activist community focused on issues of human rights and social justice.  By becoming an accountable campaigning and movement-building organization, UUSC will achieve policy change results consistent with the goals of our program partners and constituencies.  

To achieve this goal, together with our supporters and partners, UUSC will develop an effective advocacy agenda around the organization’s priority issue areas.  We will mobilize supporters and collaborate with allies that share our interest in these issues; operate an advocacy office based in Washington, D.C.; provide the training necessary to allow local activists to exert maximum policy influence.  

We will continue to expand our volunteer network and increase the involvement of that network in advocacy activities.  To strengthen the voice of the UU community on important public policy issues in the United States, we will support six additional statewide UU advocacy networks by 2010, while maintaining support for the existing networks.  In a related effort, we will establish a UUSC-related 501(c)(4) structure. 

In addition, we will build relationships with leaders within the UU, activist, and inter-faith communities and increase opportunities for action.  Finally, as the policies and practices of global corporations have increasingly influenced the fulfillment of human rights aims, UUSC will continue its shareholder advocacy efforts, aimed at corporations whose policies and practices violate human rights norms.2 

The statement that I have emphasized, in bold, is the subject of this blog post.

Why did we decide to form a parallel 501(c)(4)?  And, what is a 501(c)(4) anyway?!

Most “nonprofit” organizations like UUSC are set up consistent with section 501(c)(3) of the US tax code: donations to these agencies are tax-deductible for the donor, which is a big advantage for fundraising.  In return, the organizations accept that they won’t work in the “political” space to any significant degree, meaning that they can’t really focus on legislative or electoral advocacy.  They must focus on “charitable” activities.

Organizations established under section 501(c)(4) of the US tax code, on the other hand,  can focus almost entirely on advocacy, as long as activities are consistent with their purpose.  They can (for example) even endorse candidates for office.  The disadvantage is, however, that donations to 501(c)(4) organizations are not tax-deductible to their donors.

This made sense to me.  Certainly government shouldn’t get in the way of people, or organizations, expressing their opinions, influencing public policy, being active politically.  And while I could see the reason why donors to organizations carrying out “charitable” (501(c)(3))activities should benefit from a tax subsidy, there seemed to be no reason why political expression (via 501(c)(4) organizations) should be subsidized.  Don’t restrict it, but the government shouldn’t, in effect, take sides by freeing political donors from a tax obligation.  Makes sense.

Given UUSC’s objectives and methods, including legislative and electoral advocacy in our toolbox, by forming a 501(c)(4) made enormous sense.  In fact, when we looked around at other social-justice organizations in the US, the ones that were making the biggest impact had extended the tools they bring to their work by forming inter-linked 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations, enabling them to legally work on charitable and “political” aspects of their programs.

So the attraction of having “linked” 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) agencies was obvious: together, they can work on all aspects of their missions, as long as they maintain appropriate separation of their finances.

In summary, quoting from the “Concept Paper” produced shortly before we started our work:

To extend its ability to achieve its mission, in 2007 UUSC helped establish Just Democracy.  The purpose of this 501(c)(4) issue advocacy organization is to strengthen the voice of Unitarian Universalists and other progressive faith-based activists in the political process at the local, state, and federal levels.  Because Just Democracy has been established as a 501(c)(4) organization, it will be able to engage a broader range of advocacy activities than would be appropriate for UUSC.

Seeking to empower voters and to promote human rights and a progressive political agenda, it is anticipated that Just Democracy will:

  • Carry out legislative advocacy campaigns on priority human rights issues that will impact public policy;
  • Create and strengthen effective statewide networks of Unitarian Universalists focused on human-rights advocacy and voter engagement;
  • Facilitate interfaith coordination of advocacy and voter engagement work;
  • Train congregation-based activists in non-partisan voter engagement work and issue-based legislative advocacy techniques;
  • Facilitate appropriate coordination between statewide faith-based voter engagement work and other voter mobilization efforts;
  • Recruit faith- and values-based activists into Just Democracy to do hard-hitting issue advocacy and voter engagement in both legislative and electoral seasons.  

The interplay of a national 501(c)(3) human rights organization (UUSC) with strong ties to a liberal religious denomination, independent state-based 501(c)(3) organizations (statewide networks), and a national 501(c)(4) (Just Democracy), will allow for a broad and complementary range of activities, like those listed above.  Over time, it is foreseen that the impact of these three sets of organizations will be magnified by their productive interaction.  

*

After doing the necessary legal and operational planning, registering UUSC Just Democracy as a 501(c)(4) corporation, preparing by-laws, and forming a board of directors linked with UUSC’s board, the new organization was ready to get going.

At that point, I had been with UUSC for three years, and was happy in my role running the organization under Charlie Clements’s leadership.  I was working with Charlie and Maxine Hart (our HR Director), and a great set of Department Directors (Atema Eclai, Myrna Greenfield, Ki Kim, Maxine Neil, and Michael Zouzoua), and relations with the UUSC bargaining unit were quiet.  Programs were rolling out well.  Relations with the UUA were steadily building in a positive way.

But the opportunity to establish a new agency, especially one focused on building community activism, was too good to pass up, and so one day in early 2008 I made the pitch to Charlie: second me to UUSC Just Democracy through the upcoming federal election, and I would set it up and run it through a pilot phase.

I knew that this request represented a major disruption, a headache that Charlie didn’t need: things were going well at UUSC, and to have the agency’s Executive Director leave for an extensive secondment would be a big challenge.  But, to Charlie’s everlasting credit, he saw the potential, and my enthusiasm, and he embraced the idea.  I’m grateful that Charlie was so supportive.

So after finding an interim Executive Director, in early May of 2008 I left UUSC and became the Executive Director of UUSC Just Democracy.  While I would have my own board, and would work directly with Charlie, my focal point at UUSC would be Myrna Greenfield, UUSC’s director of advocacy and mobilization.

Myrna had recently joined UUSC, and was a fantastic communicator and organizer – I looked forward to working with her.  But she was a bit unhappy at my departure, which was understandable since I had hired her and now I was leaving.  So things were a bit unsettled.  At my farewell party, leaving UUSC, Myrna made a statement that I still remember vividly, a perfect combination of wishing me well and, since she was becoming my focal point, letting me know that now she could have her revenge for my departure!

But before describing the next exciting year …

*

I climbed Cannon Mountain on 5 July 2017, a sunny, beautiful day for a hike in the White Mountains.

The plan was to climb Mt Willey on the Fourth of July and spend the night at Dry River Campground, after what I was guessing would be a relatively easy hike.  Then I would take on one of the longer hikes in the 48 – up Owl’s Head.

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But… last time I mentioned that I had forgotten a key piece of equipment when I left home the day before – my backpack! – and had improvised for the climb up Mt Willey, carrying a stuff sack slung over my shoulder.  It wasn’t very comfortable, but it worked, and I got to the summit.

Climbing Owl’s Head without a backpack was another challenge entirely: compared to Willey, Owl’s Head is a long and complicated hike, so I needed to carry food and water, etc.  So I improvised, and decided to abandon the idea of hiking Owl’s Head, and climb Cannon Mountain instead.  Cannon was not far from my camping spot, and it would be shorter; since I was camping nearby I could get an early start.  That way I would avoid carrying very much water, and could tackle the hike with only some snacks instead of carrying a full lunch.

The night before, at the campsite, I had worked out a way to carry the stuff sack in a more stable fashion, so it would flop around a bit less.  I did get an early start, driving around from Crawford Notch to Franconia Notch, on a beautiful morning.

I had looked at the map and planned two options: an up-and-back to the top of Cannon or; if things went well, a long loop hike, making the best of the unfortunate situation.  I would walk up Kinsman Ridge Trail from the Cannon Mountain Ski Area parking lot, and then I had two choices: I could turn around, or I could continue for 0.4m, and then drop down Lonesome Lake Trail to Lonesome Lake.  If I took that option, I’d then take the same trail down to the Pemi Trail at Lafayette Campground, and along the Pemigewasset River (and the highway, which was the disadvantage with this option) back to the car:

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Cannon Mountain (4100ft, 1250m) is a ski slope, with a tram up to the top; of course, but I was going to hike up!

I arrived at the tram parking lot at about 7:45am, and started up the Kinsman Ridge Trail.  It was a beautiful day, with clear blue skies.

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About an hour later, walking steeply up Cannon Mountain, I got a good view of the ski-lift:

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By this time I was sweating profusely in the unremitting uphill slog up the well-travelled trail.  Many of the boulders on the path were wet, and the path itself was north-facing.  It would be a very tricky walk in the spring, as the boulders would be icy in unexpected places, perhaps quite late in the season.

There were surprisingly few people, considering that this was the day after a big public holiday.  During this early part of the hike, however, I did run into a family group with a hostile beagle.  Loyal readers will have noted that this has become a minor theme of my 4000-footer series: I still wonder why people bring untrained dogs into the woods.  The conditions are such – strange place, strangers walking past – that many dogs will be likely to be protective of their “pack.”  But everybody says that their dog is “sweet”, and most of them are; but often the “sweet” dogs are on edge in the strange environment, and behave aggressively.  Bring your dogs to the White Mountains, sure… but train them!

By 9am the pine trees around me were getting shorter, evidence that I was approaching the tree line:

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And soon I was able to see the observation platform at the summit of Cannon Mountain:

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Behind me, looking across Franconia Notch, was a spectacular view of the Franconia Ridge, which I had climbed just two weeks before.  Sadly, the sun was behind the ridge, making it difficult to capture the beauty of the scene in a photo:

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Lafayette, Lincoln, and Liberty Across Franconia Notch

 

I got to the top of the observation platform at 9:45am, so it had been two hours from the parking lot.  The terminus of the ski lift was clear, looking north from the summit:

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There were a few people here that had taken the tram up to the top.  I was the only hiker there, though I could hear a group, perhaps the ones with the untrained dog (?), nearing the summit.

At this point, I had a choice: I could retrace my steps back to the parking lot, which would make for a rather short day; or I could continue south to Lonesome Lake, and then drop down into the notch from there.  That second option looked attractive; the only disadvantage seemed to be that I would have a couple of miles to walk close to the highway in Franconia Notch, back to where I had left the car.

I decided to continue on to Lonesome Lake, which turned out to be the right choice!

From the observation tower at the top of Cannon Mountain, the path drops down steeply into a saddle, scrambling down large boulders, and then reaches the junction with the Hi-Cannon Trail:

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Just after 10am, along that saddle I came across a large boulder that seemed to have crushed a tree, recently.  The tree that had been destroyed appeared to still have some leaves on it, so that very large boulder must have come down the hill in the recent past.  Hard to get a sense of the impact in this photo, but it would have been a scary event, had I been nearby!

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Several groups were coming up, mostly groups of young people.  I suppose they were coming from the AMC Lonesome Lake Hut.  I reached the Lonesome Lake trail about a half-hour later, at 10:30am, and took it to the right:

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It was a pleasant and beautiful walk down to the lake, steadily dropping through a beautiful White-Mountains day, rock-hopping much of the time:

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At 10:45am, as I continued downward to Lonesome Lake, I passed an older man coming up.  He came up from Rhode Island for the hike, just to go up to the Hi-Cannon Trail (he said), and would go home that night!  That’s 3 1/2 hours each way, more or less… he must have gotten an early start!

As I neared Lonesome Lake, I passed a few groups of young people working on trail maintenance.  They had AMC uniforms on.

I arrived at Lonesome Lake at about 11am.  For some reason, I immediately got a deep sense of calm and well-being sitting by Lonesome Lake.  What a beautiful place, on a gorgeous day:

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A duck came over as I quietly sat there:

After a nice rest and some gorp, at around noon I decided to  walk down to Franconia Notch on the Lonesome Lake Trail, but it was closed for trail maintenance:

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So I took the alternate route, the Hi-Cannon Trail, down, passing a nice small stream and what looked like a minature refugee from Angkor Wat along the way!

 

 

 

 

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I rejoined the Lonesome Lake Trail, and continued on a very well-maintained path downward.

I arrived at the end of the Lonesome Lake Trail at 12:13pm.  The Trail ends at Lafayette Place Campground, which is a larger version of the Dry River Campground I had stayed at the night before with hot showers!  It had been around 4 1/2 hours walking, so far.

At the end of the campground, the Pemi Trail runs along the stream (and the Highway) up to the Cannon Mountain parking lot where I had left my car.  I had been a bit wary of this trail, as it runs right alongside the highway, but in fact it turned out to be a pleasant walk, though longer than expected.  Yes, I could hear the freeway, but the walk was nice and the 2.3 miles went quickly as I headed north towards the end of the hike.

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The Pemi Trail passes just below Franconia Notch, the site of the “Old Man Of The Mountain”, at about 12:30pm:

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For my readers who are not familiar with New Hampshire, the “Old Man In The Mountain” was a rock formation in Franconia Notch, forming the distinct profile of an old man.  It was in many ways the most-destinctive and well-known symbol of the state.  The “Old Man” collapsed in May of 2003:

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I arrived back at my car at 1:15pm, having had a great climb.  Since Cannon Mountain is a relatively easy climb, and I was walking it just after a major holiday, my expectations had been low.  Plus, I was hiking without my backpack!  But the walk was very pleasant, the views were outstanding, and Lonesome Lake gave me a strong sense of well-being.

And I made the best of a bad situation, having left my backpack at home!

*

We were starting UUSC Just Democracy from scratch.  So we needed a board of directors, a website, members, and a plan.  And we needed funding!  Luckily, Charlie had raised enough for us to get started, and so I was able to start my work with about $50k in the bank.  Enough to move ahead.

But what were we going to focus on?  In late 2007, we had prepared a “Concept Paper” describing the first months of UUSC Just Democracy.  The summary of that paper reads as follows:

“Through this project, Just Democracy, a 501c4 organization affiliated with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (“UUSC”), seeks to build a progressive faith-based infrastructure for grassroots activism.  The long-term success of a progressive political agenda in the United States will require the building of such an infrastructure, sustained beyond election cycles, rooted authentically in communities across the country, and standing on a firm values-based foundation.

Over the next 15 months Just Democracy will seek to create such a grassroots, progressive infrastructure in New Hampshire, as a first step in what will become a national effort.  This proposal outlines Just Democracy’s project objectives for an initial phase of work in New Hampshire, along with the resources necessary to achieve these aims.”

Later in the paper, our focus on New Hampshire was explained:

Just Democracy seeks to launch its program of building a faith-based and sustainable progressive infrastructure in New Hampshire.  New Hampshire has been chosen for three reasons.  

Firstly, over the next 15 months, New Hampshire will be at the center of the political process in the United States.  It retains its first-in-the-nation presidential primary and, despite a relatively small number of electoral votes, New Hampshire will remain a battleground state, since it was the only state to move from “red” in 2000, to “blue” in 2004.  Furthermore, key federal races are highly competitive, with polls showing Senator John Sununu to be vulnerable, and two freshmen members of congress needing to work hard to win re-election. This electoral excitement will greatly enhance our efforts to recruit faith-based activists into both non-partisan voter engagement work and a politically active 501c4.  In addition, there are stark differences between candidates on fundamental issues of human rights and justice. The outcome of these races will impact the prospects for future policy work.

Secondly, one of the first statewide voter-engagement and advocacy networks to be established was the UU Action Network in New Hampshire (”UUANNH”), which has been functioning strongly since 2004.  Established as a 501c3 entity, and working initially in voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts, UUANNH has engaged 24 UU congregations in voter pledge drives, issue education, phone banking, and campus organizing.  UUANNH’s focus at present includes issues such as access to health care and cutting the federal defense budget and redirecting the money to human needs and energy independence.

Finally, UUSC’s national headquarters is located within an hour of southern New Hampshire, and its Executive Director is a resident of the state.  These existing resources will greatly streamline the cost of managing an effective pilot project.

Over the next 15 months in New Hampshire, Just Democracy proposes to:

  1. Hire a full-time organizer to build membership in Just Democracy, reaching out actively to the members of Unitarian Universalist (UU) and other progressive congregations such as the United Church of Christ (UCC). 
  2. Link our efforts to allied secular groups such as AFSC, NH Peace Action, the Granite State Organizing Project, etc.
  3. Participate actively in America Votes’ Table meetings. 
  4. In coordination with the Table, identify and carry out a number of election season activities to support the progressive agenda.  These activities will include:
  • Polling and messaging
  • Membership communication concerning candidates’ position on our issues
  • Voter education and identification, and Get-Out-The-Vote efforts, through volunteer canvassing and phone-banking
  • Design and carrying out of issue and express advocacy mailings to the broader public concerning the positions of candidates and elected officials.
  1. Build the power of UUANNH’s work on access to health care in the key New Hampshire cities of Manchester, Nashua, and Portsmouth by linking their efforts, as appropriate and legal, to local, state, and federal political processes.
  2. Build the power of UUSC’s work on peace and human rights (ending the war in Iraq and the genocide in Darfur) on New Hampshire college campuses, starting in the key city of Keene, and, as appropriate and legal, linking these efforts to local, state, and federal political processes.

*

There was a lot to do.  On the organizational side, I needed to establish the basic infrastructure of board governance and reporting, registration, logistical capabilities, membership development, and fundraising.  So I quickly learned about nonprofit mailing permits, set up a rudimentary website, and created a simple registration process for membership and began to support these “members” with information and requests.  And I worked with Charlie to make sure that our existing donors were happy and to reach out to more people who could support us.

We were able to form a fantastic board of directors, quite quickly, mostly because of the organic connection with UUSC.   As I mentioned above, 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations need to be linked to have the greatest impact, but had to be scrupulously separate in terms of overall governance and (in particular) financial management.  Joining the initial UUSC Just Democracy board were:

  • Kathy Hall, who served as UUSC Just Democracy’s board chairperson.  Kathy was also serving on UUSC’s board of directors, so she was one formal link between the two organizations.  Kathy was an outstanding board chair, dynamic and supportive yet holding me accountable;
  • Tom Andrews, former Congressman from Maine, who was heading the “Win Without War” coalition in Washington.  Tom would later become UUSC’s president and CEO, following Charlie and Charlie’s successor, Bill Schulz;
  • Chuck Collins, co-founder of “United for a Fair Economy.”  Chuck was, and is, a gifted activist, with a knack for combining a social-justice message with humor and panache.  I learned a lot from Chuck, though he mostly attended board meetings by phone;
  • Kathy Partridge, who was then the Executive Director of “Interfaith Funders,” a network of secular and faith-based grantmakers working for social justice through support of congregation-based community organizing.  Kathy was always very supportive and, since she was running a similar organization, I learned a lot from her, too;
  • Jack Spence, who also served on UUSC’s board, and who later became UUSC’s board chair.  Jack had recently wrapped up a career as university chancellor in Florida;
  • Fasaha Traylor, another link to the UUSC board, came onto the UUSC Just Democracy board a bit later, adding a lot of spirit and activist bona-fides!

Perhaps my most important task was to establish relationships with key players in New Hampshire, where we were pilot testing our organization.  There were two priority groups here: I needed quickly to connect with the progressive faith community in the state, including the UU Action Network, the NH 501(c)(3) group that UUSC had been supporting; and I had to gain entry to and acceptance by the progressive 501(c)(4) community, which was coordinated by “America Votes” out of our state capital, Concord.

In both areas, I was very lucky and, quickly, very successful.

*

I was running UUSC Just Democracy from home, in Durham, and I quickly confirmed that there was a vibrant UU movement in the area.  I can’t say enough about Kendra Ford and Roberta Finkelstein, Ministers at the UU congregations in Exeter and Portsmouth, respectively.  They both welcomed our work, seeing that it was consistent with the focuses of their congregations.  And they welcomed me into their congregations, inviting me to speak at their services and (in Exeter) to work intimately with their social-justice committees.

For example, this is a photo of me speaking at the Manchester UU church in the summer of 2008.

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Roberta was a featured participant and speaker at UUSC Just Democracy’s Candidate Forum on Climate Change – more on that event below.

My connection with the UU congregation in Exeter proved to be fundamental to the success of UUSC Just Democracy.  Thanks to Kendra’s welcome, I found lots of energy there, and over time I ended up basing most of the electoral work we did from the Exeter congregation.  More on the election below…

Finally, in terms of connecting with the UU movement in New Hampshire, I want to appreciate the outstanding work of Tess George, who at that time was leading the UU Action Network in the state.  Even though the UU Action Network was a 501(c)(3), and there were many reasons why coordinating some aspects of their work with UUSC Just Democracy made sense, our arrival seemed to perturb the work that Tess had been doing.  I regretted this.  Tess and I had to work hard to clarify roles and complementarities, and though things never seemed to become 100% clear, we worked well together.

*

The most important connection we made, outside of the progressive faith community in New Hampshire, was with America Votes.   America Votes performed (and still performs) a vital role, coordinating the “Table” of progressive 501(c)(4) organizations in many states, including New Hampshire.

UUSC Just Democracy had attended several “Table” meetings even before I transitioned from UUSC, and I made a point of attending every meeting I could, often with Shelley Moskowitz, UUSC’s able and experienced “Senior Leader for Public Policy and Advocacy.”  Shelley knew her way around Washington from having worked there for a long time, and so she was a real source of advice and wisdom for me.  And I liked her a lot.

I was lucky that Shelley could attend America Votes “table” meetings with me, because her passion and experience rubbed off on me and on the organization!  We had instant credibility.

Josiette White was the head of America Votes in New Hampshire, a real dynamo with a very strong team including Melissa Bernardin and Zandra Rice Hawkins (in the linked organization, Granite State Progress).  These were spectacular professionals, working tirelessly to help make New Hampshire a better place.

One of the most important benefits that UUSC Just Democracy got from being a part of the America Votes “Table,” was that we became the lead organization for Exeter.  This meant that we had access to the consolidated voter database, and were responsible for voter mobilization for the November 2008 federal election.

That database was pretty amazing.  When it came time to contact voters about our priorities (ending the war in Iraq, and stopping climate change), and to educate them about the positions of federal candidates on these issues, the database gave us details about who to contact, and even set up the most efficient walking trajectories we should take.

In practice, this meant that I could indicate an area around Exeter, specify characteristics of voters in that area, and then the algorithm would produce a Google Map with a walk and a list of people to contact.

My job was then to mobilize the growing UUSC Just Democracy membership, and the congregations in and around Exeter, train volunteers, and then send them out with materials and talking points.

It was 2008, and we wanted to help elect Jeanne Shaheen, our governor who was running for US Senate.  And we were working to elect Barack Obama.  Both of these candidates were progressive, and they held positions on our issues that we agreed with.

But before election day approached, we held several events related to our issues.  For example, once the general election campaign began, we participated in a protest at an appearance by the Republican nominee for the presidency, John McCain, focused on our push to end the war in Iraq.  Here are some images of that protest:

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This slideshow requires JavaScript.

*

But the most important event we held that fall was our Climate Forum at the University of New Hampshire.

The Climate Forum was framed as an opportunity for federal candidates to speak about climate change.  After a lot of outreach, Oxfam America, CARE International, and the University of New Hampshire signed on as co-hosts.  And I was able to attract a strong panel of experts to introduce the candidate forum:

  • Scott Spradling, Emmy Award-Winning former reporter and anchor at the most influential NH television station, moderated the forum.  This was a coup for me, both because Scott was very good at this kind of thing and he was easy to work with.  But also because Scott was seen as fairly conservative in his political leanings, which helped – UUSC Just Democracy and its Executive Director, and all of the organizations that were co-sponsoring were probably perceived as somewhat left-leaning.  And holding the event at the University of New Hampshire, in Durham, probably just reinforced that impression.  So having Scott moderate the forum balanced things in a good way;
  • Dr Cameron Wake, Research Associate Professor at UNH, whose research focus was climate change from a scientific perspective;
  • Nancy Hirshberg, VP of Natural Resources for Stonyfield Farm, one of New Hampshire’s biggest companies;
  • Rev. Roberta Finkelstein of the UU South Church in Portsmouth.  It was great having Roberta there – she spoke movingly and from the faith perspective, which was very important for our organization;
  • Dr Stacy VanDeveer, Associate Professor of Political Science at UNH.  Stacy spoke about climate change from the policy perspective.

Most importantly, representatives from the McCain, Obama and Shaheen campaigns attended, and spoke, and listened.  Here is the advertisement we put in the student paper the day of the event:

THE UNH FORUM ON CLIMATE CHANGE

 

Perhaps just as important, we had a full room of interested participants!  I also put flyers up around Durham, and publicized the event through our growing membership.

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Scott and Mark Before The Forum

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Scott and Roberta Before The Forum

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Scott Introducing The Forum

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Larry Brickner-Wood, UNH Chaplain, Welcoming Participants

 

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Welcoming People

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Our Panel: Cameron, Nancy, Roberta, and Stacy

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Roberta Speaking, With Cameron And Nancy

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Stacy Speaking, With Roberta

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Candidate Representative Speaking

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The Audience

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The Audience

 

The event was filmed, and the video of the forum is available on YouTube, in eleven parts (due to the length of the event).  Here’s the first part:

 

And here are links to the other ten parts:

Our Climate Forum was a big success, attracting lots of people as well as representatives from most of the federal campaigns in New Hampshire.

*

All along, I was working hard to build a membership for UUSC Just Democracy.  This was for several reasons: it seemed to me that the more people that joined us, the more powerful our message would be.  Also, members were asked to contribute a small amount: small, but every bit helped!  Finally, as I grew our database, I was able to contact more people when we needed to education or mobilize.

To do this, I needed to master the fine arts of setting up tables to appeal for support, and to do the same thing via bulk mail:

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The UUSC Just Democracy Table At A Congregation

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Sorting Nonprofit Bulk Mail Appeals By Postal Code

*

The election came in early November, and we got into action in the Exeter area, door-knocking and getting-out-the-vote on the day itself.  We ran our operation out of a building in the center of Exeter, where I trained (and accompanied) our volunteers as they moved around the area, talking to voters.

Here are some images of those events:

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That’s Laurie Brunner From UUSC, Who Came Up From Cambridge To Volunteer!

 

*

Before closing, I want to share the results of the external evaluation we commissioned in early 2009.  We had included funding for an assessment as part of our initial planning, because we viewed the initial period of UUSC Just Democracy as a pilot.  I’ll attach the resulting external evaluation here (Healey Report on UUSC JD), and copy one section of the report’s Executive Summary here:

“… let me begin by stating that overall reviews for Just Democracy’s work in 2008 were overwhelmingly favorable. There was consensus among the interviewees that Just Democracy represented an innovative approach to faith-based progressive action in 2008, added real value to the work progressive groups were doing in New Hampshire, and established itself as a potential player in that state going forward.

Furthermore, interviewees gave rave reviews to Executive Director Mark McPeak for the work he did over the course of the last year, in spite of numerous obstacles. His thoughtful and committed leadership was clearly the key to Just Democracy’s successes in 2008, and his relationships in New Hampshire are central to the organization’s ability to build on its 2008 pilot in that state.

In terms of objective measures, while the number of activists trained, members recruited, and grassroots electoral activities undertaken were all modest, they represent a significant foundation for further work. In an electoral context where the unprecedented Obama campaign made progressive 501(c)(4) volunteer recruitment difficult for even the most established organizations, the initial accomplishments of Just Democracy are worthy of real congratulation.

In the future, it is clear that there is an opportunity for Just Democracy to fill a unique, faithbased niche in New Hampshire’s progressive infrastructure, and it seems that that niche has three prongs – that of a consistent ally in legislative advocacy efforts; that of a candidate recruitment and training hub; and that of a communications operation focused on shaping media narratives through a progressive, values-oriented lens. These three prongs all represent separate challenges, but they also complement one another such that a strategic organization-building approach could utilize each of them to grow the organization’s power for the long-term.

However, despite this opportunity, there are two facts suggest that Just Democracy must undergo some organizational change regardless of whether the organization remains focused on growth in New Hampshire in the short term or attempts to expand into other states.  Those two facts are 1) the lack of secure funding going forward, and 2) the ability of a 501(c)(3) organization to take on some – perhaps much – of the work that interviewees suggest Just Democracy should do in 2009 and beyond. This reality, especially when paired with the challenges faced by the state-based UU Action Networks, makes a closer working relationship with the UUSC almost a necessity.

Over the course of this report, I will seek to highlight anecdotes from interviews and other documents that point to some of Just Democracy’s strengths and weaknesses, within the context of an analytic political framework that I hope that the Board will find helpful in making decisions. My hope is not to be overly prescriptive, but instead to suggest key challenges and opportunities so that this document can serve as a useful aid to a team of people who are working together to birth an effective, sustainable and powerful progressive voice of faith onto the American political scene.”

*

For me, the experience was very formative.  I learned a lot about political activism in the US context, and I felt like our organization contributed a little bit to advance our issues in New Hampshire.  Personally, I felt that I was doing my part in my own country, to advance social justice with my own work, not just overseas (as in my career up to UUSC), or through others (as Executive Director at UUSC).  This time, I was getting my hands dirty and mud on my boots … and it felt great!

*

Soon after the election, which (from our perspective) was very successful, we pivoted towards legislative advocacy.  I testified twice on climate-change issues at our state capital, and organized letters to the editor on both of our focus issues.

Our membership grew to over 160 by the end of March, 2009.  And we prepared a discussion paper for the expansion of UUSC Just Democracy past its initial pilot phase, which included a draft “theory of change” for our new organization:

Human rights in the United States will only be advanced to the extent that the progressive political agenda in this country gains strength. Conservative, hierarchical, and patriarchal forces of intolerance have gained momentum over the last two decades, in part because they have learned how to utilize all tools at their disposal. They have skillfully used the media, formed a range of different but inter-linked organizations with distinct legal forms, established well-funded think-tanks, and rooted themselves in the fundamentalist faith community, all in a carefully thought-out and artfully-interlinked strategy to gain political power. 

We have seen the result: increasing infringements in civil liberties, reductions in governmental efforts to build justice and equity, and an inability to expand our national framework of human rights to the changing circumstances in which we live. 

Lessons learned throughout history have taught us that “human rights and social justice have never advanced without struggle. Sustained, positive change has always been built through the work of organized activists with the courage to challenge and confront oppression.” 

Another lesson of history is that the faith community provides a sustained and values-based platform from which change can emerge. The American Civil-Rights struggle is a prime example of this phenomenon. The achievements of the right-wing evangelical movement in more recent times are another, though from our standpoint quite negative, example. 

UUSC-JD believes that it is crucial for the future of our country, and of the world, that the power of progressive faith communities be built and directed towards positive progressive change. Our organization is well-placed to integrate itself into the political dynamic, on a state-by-state basis, playing a linking and empowering role across three spheres: we see our organization operating in the intersection of a state’s liberal faith communities, the array of 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(3) organizations operating there, and the work of UUSC.”

 

Our idea was to expand, carefully, from NH into Maine in the next couple of years, and add one more state in 2011.

But, sadly, funding for progressive advocacy tends to be very cyclical, and in 2008 it looked like the political landscape in the US had shifted permanently (not so!)  So our donors, who had been loyal and steadfast thus far, lost a bit of interest.  The job was done, why do we need to keep working?

We know how that’s turned out.

The consequence for UUSC Just Democracy was that I started to pick up some consulting work from my old life, in particular I worked with my old friends at ChildFund to organize what became Bright Futures 101 in the Philippines, which I’ve blogged about earlier.

That consultancy led to me being put in touch with ChildFund Australia, which was looking to stand up a new, international program department in Sydney.  That’s a story, a new chapter, stay tuned!

As I departed, I was able to turn over the leadership of UUSC Just Democracy to a gifted and experienced organizer, who had worked with us as a consultant during much of 2008, Dick Mark.  So I was able to move towards Australia knowing that UUSC Just Democracy was in good hands, though with an uncertain funding future…

*

Here are links to other blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration.

 

  1. UUSC Strategic Plan 2006-2010, page 9.
  2. UUSC Strategic Plan 2006-2010, page 14, emphasis added.

Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle And Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit

December, 2017

I began a new journey in May of 2016, tracing two long arcs in my life:

  • Climbing all 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall (1219m), what is called “peak-bagging” by local climbers.  I’m describing, in words and images, the ascent of each of these peaks – mostly done solo, but sometimes with a friend or two;
  • Working in international development during the MDG era: what was it like in the sector as it boomed, and evolved, from the response to the Ethiopian crisis in the mid-1980’s through to the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

So far, I’ve described climbing 27 of those 48 mountains in New Hampshire.  Last time I described some aspects of my time as Executive Director at the UU Service Committee in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  I had moved sectors – from the international development field where I had been working since joining the Peace Corps in 1984, to focus now on human rights advocacy.  I joined UUSC in early 2005.

This shift felt right.  The world had changed – at least on average, for majority populations, basic human  development had advanced substantially in the twenty years I had been overseas.  The challenge for social justice now was to address injustice, inequality, and human rights – and not just overseas!  In fact, in those Bush years, my own country seemed to be on a dangerous, wrong track.  Since the mission of UUSC was to support activism to advance and protect human rights, I made the move!

Last time, I mentioned that one of the challenges of working at UUSC was managing relations with the staff union.  I learned a lot from that experience, so I will write about that here, below.  But first:

*

I climbed Mt Willey, the 28th of New Hampshire’s 48 4000-footers, on the Fourth of July, 2017, driving up from Durham that morning.  My plan was to drive to Crawford Notch, get to the top of Willey, and stay the night at the nearby Dry River Campground.  Then I would get an early start on 5 July 2017, drive across from Crawford Notch to Franconia Notch and down to Lincoln, get a sandwich to-go, and then drive east from Lincoln on the Kancamagus Highway to climb Owl’s Head.  Owl’s Head is one of the longer, and (supposedly) less scenic climbs of the 48 4000-footers, but it’s on the 4000-footer list – I thought getting an early start, by staying overnight at Dry River after climbing Willey, would make the second day of this trip a bit easier.  But things didn’t work out quite the way I had planned!

I had intended to climb Mt Willey the previous year: my very first climb in this new journey was meant to take me up Mt Tom, Mt Field, and Mt Willey, back in May of 2016. Loyal readers will recall that I was unprepared, back in May 2016, for the packed ice I found on the trail once I got up to elevation, and I only made it up Mt Tom and Mt Field.  Who knew that there would be ice that late in the spring?!  In fact, I fell going down from Mt Field, and injured my shoulder, which I would reinjure after climbing South Carter, as I have described.

So Mt Willey had been pending for over a year.

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I left Durham at 8:45am, and made good time up Rt 16, stopping only in Ossipee to grab a sandwich for lunch and a coffee to-go at “Aroma Joe’s.”  Traffic wasn’t too bad for a Fourth of July…. at least not until I arrived at Bartlett, not too far from Crawford Notch State Park: it was 11am, and Rt 302 was closed for a parade!

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Once the parade had finished, I was on my way again, and arrived at the trailhead – the parking lot for historic Willey House – at about 11:45am.  Normally it takes about 2 hours to get from Durham, but this day it took an hour longer than usual due to the parade in Bartlett.

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As I prepared to start walking, changing into my boots and assembling everything into my backpack … I realized that I had forgotten a very important piece of equipment: I didn’t have my backpack.  This was very frustrating, because even if I could improvise and manage to get to the top of Mt Willey, the long Owl’s Head climb I had planned for the next day would certainly not be feasible without carrying equipment and water, etc. Very frustrating indeed.

So I improvised for the day, using a stuff-sack to carry lunch, water, and my first-aid kit, and started the hike, grumbling about my forgetfulness. How could I forget something so important?!  I would think about what to do tomorrow when I got back down…

Still, it was a very pleasant day, mostly sunny and cool, very few insects on the path. And fewer people than I had feared there would be, this being a major holiday.  As I went, my mood lifted and I stopped kicking myself so much. I vowed to prepare a checklist that will prevent this kind of mistake in the future!

Walking up Kedron Flume Trail from Willey House was steadily uphill, crossing the railway line at about 0.4 miles. Just before that I passed an old box culvert.

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From the railway crossing it’s steeply up to Kedron Flume at 1 mile, a picturesque waterfall:

 

 

Soon Kedron Flume joins Ethan Pond Trail, which is part of the famous Appalachian trail here.  I arrived at that junction at about 12:30pm.

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I continued on Ethan Pond Trail, and began to hear the train whistling in the distance down below me.  I think it’s a tourist train these days, so it would be busy on a holiday like today.

About 15 minutes later, at 12:43pm, I arrived at the junction of Willey Range Trail and Ethan Pond Trail, and took Willey Range towards the summit of Mt Willey.  After a short, fairly-flat section, Willey Range Trail becomes rough and steep, with several flights of steep wooden staircases.

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Views across Crawford Notch started appearing as I climbed:

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Mt Webster

 

I stopped for lunch at 1:15pm, at a very beautiful spot, but well short of the summit of Mt Willey. Still going up steeply.  It was a bit surprising how few people I had seen so far, just a handful, on such a major holiday.  And it was becoming even more sunny, so my mood was lifting – it was a beautiful day!

Just before 2pm I passed an outlook, near the top of Mt Willey, with a spectacular view across Crawford Notch. Several peaks I’ve climbed on this journey were clearly visible, as were some I was yet to climb: Mt Webster, Mt Jackson, Mt Pierce, Mt Eisenhower and, in the distance, Mt Washington.  To the east, I thought I could see the Wildcat / Carter Range. I didn’t stay at the outlook for long, because a couple with a young daughter arrived and space was limited.  I took a few pictures:

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I got to the top just after the outlook, just after 2pm – a wooded summit with a cairn but no views.

 

From there I turned around and retraced my steps on this very nice, clear day, taking photos and a few videos as I went. The descent was pleasant, especially when compared with the climb up!

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An “Appalachian Trail” Blaze On The Willey Range Trail

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I arrived back at the junction with the Ethan Pond Trail at 3pm, rejoining the Appalachian Trail. Ten minutes later I reached Kedron Flume Trail, and took a left to return the 1.3 miles to the parking lot.

At 3:25pm I was back at Kedron Flume:

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and I arrived back at the railway crossing at 3:43pm, finishing up the hike at 3:53pm, at Willey House.

It was a very nice walk, marred only by my beating myself up over having forgotten my backpack.  And I could have done with a little longer spell at the outlook at the top, but it was good to give the family with the little girl the opportunity to enjoy that view.  I will have plenty of chances.

I stayed the night of 4 July 2017 at Dry River Campground: it was much posher than Dolly Copp, where I’ve stayed on two earlier overnights in Pinkham Notch as I climbed these 4000-footers:

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Not only was there a platform for my tent, but hot (!) showers and toilets and laundry facilities!  Luxury!  I decided not to attempt Owl’s Head without my backpack – it’s a very long hike, so I thought it would be better to carry more equipment, water, food, etc., in case of unforeseen eventualities.   So I decided I would go up Cannon Mountain, a shorter climb in Franconia Notch, which would be more suitable, shorter, and much more predictable.  And Cannon is still a 4000-footer.

More on my climb of Cannon Mountain to come, the next posting in this series!

*

I enjoyed my time at UUSC.  We worked hard and achieved a lot together during those years, and I learned a lot, about managing a domestic NGO, about campaigning, activism, collective action, and power, and about the social justice landscape in the United States.  I extended my range, my toolbox, from development into human rights and social justice campaigning and activism.  This would serve me well in the coming years, in future roles…

In this blog post I want to describe a little bit about one of the challenges I faced at UUSC: managing relations with the staff bargaining unit.  The difficulty resided, I think, in three areas: our idealistic approach to working with the union, at least at the beginning; my own inexperience in union relations, at least initially; and the tension between the organization’s commitment to economic justice and our (management’s) obligation to manage the agency pragmatically.  Navigating across principle and pragmatism was especially complex when it came to working with our staff union.

*

When I joined UUSC, I felt quite able to lead and manage international nonprofits: I had grown up with the sector, and developed myself professionally as our nonprofit organizations grew and professionalized.  I had served in a wide range of roles (local, country, regional, and international) across the world, working in line management at all those levels, and in staff roles as well.  So when I started as Executive Director in Cambridge, I was able to offer UUSC a useful range of capabilities: general management expertise, especially across cultures, experience developing and implementing programmatic and business systems and procedures, and an empowering leadership style.  That’s really why UUSC had hired me – I could take the organization to the next level, internally, letting Charlie Clements (UUSC’s President and CEO) focus on the external side where he was so gifted.  I was a safe pair of hands, competent in areas where Charlie and the board felt UUSC could use some attention.

And, for my part, it was exciting to play a leading role in an organisation that was pushing back against US-sponsored torture, working to advance the human right to water, responding in partnership with groups particularly harmed by humanitarian disasters (such as Hurricane Katrina) because of their ethnicity, campaigning to stop the atrocities happening in Darfur, advancing a living wage, and pushing to expand labor rights.

But although I had been managing staff for two decades, I did not have much experience working in a unionized environment.  (Yes, there had been a union for the staff in Plan Viet Nam, but that was mostly just a social club, a mockery of the concept of a union.)   This meant that, at least at first, I relied on guidance from Charlie and Maxine Hart (our HR Director), who had been managing relations with the union before I joined.  And when it came time to renegotiate UUSC’s collective-bargaining agreement with the staff union, I would also learn a lot from Phil Schneider, who provided excellent legal support during weeks of tense negotiations.  More on that below!

*

The situation was complicated.  Charlie’s predecessor had not worked out, and the staff union had played a key role in her departure.  While this may have been for the best, it was a dangerous precedent: Bargaining-Unit leadership felt that they had rescued the agency by forcing out a President and CEO.  I think that this led to union leadership sometimes acting as if they, not Charlie, the board of trustees or I, were in charge of UUSC, they were the real stewards of the spirit of the place.

In retrospect, a decision that had been made a year before, with the best intentions, was making things worse.  When Charlie had returned to UUSC as President and CEO, having worked in a program role in the 1980’s, he had established two senior teams:

  • The “Management Team,” comprising Charlie and the Department Directors, plus me once I was on-board.  Chairing of MT meetings was meant to rotate around all members, and meetings were scheduled for the first and third Wednesdays of each month;
  • The “Leadership Team,” which, in addition to the members of the management team, also included the three union shop-stewards.  Charlie chaired LT meetings, which were scheduled for the fourth Wednesday of each month.

Charlie sometimes described the Leadership Team as comprising both the “selected” and “elected” leadership of UUSC.  His intention was positive and generous: since UUSC was dedicated to labor rights, we would “walk the talk” and open things up to the union, being inclusive and transparent.

But after attending a few meetings of each team, it felt like things weren’t working out as we had hoped.  Bargaining Unit representatives on the LT almost never proposed agenda items for discussion, instead seeming to prefer to be reactive and passive.  It really felt like LT meetings were just being used by Union members to monitor UUSC’s management.  Since they viewed themselves as the real “stewards” of the place, having ousted Charlie’s predecessor, they were going to keep a careful eye on us.

To address this, I prepared “charters” for each group, trying to clarify accountabilities; here is a version of the charters from October of 2006: Team Charters – 25 October 2006.

Looking at the charters today, over ten years later, they seem quite clear: the Management Team managed the organization:

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while the Leadership Team provided a space for problem-solving, reflection, and input:

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But it wasn’t working out that way – Bargaining Unit members on the Leadership Team weren’t providing input, they were just gathering information about management.  As this dynamic continued, I began to feel that we (management) had created a monster.

And members of the Management Team were becoming conflict averse, as tensions grew over time.

*

Some examples:

  • A particular staff member in one Department was not performing.  I worked with the Director of that Department to devise a progressive-discipline process – this was something that I knew a lot about, from my time with Plan International.  Plan had very well-developed processes for staff management and development, which we had pilot tested back when I was a junior staff member in Tuluá, Colombia.  My experience was that, if we provided clear feedback and, when the time came, agreed a plan of corrective action, the under-performing staff member would probably improve.  If not, most of the time, when the time came, the staff member would recognize that he or she needed to move on and the separation would be relatively smooth and uncontested.

In this case, however, the Department Director really did not want to work through progressive discipline, was very averse to taking that kind of action, having lived through the departure of the previous CEO and seeing the power of the staff union.  The Director even suggested on several occasions that, since I had experience, I should take over management of that particular staff member and manage the disciplinary process myself!  But I felt that managing staff performance was a skill that all Directors needed to build, so I kept coaching the Director.

(UUSC had become very conflict averse.  In fact, the only example of a formal warning being given to anybody, ever, at UUSC that anybody could recall was when I had forced one to be given quite early in my tenure.  I had decided to get a feel for how things were being managed by reviewing all staff expense reports, something that I planned to drop once I felt comfortable with the levels of control being exercised.  But I soon saw a troubling example, where a staff member had used a UUSC credit card to pay for personal travel.  The employee’s Director, who had not discovered the situation, accepted the staff-member’s explanation that the whole situation was a mistake.  “So do I,” I told the Director, “that’s why we won’t dismiss them!  But we must provide written warning, and you should do it, not me.”  The warning was given, but grudgingly, because of how unprecedented this kind of action was.  Later, this employee would angrily vow that they would have me dismissed, in a very public area of our office, apologizing after I confronted them about that particular threat.  Clearly staff felt that they really ran the place!)

But things weren’t getting any better with this particular situation, with this underperforming staff member.  The Department Director was deeply resistant to taking formal action, or even putting a plan of corrective action in place.  And the employee was going from under-performing to not performing at all.  In a sense, I couldn’t blame the employee, because we (management) were not taking any action even though it was clear that things weren’t going well.  Probably we put the employee under a lot of unnecessary stress by prolonging the ambiguous situation.

I met with the external union representative (“business agent”) fairly regularly.  She was smart and pragmatic, and I think we had a good relationship.  One time she brought up the employee that we were having such trouble with, and told me, confidentially, that if we fired them the union wouldn’t take any action.

But we wanted to follow progressive-discipline procedures that I had put in place, were unwilling to be seen as being unfair by simply firing the employee (even though the Union was in agreement with that!) and so it was a muddle.  By the time I left UUSC to start up UUSC Just Democracy, the staff member was still in place, still underperforming;

  • I dismissed a “confidential” staff member for sharing sensitive and confidential salary information with the union during contract negotiations.  The staff member, whose position was not eligible to be part of the bargaining unit, admitted having given union leaders that information, despite clearly understanding that it was forbidden.  And the employee refused to provide assurances that this wouldn’t happen again.

I looked to see if there might be a position for the person in the near future that would be inside the bargaining unit, thus being able to stay as an employee, but there no suitable vacancies foreseen.  So, after giving them a second opportunity to commit to not sharing confidential information outside management, and hearing (again) a refusal, I dismissed the employee.

The organization exploded with anger and righteous indignation.  How dare I fire this person!  Believe it or not, staff began wearing black armbands and putting up protest banners.  The reaction was beyond what we had expected, what I had expected.

(I think that the cause of the extreme reaction was that the staff was completely unused to management taking that kind of strong action and, to make matters worse, I hadn’t consulted with the bargaining unit; which never occurred to me, remember, this employee was not a member of the union!)

In the end, we agreed to mediate the situation, and (of course, since I had worked closely with legal counsel all along) UUSC prevailed on the terms we had offered the staff member initially.  But, as I have described elsewhere, the very fact that we took this extra step, and sought external mediation, entirely defused the internal situation.  In other words, the internal atmosphere inside UUSC immediately and significantly improved right after the mediation!

Years later, I became fascinated with how much things improved after the mediation.  After all, management prevailed, and the employee I had dismissed was not reinstated (as had been demanded).  I would write a paper on this as part of my pursuit of a masters degree in dispute resolution at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia.

As I concluded in that paper, I think that the fact that management took this extra step, using a “neutral,” demonstrated the “justice” of our actions.  If we had realized that at the time, perhaps we could have pushed through into a new era of management-union relations.  Who knows?

  • Finally, contract negotiations!  Bargaining Unit contracts, at least in UUSC in those days, lasted three years, and then the two sides would renegotiate another three years.  Those who had been around for previous renegotiations often spoke about them with a deep degree of “gallows humor,” as if they were deeply traumatized.  “Just wait,” people would warn me.

This time, in 2006, it would be my turn.  My partners were Maxine Hart, our HR Director, and Phil Schneider, a veteran of many similar negotiations, both with UUSC and beyond. This was his field, and he was very good at it.

Nonetheless, it was every bit as unpleasant as I had been warned.  By then, the external “business agent” from the union had changed, and the new representative was much less straightforward then the previous one.  And our counterparts on staff, the UUSC bargaining-unit negotiating team, behaved appallingly – openly hostile, petulant, and unreasonable from the very beginning right to the end, in August 2006, when we agreed a three-year contract.

*

Why was this happening?  What was going on?  Was it just that management was simply not doing its job?

Several times in this blog series I’ve reflected on the complexities of culture inside NGOs. The idealistic nature of our missions, and the passion of our people, leads to great motivation and commitment, but also, often, to overly emotional internal dynamics.  We strongly associate our own self-images with our work, which is dangerous!

And it can be easy to be trapped by the realities of managing an organization in the real world when you’ve committed to noble ideals.

This was happening to us at UUSC, in a big way.  Our commitment to economic justice was real, and honest, but it got in the way when we had to take strong action inside the organization.  It made us too careful about taking actions that should have been uncontroversial – like giving that staff member a warning, or dismissing an employee that was leaking confidential information.

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And at an even higher level, our “mission” statement seemed to empower our staff to “confront unjust power structures” (management?!) on anything they judged to be “oppressive”:

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The creation of the Strategic Plan, as I described last time, was quite good and in general the result was solid.  But there was one statement that further complicated management’s relations with the UUSC union.  In the section on “Organizational Development Goals and Strategies,” we made a commitment that:

“UUSC will create a work environment in which all staff can develop professionally, progress in their careers, and maximize their contributions to achieving the mission of the organization.  Central to achieving this goal will be building upon the constructive and productive working relationship between the bargaining unit (UNITE HERE!, Human Rights Local 2661) and management…

… We will review our internal work processes to ensure that they are as inclusive and participatory as possible – for example, decentralizing decision-making wherever possible and prudent, carrying out continuous improvement efforts led by staff involved in work processes, etc.  A component of this review will include a periodic power analysis.”

This was good, and proper – except perhaps for that last reference to “a periodic power analysis” – not sure about that one!  But it added to the challenge of navigating between principle and pragmatism.

*

UUSC’s bargaining unit had succeeded in dismissing the previous CEO, and this led to roles becoming confused and to management being too cautious.  For good, idealistic reasons, we had established internal mechanisms by which management shared power with the union, further confusing roles and raising tension.  And we were perhaps somewhat “boxed-in” by our noble programmatic commitment to economic justice, to labor organizing and activism against “oppression.”

We had created a monster, and our desire not to appear hypocritical about economic justice was blocking action to clarify roles internally.  We were trapped between principle and pragmatism.

*

In the years since leaving UUSC, I’ve thought about what I would do differently, looking back.  Would I navigate the terrain between principle and pragmatism any differently?

For me, today, it boils down to being clearer and tougher, and deepening self-awareness and non-attachment.  Because there is no contradiction between being clear and firm about roles, being fair but strict about adherence to procedures and performance, and the ideals of a nonprofit organization dedicated to social justice.  

  • In the first instance, above, I should simply instructed the Department Director to correct, or dismiss, the under-performing employee.  If, despite coaching, the Director couldn’t do this, I should have resorted to progressive discipline with the Director also!  And I certainly should have taken the opportunity given to me by the union “business agent” to dismiss that employee;
  • In the case of credit-card abuse, I was absolutely right to force the Department Director to issue a formal warning.  And when the employee threatened me I should have issued a second warning;
  • When staff started wearing black arm-bands after I dismissed the confidential employee, I was right to push forward towards mediation;
  • And when the union team behaved inappropriately, I should have suspended contract negotiations.

In future situations, these reflections would serve me well.  I would be clearer and tougher, while still acting from foundational principles of social justice internally.

That’s easy to say, but hard to do.  So perhaps the most valuable outcome of my years of working with UUSC’s Bargaining Unit is that I have taken the time to build my competencies in two key areas, include two very useful tools in my personal toolbox that, for me, are key to navigating principle and pragmatism.

  • Firstly, as I mentioned above, I’ve taken the time to pursue advanced studies of dispute resolution.  This has given me a range of capabilities to manage conflict, tools that would have enabled me to deal constructively with the tensions that rose in key moments as I worked with UUSC’s Union, and move past those challenges to deal with the issues at hand.
  • Secondly, navigating principle and pragmatism in the kinds of situations I’ve described here often brings intense emotional flooding and threats to self image.  Even using the tools of dispute resolution and conflict management, it’s not always possible to manage these kinds of situations successfully because of the physiological reality that comes from the cognitive dissonance between principle and pragmatism inside NGOs like UUSC.

But the chances of success, for me, are improved dramatically as I deepen my sense of humility and self-awareness, of mindfullness and equanimity, of engaged non-attachment.  So I recommitted myself to my practice of meditation, the best way I know to build those particular skills and characteristics.

To repeat for emphasis, my biggest lesson learned from those years of working with the UUSC Bargaining Unit was that there is no inherent, inevitable contradiction between being clear and firm about roles, being fair but strict about adherence to procedures and performance, and the ideals of a nonprofit organization dedicated to social justice.  

And, for me, the way to successfully navigate the terrain between principle and pragmatism is to learn how to manage conflict while developing a deep sense of humility and self-awareness, mindfulness and equanimity, and engaged non-attachment.

*

Last time I described in some detail how we had developed UUSC’s Strategic Plan.  One of the commitments we made there was that we would “research the feasibility and usefulness of establishing a UUSC-related 501(c)4 structure.”  In 2007, we decided to set up what became “UUSC Just Democracy,” allowing UUSC to expand our focus on social justice and human rights more into the political realm.

And, in 2008, I would move to head up “UUSC Just Democracy,” and spend the next year working mostly in New Hampshire as a pilot test of how we could influence the federal election process in favor of our priorities: ending the war in Iraq, and stopping climate change.

More on that next time!

*

Here are links to other blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration.

 

 

 

South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study

July, 2017

I began a new journey in May of last year (2016), tracing two long arcs in my life:

  • Climbing all 48 mountains in New Hampshire that are at least 4000 feet tall (1219m), what is called “peak-bagging” by local climbers.  I’m describing, in words and images, the ascent of each of these peaks – mostly done solo, but sometimes with a friend or two;
  • Working in international development during the MDG era: what was it like in the sector as it boomed, and evolved, from the response to the Ethiopian crisis in the mid-1980’s through to the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

In this article, I move into another phase of my journey – working with CCF as a consultant for two years, helping that organization develop, pilot test, and begin to implement a new program approach for their global operations.  It was a very creative and exciting time for me, and (I think) for that organization, and it very much builds on the reflecting I’d been doing about how the development sector had changed.  It’s worth telling the story.

But first, let me describe my climb of South Carter, and the disaster that struck after that climb was over: an injury that would just about put an end to my hiking adventures for the rest of 2016.

*

I had reached the top of Middle Carter at noon on 13 September, 2016.  After a quick lunch, I continued south towards the top of South Carter (4430ft, 1350m).

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Here is a view looking back at Middle Carter, taken at about 12:30pm:

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What a beautiful day it was.  Here are some views towards the east and south as I hiked away from Middle Carter:

 

 

Approaching South Carter, I had a fine view back towards the Wildcat Range, where I had hiked the day before.  Here Carter Dome (as yet, unclimbed at this time) is on the left, with Wildcat Mountain (which I had climbed the day before) on the right, with Carter Notch in between:

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Carter Dome On The Left, Wildcat “A” On The Right

 

Views to the east, towards the ocean, were also fantastic.  Here the Atlantic is clearly visible on the horizon:

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No insects, clear blue sky, heaven!

I retraced my steps from the top of South Carter, arriving back at the junction of Carter-Moriah and North Carter at 1:25pm.

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Descending from the Carter Ridge on North Carter, I reached the Imp Trail at a little after 2pm.

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This time I took the southern branch of Imp Trail, reaching the road (NH 16) at 3:45pm.  The Imp Trail reaches NH 16 slightly south of where it leaves from, so there was a brief road-walk to get back to the car, which was still there, eight hours later!

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My two days climbing four of the six 4000-footers in the Carter Range were spectacular – dry and clear, no insects, and few other hikers.  Two great days in the White Mountains, with a pleasant evening camping nearby.

*

Then I drove home back to Durham.  Since I had camped at Dolly Copp Campground the night before going up Middle and South Carters, when I got home my groundcloth and tent needed cleaning before putting them away.  So, the next day, I took them out the back of our second-floor unit, and went down the metal circular staircase, in my socks.  My plan was to clean up both the groundcloth and the tent, and then leave them out to dry in the sun.

But as I started down the metal spiral stairway, with the damp groundcloth in one hand, the tent in the other, wearing socks, I slipped and fell.  As my feet came out from under me, I landed with all my weight directly on the edge of a metal stair, hitting (and breaking) a left rib.  I then slid down the rest of the stairway, trying to arrest my fall by hanging on with my left arm.

(Readers may recall that I had hurt my left shoulder on the very first hike in this series, when I climbed Mt Tom and Mt Field.  There was ice on the trail descending from Mt Field, and I had slipped on steep ice, going down, and grabbed onto a small tree with my left arm, twisting and wrenching it up and behind me as I arrested the fall, my full weight, with my left arm.  That had seriously injured the rotator cuff on my left shoulder.)

On the stairway, this time, I severely re-injured that shoulder, tearing my left rotator-cuff.  And breaking a rib.  Ouch!

These injuries put me out of circulation for some time, so I wasn’t able to hike again until I went up Mt Tecumseh, in late October.  (It was hard enough just getting out of bed, for a few days at least!)  I probably shouldn’t have climbed Mt Tecumseh, but I got away with it… Several months of physical therapy followed over the winter of 2016/2017.

*

I returned from Viet Nam in October of 2002, and (as I mentioned last time) I had made a connection with Daniel Wordsworth just before leaving Hanoi when, out of nowhere, he had sent me an email.  It turned out that he had been the CCF Australia Country Director in Viet Nam during my first two years there, but I don’t think I had ever met him there: I think he worked at night and slept during the day, actually.

(Much later I would find out how the connection was made.  Daniel’s CEO colleague in Sydney, Jane Edge, had visited Hanoi when I worked there, and made an appointment to meet with me.  Just networking, I think, but it turned out that she had read one of the articles I had published during my sabbatical year – perhaps the only person I’ve ever met who had read that piece – which was a bit mind-blowing.  Later, I think she suggested that Daniel contact me…)

Daniel Wordsworth

Daniel Wordsworth in 2003

Daniel was the Program Development Director at CCF’s headquarters in Richmond, Virginia.  More about Daniel in my next blog.

He worked for Michelle Poulton, who was CCF’s Vice President for Program; I knew Michelle from my time at Plan’s International Headquarters – our positions were equivalent – but hadn’t stayed in touch after that.  I had admired Michelle’s obvious intelligence, experience, passion, and courage.

Michelle and Daniel were engaged in a fundamental reconsideration of how CCF approached its programming, aimed at realizing the agency’s strategic goal of being a “leader for children.”  John Schultz, CCF’s President, articulated the motivation quite well, with impressive humility and candor:

As a worldwide organization that has been lifting children and their families from the grip of poverty for over 65 years, Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) understands well the difficulty of our task. Not all of our approaches have worked and some have become outmoded over the years. Education alone is certainly not the guaranteed route out of poverty and deprivation we once thought. Anti-poverty programs of all types have had mixed success.

As a learning organization that has changed enormously and adapted to new situations and new locations, CCF is always seeking out ways to do what we do better. We know that breaking the cycle of multi-generational poverty-making a truly long-lasting difference in a young person’s life — is a tall order. There are no set recipes. It is always good to reflect on our goals, our methods, and our rates of success in accomplishing our mission.

We arranged to talk by phone before I left Hanoi, and Daniel asked if I knew anybody who could help CCF create a “program practices guide” that would describe their new approach, which would have to be created.

It sounded like a perfect next step for me.  I had been thinking a lot about how things had changed in the development sector, and the idea of spending some time helping an agency think through how they could have the most impact was very appealing.  Jean and I left Hanoi in early October, 2002, and a week later I flew from Boston to Richmond to spend a couple of days talking with Daniel and Michelle and John Schultz, CCF’s president, about the assignment.  We quickly agreed that I would help out as an external advisor, working directly with Daniel to define, pilot test, and document CCF’s new program approach.

*

While I was in Richmond, I asked Michelle if I could meet with John Schultz.  I had learned from my time with Plan International that the kinds of changes she and Daniel were contemplating would need support from the top if they were to be successful.  So, one afternoon, I walked down to John’s office – it said a lot for Michelle and Daniel that they let me have that meeting by myself!

John and I had a good conversation.  It was clear that he was fully behind the changes that were being discussed; but two comments he made struck me in particular.  First, when I asked him about the degree of support for the programmatic changes that were coming, he said that “everybody supports the changes, but nobody understands them.”  That was a very perceptive and interesting remark, indicating that we would have to build consensus carefully, because once the nature of the shifts became apparent, support might evaporate.  Or, alternatively, just push the changes through…

He also took care to describe CCF as a “faith-based” organization.  That comment made me sit up and take notice!

This was 2003, and the US Administration, under President George W Bush, had placed great emphasis on working through “faith-based organizations.”  There was a White-House office tasked with increasing governmental partnerships, and grants were flowing to these agencies.  John Schultz himself was a retired Christian minister, and (after all) the agency he headed was called “Christian Children’s Fund.”  So I took his comments seriously.

But this was a problem for me.  I had witnessed the toxic combination of development assistance and religion in the past.  For example, I had seen people leaving evangelical Christian services in Colombia being given sacks of cement by the international NGO that was sponsoring the services.  And I had seen that same INGO proudly display its “transformational development indicators” in Uganda and in Viet Nam: in (predominantly) Christian Uganda, several indicators related to Christian conversion were included, but in (predominantly) non-religious Viet Nam, those indicators were nowhere to be seen in the agency’s literature.  This seemed wrong to me.

So when I was finished with my (otherwise very positive) conversation with John Schultz, I returned to debrief with Daniel and Michelle.  When I told them what John had said about CCF being “faith-based,” and shared my misgivings, Michelle said: “If that’s true, we’re both quitting!”  Then she went to speak with John Schultz!

Of course, what John meant was that CCF’s work had originally flowed from the values of compassion and solidarity of early-20th-century American Christianity, but that no religious content was, or would ever would be, included in the organization’s program work.

Well OK, then!

*

Some months before, CCF had completed a new strategic plan that articulated an overall aim of becoming a “Leader For Children.”  Michelle and Daniel had asked Alan Fowler to carry out an overall “Organizational Capacity Assessment” (the “OCA”), focused on positioning CCF to increase grant funding from technical donors.

I will describe a bit more about the OCA, below.  An action plan had emerged from the OCA, and the first goal of the action plan led directly to the CCF Poverty Study, which will also be described below:

  • Goal 1: CCF will work from a more comprehensive understanding of poverty, and its impact on children, and will seek to integrate itself within the global movement against poverty.

My own assignment was to support work on the second goal:

  • Goal 2: CCF program practices will be guided by a more refined development approach that mitigates both the cause and effect of child and community ill-being through holistic and sustainable intervention strategies.

Next time, I will describe the research that I carried out as we developed what became known as “Bright Futures.”  This time, I want to describe the OCA, and the CCF Poverty Study, two efforts that produced important inputs for what became “Bright Futures.”  These projects were clear evidence that Michelle and Daniel, and John Schultz, were very serious about transforming CCF into a world-class evidence-based development organization: they were questioning almost everything, in an honest and open spirit of discovery.  Exciting stuff.

*

The Organizational Capacity Assessment – “OCA”

Michelle had asked Alan Fowler to review CCF’s capacity to reach a major strategic goal: increasing private funding by 50%, and growing technical grants by a whopping 800%.  Alan was, and is, one of our sector’s “respected elders” – people who have thought and written deeply about our work.

Along the way, I had read several of Alan’s books, and many of the papers he produced.  (I had never met Alan, though had briefly collaborated with his wife, Wendy Crane, when she was with Plan International: as I arrived at Plan’s headquarters in 1993, a new strategic plan was being finalized, and it was my responsibility to finalize the plan.  Wendy had been on the taskforce developing the plan, so we worked together to finish it up and present the draft to Plan’s senior management and board.)

If CCF wanted to have an unvarnished assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, Alan was the perfect choice.

Data for Alan’s draft “OCA” report, dated April, 2002 (a few months before I arrived on the scene) was gathered through in-depth case studies, a survey, and focus group discussions.  He began with an appreciation of what CCF was already doing:

A major finding is that CCF’s distinct model of parent-driven and managed development using directly remitted sponsor funds has the potential to place it in a good position to raise funds from professional grant makers – predominantly the official aid system.

CCF’s approach produces what parents want for their children. It creates local community capacity, albeit within the narrow confines of managing CCF inputs. It fosters community ownership of change. It is sensitive to local and culturally appropriate forms of organising and oversight. It has helped bridged cleavages within communities and kept at bay political and external interference. And, it has helped women make significant gains in terms of position, voice and capabilities. These assets are some of CCF’s best-kept secrets.

But Alan had some significant suggestions, many of which led directly into the Poverty Study, and also into what became Bright Futures.  For example, the following observation was an important element in the organization’s decision to study how children and youth actually experience poverty:

However, there are important weaknesses in the CCF development model. It is insufficiently holistic and lacks a cause-based analysis of child poverty, vulnerability and deprivation. Consequently, symptoms receive more attention than causes.

As will be seen next time, Bright Futures would emphasize building the capacity of local partners to interact with, and influence, government service provision, in favor of people living in poverty.  The OCA pointed out the importance of building this into the new approach:

Attention needs to be given to policy and practical reform and strengthening in the CCF community development methodology. The policy parameters for CCF assistance require adjustment to deal with the problem of ‘development ceilings’. This does not automatically imply that CCF should gather every conceivable development competence in house. Rather, it implies building the capacity to relate and link communities to others. Of particular importance is capitalising on the decentralisation thrust in government reform and service delivery, with communities as legitimate claimants with rights, not supplicants.

Associated with this type of review, is developing a capability to build the capacities of local organisations and associations beyond the confines and requirements of managing CCF and community inputs. In other words, that the principle of community engagement is one of organisational development, not project management.

These findings would provide important underpinnings to what became “Bright Futures.”  Alan had identified with great clarity many of the ways that CCF’s program approach was falling short; it would be for Daniel and me to propose the remedy.

But first, Jo Boyden and her colleagues were busy interviewing children in five countries, trying to understand how they experienced poverty.  The resulting “Poverty Study” would be fundamental to the design of “Bright Futures.”

*

The CCF Poverty Study

Consistent with the first goal that emerged as CCF considered Alan’s recommendations in the OCA, Jo Boyden was asked to carry out a ground-breaking effort to understand how children actually experience poverty.

A few years earlier, the World Bank had commissioned a landmark study of the lived experience of poverty, interviewing over 20,000 men and women across the globe.  The document that emerged, “Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change,” had a powerful effect on work in our sector.  (I’ve mentioned the work of one of the study’s authors, Robert Chambers, in an earlier posting, and I will return to highlight an impressive talk he gave many years later, at a conference I attended in Canberra.)

That the World Bank, such an enormous organisation with such an uneven record of impact, would take the time to listen to so many people living in poverty was, itself, impressive.  Even if the document’s findings didn’t seem to have much impact on many projects, particularly larger, infrastructure-focused efforts, it was easy to see the powerful effect it had on the wider policies and commitments of the Bank.

The findings from “Voices of the Poor” were organised around ten themes:

  • Livelihoods and assets are precarious, seasonal and inadequate.
  • Places of the poor are isolated, risky, unserviced and stigmatized.
  • The body is hungry, exhausted, sick and poor in appearance.
  • Gender relations are troubled and unequal.
  • Social relations are discriminating and isolating.
  • Security is lacking in the sense of both protection and peace of mind.
  • Behaviors of those more powerful are marked by disregard and abuse.
  • Institutions are disempowering and excluding.
  • Organizations of the poor are weak and disconnected.
  • Capabilities are weak because of the lack of information, education, skills and confidence.

This was important stuff, and I really liked that the authors had recognised that poverty, for those who experienced it, was more than deprivation.  Much more.

I still highly recommend “Voices of the Poor” – for me, it’s become one of the seminal, foundational texts for our sector.  But Daniel and Michelle recognised that the Bank study was incomplete in one important way, especially for a child-focused agency like CCF: it didn’t look at poverty from the perspective of children and youth!

As CCF sought to reformulate its program approach, this was a gap that needed filling.  And, importantly, it was an opportunity for the organisation to contribute fundamental research to the sector, and to thereby raise its fairly-low profile.

CCF had asked Jo Boyden to carry out the ambitious project that would fill this important gap.  Jo was a well-respected professional, with a strong background in participatory methods with children and youth, then working at Queen Elizabeth House at Oxford University.  Daniel and Michelle formed a steering committee, including Alan Fowler and, later, me, among others.

Jo and her team would produce three reports: firstly, they produced an extensive review of contemporary literature and thought related to child poverty, included here CHILDRENANDPOVERTY1 – COPY.  There were ten main findings, which I copy here from the report’s executive summary:

  1. Assumptions and Cultural Bias.  The literature of child poverty is based on demarcations of children and childhood drawn from Western cultures, and promotes certain conceptualizations of child and family relationships as the ‘goal’ of alleviation strategies, while vilifying others as the ‘cause’.
  2. Inaccurate Measurement, Irrelevant Indicators.  The literature is overly dependent on the statistical, quantifiable dimensions of child poverty, and organizes its knowledge around adult and institutional requirements rather than real situations. This has meant that the terminology, indicators and resulting interventions are often irrelevant to children’s lives in many ways.
  3. Overly-Simplistic Macro-Micro Linkages.  Not enough attention is given to how features in the macro environment — such as economic policy, political governance and conflict — translate into impacts on children. This partly because child poverty studies tend to adopt a ‘snapshot’ approach, making it difficult to assess the longitudinal effects and linkages to larger macro frameworks.
  4. Stigma and Discrimination.  The understanding of how child poverty is regarded by and responded to within the community is poor, and myopics, exclusively targeted interventions may themselves encourage or create further discrimination, as is the case with disabled children. There too little focus on how institutionalized systems of exclusion (e.g. caste and ethnicity) interact with the economic poverty of the family.
  5. The Narrowness of Health.  Health is a prime indicator of child poverty, but in the literature it is largely confined to considerations of mortality, excluding the mental health issues and other less visible concerns of older children. Local understandings and practices of healthcare are ignored, as are the views of the children themselves.
  6. The Reification of School-based Education.  Literacy and schooling are consistently held up as the universal keys to breaking the cycle of poverty in the literature, despite increasing evidence from many countries that education may be contextually useless or damaging, particularly for girls. The benefits are far from automatic, and are rarely available to all.
  7. The Myths of Child Labor.  Culturally biased notions of childhood as ideally ‘work-free’ have vilified the labor contribution of children and over-determined the causal link between work and poverty. There is evidence that in many cases employment can actually be more beneficial to the child than schooling, and may be entered into willingly without parental pressure.
  8. Overstating Vulnerability.  The creation of categories of ‘especially vulnerable children’ such as street children, AIDS orphans and child sex workers has led to disproportionate attention at the expense of other children suffering similar but less visible threats to their protection. It also appears that the vulnerability of such groups is in many cases overstated or misplaced, and being singled out in such a way may unintentionally further their stigmatization.
  9. Ignoring Child Agency.  The literature is very reluctant to accord any social or economic agency to children, despite increasing evidence of children taking control over their own lives at significant stages, and developing strategic capacities for coping that were once thought beyond them. 
  10. Understanding Poverty and Protection.  There is little recognition of child poverty as a protection issue, despite significant reports into child prostitution and trafficking. If at all, these threats to the protection of children are nearly always considered as originating from outside the home, and very little information is available on how poverty affects levels of domestic violence, family dynamics or alcoholism, for example. Some simply see these issues as pertaining to crime and lawlessness, and therefore outside their ‘development’ mandate.

For me, these were powerful findings, dramatically illuminating the biases and blind-spots that were common in our sector.  It was particularly challenging, to me, to read the critique of how we were overemphasising formal education, and demonising child labor, without considering the real impacts of each.

Parallel with the literature review, Jo’s team was engaged in semi-structured and focus-group discussions with children in five countries: Belarus, Bolivia, India, Kenya, and Sierra Leone.  Her report is included here: CHILDRENANDPOVERTY2 – COPY.

This was the most important output of the CCF Poverty Study: actually listening to children, across five continents, hearing them describe their lived experience of poverty, in their own words.  For example:

  • A 16-year-old girl in Kenyas said: “I feel bad. I feel like the odd one out…You lack self-esteem. You feel like you shouldn’t talk wherever you are, like you shouldn’t be expressing your ideas. You feel lonely. You feel ashamed. Like if you have only two underpants and you have to wear one and wash the other and hang it up to dry everyone will always see that you have only two – the red one and the green one – and you are alternating between them.”
  • A young woman in Sierra Leone said: “You have to be humble to the aunt and uncle and show them respect. You must not be proud. Because you don’t have a mother, you don’t have a father so you have no other choice but to be humble. If you do good things you never get praised – they always shout on you and put you down.”
  • A 30-year-old woman in Bolivia said: “There’s no justice. For them (urban population) there’s justice, there’s law, while here there’s nothing, we die and that’s it. Quietly we disappear…that’s how it is.”
  • A 9-year-old girl in India said: “It does not look good when Patlia children say on our face that ‘you are Harijan and we do not eat the food served to you’. I do not feel good when they do not eat in the school. It hurts me.”
  • A young girl in Belarus said: “Poverty means unequal relationships with others. If you are poor you suffer from stigma. Others look at you in a certain way like you’re worthless. Feeling unimportant: ‘No one will listen to me, no one cares for me’. ‘You don’t count’. ‘I’m poor, I don’t count, I’m a piece of dirt.’”
  • A 12-year-old boy in India said: “Of course I want more money because ultimately, food is the ultimate thing you want in life, you know there’s lots of problems we don’t have enough money to get food, for ourselves so we would…we have only two goats and two cows and we have little land, and that’s what we do.”

In summary, the CCF Poverty Study found that children understand poverty as a deeply physical, emotional and social experience.  This experience is felt acutely and minutely from an early age.  And, for them, poverty is more about experience than about resources.

The final output from Jo’s team was a summary document that sought to integrate the literature review with the voices of children: CHILDRENANDPOVERTY3 – COPY.

*

Early in 2003, the Poverty Study Steering Committee met in London to try to make sense of it all.  I felt fortunate that, by then, I was a member of the Committee.  Our aim was to formulate a poverty framework, using what we were hearing from children about their lived experience, that could be used by CCF staff as a key input for program design.

Those three days in London were fantastic – collaborative, creative and mutual team-work that produced a framework that would stand the test of time for CCF.  We agreed that:

  • For children, poverty is a deeply relational and relative, dynamic, and multi-dimensional experience.
  • Poor children are deprived of essential material conditions and services; they are excluded on the basis of their age, gender, class, caste, etc.; and they are vulnerable to the increasing array of threats in their environments.

We came to call this the “DEV” framework: like adults, children and youth experience poverty as Deprivation – the typical “lack” of basic needs.  But, from a surprisingly early age, children living in poverty also feel Excluded from their communities, and Vulnerable to risks and threats around them.

The Poverty Study was very valuable in encouraging CCF staff to recognise that poverty, for children was much more than a “lack” of basic needs.  This way of thinking about child poverty, from the lived experience of children themselves, would be a fundamental foundation for Bright Futures.

*

The OCA and the CCF Poverty Study were very impressive examples of rigorous, evidence-based research.  But, in a very real sense, they were just studies, on paper.  The next, and most important step, would be to integrate insights from these studies into what CCF actually did, on the ground, in poor communities.

It would be up to Daniel and me to create, test, and document CCF’s new program approach, Bright Futures.

I’ll begin to describe how we did that, next time.

*

Here are links to other blogs in this series.  Eventually there will be 48 articles, each one about climbing one of New Hampshire’s 4000-footers, and also reflecting on a career in international development:

  1. Mt Tom (1) – A New Journey;
  2. Mt Field (2) – Potable Water in Ecuador;
  3. Mt Moosilauke (3) – A Water System for San Rafael (part 1);
  4. Mt Flume (4) – A Windmill for San Rafael (part 2);
  5. Mt Liberty (5) – Onward to Colombia, Plan International in Tuluá;
  6. Mt Osceola (6) – Three Years in Tuluá;
  7. East Osceola (7) – Potable Water for Cienegueta;
  8. Mt Passaconaway (8) – The South America Regional Office;
  9. Mt Whiteface (9) – Empowerment!;
  10. North Tripyramid (10) – Total Quality Management for Plan International;
  11. Middle Tripyramid (11) – To International Headquarters!;
  12. North Kinsman (12) – Fighting Fragmentation and Building Unity: New Program Goals and Principles for Plan International;
  13. South Kinsman (13) – A Growth Plan for Plan International;
  14. Mt Carrigain (14) – Restructuring Plan International;
  15. Mt Eisenhower (15) – A Guest Blog: Max van der Schalk Reflects on 5 Years at Plan’s International Headquarters;
  16. Mt Pierce (16) – Four Years At Plan’s International Headquarters;
  17. Mt Hancock (17) – Hanoi, 1998;
  18. South Hancock (18) – Plan’s Team in Viet Nam (1998-2002);
  19. Wildcat “D” Peak (19) – Plan’s Work in Viet Nam;
  20. Wildcat Mountain (20) – The Large Grants Implementation Unit in Viet Nam;
  21. Middle Carter (21) – Things Had Changed;
  22. South Carter (22) – CCF’s Organizational Capacity Assessment and Child Poverty Study;
  23. Mt Tecumseh (23) – Researching CCF’s New Program Approach;
  24. Mt Jackson (24) – The Bright Futures Program Approach;
  25. Mt Isolation (25) – Pilot Testing Bright Futures;
  26. Mt Lincoln (26) – Change, Strategy and Culture: Bright Futures 101;
  27. Mt Lafayette (27) – Collective Action for Human Rights;
  28. Mt Willey (28) – Navigating Principle and Pragmatism, Working With UUSC’s Bargaining Unit;
  29. Cannon Mountain (29) – UUSC Just Democracy;
  30. Carter Dome (30) – A (Failed) Merger In the INGO Sector (1997);
  31. Galehead Mountain (31) – What We Think About When We Think About A Great INGO Program;
  32. Mt Garfield (32) – Building Strong INGO Teams: Clarity, Trust, Inspiration.